In one case, the contesting powers are even prepared to subject their common problem to third party adjudication. Malaysia and Indonesia have agreed to go the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to determine the ownership of two islands in the South China Sea. Because of the general conviction that China, as a responsible maritime power, it would be prepared to embrace the CBMs process and that it would be willing to play by the accepted rules of the game in international relations.
The CBM process in the South China Sea is geared at providing China with some flexibiiity in dealing with the countries in the region. The ARF, CSCAP, INCSEA, or ASEAN sponsored CBM initiatives are primarily intended to give China an important role in the geo-political process of promoting peace and stability in the region. These cooperative security mechanisms are intended to strongly hook China to the international mainstream and to get China to be "on board". Evidently, these mechanisms have failed to restrain China from asserting its activities. The lack of effectiveness of these mechanisms in moderating China's assertiveness in the South China Sea is one real concern of many in the region. The alternative to engaging China is return to power politics. No one in their right mind wants to return to the days of the cold war where power politics reigned. It is understood by some in the region that the pursuit for multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms could serve as building blocks towards the development of a more permanent and broader region-wide cooperative security architecture in Asia Pacific.
At the outset there are three obstacles to effective multilateral security cooperation in the Spratlys. Firstly, China's resistance to embrace fully multilateral approaches in the South China Sea. Secondly, the reluctance on the part of those countries which have deployed forces on the islands to withdraw them. The third obstacle for effective multilateralism is the reluctance on the part of China to recognise rights of other countries to undertake joint development projects in areas claimed by China, e. g., off the Paracels. Thus far China has vaguely indicated its willingness to jointly develop areas where China's presence is weakest as in the Spratlys. This has led to this analyst to complain that China only give lip service to the concept of joint development. China's most recent unilateral decision (March 25, 1999) to impose a two-month fishing ban in a year in the South China Sea north of 12 degrees latitude does not augur well with proposals for multilateral approach to dispute settlement in the South China Sea.
In May 1992 China passed a law defining its territorial sea and contiguous zone reiterating its claim to the entire area in the South China Sea. The new law,among others, provides the right of innocent passage for foreign non-naval vesseis but requires Beijing's approval beiore military vessels could enter China's territorial sea, reaffirming an earlier declaration in 1958. Many countries contested China's insistence on prior notification for military vessels to enter its territorial sea as it is considered inconsistent with international law. However, such practice is not confined to China. Throughout luly and August, Chinese fishermen were again sighted in the area. The Philippines Navy had arrested them, jailed them and in some cases, after some negotiations, released them.
In May 1992 China gave a concession to an oil exploration company from Denver, Crestone Energy Cooperation in a disputed area around Vanguard reef. The Chinese call the area Wan-an Bei 21(WAB 21). Vietnam protested as the concession is smack on its continental shelf. The other countries in the region also protested. Many security analysts in the region were made to beiieve or under the impression that China was willing to cooperate in the South China Sea and would not undertake any mischievous activity. Yet the timing of the announcement gave the impression that China lacked diplomacy or paid only scant attention to multilateral diplomacy. China chose to announce the concession award at the same time as the representatives of the claimant countries including participants from China and others were meeting in Yogjakarta under the auspices of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to look for a solution to the South China Sea problem. Whether the act was intended to embarrass some parties or not could be debated, the action left behind a chilling effect on ASEAN relations with China.
In May 1995 Chinese troops landed on Mischief Reef. Soon atter, an above-water concrete structure emerged suddenly indicating prior approval and preparation as the concrete structures have to be designed, tested, fabricated and towed to Mischiet Reef. According to some engineers, the entire process could take months. The place became very busy with engineers and naval personnel. The Filipinos were not the only ones to protest as the incident happened in their backyard. The Chinese authorities claimed that they had put structures as shelters for their fishermen in the area. We have no means to verify this. And for many the matter would have ended there had it not been for their action to further strengthen the location with more concrete and the deployment of a few frigates in the area in 1998. China was not only being mischievous when it landed troops on the Mischief reef, but "concretising" the reef with reinforced concrete structures in 1998 went beyond expectation. It is an irresponsibie act. According to one analyst China is doing everything possible to gain ground, physically and politically, in the South China Sea scramble.
