The effectiveness of multilateral security cooperative mechanisms can be assessed in the Spratlys by looking at the level of reciprocity and the assurance generated by the contesting states. Reciprocity implies the willingness to show compliance with policy prescriptions proposed. In the case of the Spratlys, the intention of the CBMs is to contain the dispute and to lower the threshold for potential military conflicts. Essentially, the underwritten expectation from introducing the CBM is the acceptance of the status quo. In other words, underlying the July 1992 the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea were the following:
・No further creeping annexation i.e., no further occupation of islets or ieatures at sea;
・No illegal fishing;
・No additional troop deployment in the area;
・No espionage or other intelligence gathering activities in the area; and
・No other efforts to consolidate legal position in the area.
For a while, there seems to be some peace in the area following the ASEAN Declaration. Many security policy analysts felt that China was restrained as it behaved itself for a while. No one expected that a storm was to break out following the calm. Many thought as a gesture of friendship and respect for the ASEAN Declaration, Chinese fishermen would no longer fish illegally in the area. More Chinese fishermen were arrested not only in the Philippines area but also in the Malaysian sea after July 1992. The practice has always been to arrest and to charge them in the courts of law for illegal fishing. On many occasions, the cases were settled out of court and the perpetrators were released with warning not to encroach again. However, evidently the Chinese never paid much attention to the warnings. Neither, have the arrests deterred them from further encroachment as they keep coming!!
The story just did not end in 1995. A year later on May 15, 1996 China claimed an EEZ, ratified the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and delimited straight baselines along most of its coast. The US and many other countries protested the Chinese baseline, complaining that some segments are too long and in some parts the baseline does not follow the general direction of the coast, the criteria for drawing straight baselines. The protests also focussed on the decision by China to apply archipelagic principles around the Paracels when a strict interpretation of the 1982 Convention would not have allowed it. However to the credit of China it did not draw any boundary around the contested Spratlys. The move was welcomed by some claimant states, but most analysts believed that China has some strategic designs for the Spratlys. Only time will tell when China will move in to take effective control of the Spratlys.
The question often posed deals with the effectiveness of CBM measures in the Spratlys. Many in the region want to know whether the ARF, CSCAP, the various ASEAN statements as well as bilateral agreements with China on the South China Sea have been effective in managing China or restraining it from escalating the conflict level in the Spratlys. While it is difficult to determine precisely the impact of such multilateral cooperative mechanisms on China's foreign policy in the South China Sea (read Spratly), China continues to behave in ways that could only be interpreted as ignoring all those CBM mechanisms. In our view China has only given lip service to the CBM process at sea.
We have given a few examples to support our assessment of China's behaviour in the Spratlys. In July 1992, for example, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila produced a strong statement restraining the claimant parties in the Spratlys from making any unnecessary move that could raise tension in the area. This declaration was primarily aimed at China. But as pointed out shortly after the meeting in Manila, the Chinese PLA Navy erected four clusters of buildings on steel pylons over the Mischief Reef. Chinese fishermen were also sighted in the region. President Ramos angrily protested to the Chinese occupation of the Mischief. He said the Chinese occupation at the Mischief Reef was inconsistent with international law and with the 1992 ASEAN Manila Declaration on the Spratlys.
The second ARF meeting was held in Brunei August 1995 shortly after the Mischief Reef incident. At the ARF meeting the Chinese delegation played down its assertive policy in the Spratlys and preempted a heated debate by pledging that it would rely on international law and in particular the 1982 law of the sea to settle their problems. And yet, between 1992 and 1998, there were a series of illegal activities involving Chinese fishermen in the Spratly region, mainly in the Philippines-claimed territory. In 1996, China declared a baseline purportedly based on the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. However, on closer examination, the baseline has some discrepancies. For example, China drew straight baselines around the Paracels treating the group of islands as though China is an archipelagic state. Some segments of the baselines are also quite long and enclose certain islands which are far from the coast. Some analysts have argued that the Chinese baselines do not meet the requirements under Article 7 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Some analysts maintain that the Chinese baseline may have infringed the spirit or Article 7, but they are not entirely imperfect. By taking steps to pass a law on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone in 1995 and the declaration of the baselines China has actually consolidated its legal position in the Spratlys and this seems to run contrary to the five points expected from the ASEAN Declaration. All this seems to suggest that China has acted contrary to its promises in the South China Sea.
