During the cold war period the superpowers were more interested in the broader strategic aspects of maintaining power and they were less concerned with the conflicting claims from the smaller nations.
Aftermath the cold war, especially after the US withdrawal from Subic Bay, some claimants especially China became very assertive. China began flexing its muscle through its brown water navy in the area soon after the US and Soviet Union left the region. From the geo-strategic perspectives, it is easy to understand Beijing's rationale for a strong presence in the Spratlys and by extension the South China Sea. Firstiy, China still believes the entire South China Sea belongs to them since time immemorial. This historical fixation has drawn reservations from many quarters. China has accused various colonial powers of grabbing their territories by means of unequal treaties. In other words, China never forgive nor forget those powers which have over the years grabbed those territories when it was weak and undergoing political transition. China did not recognise the claims by France, UK, Japan, Vietnam in the South China Sea but did not effectively register their protests as required under customary international law. China did not, for example, take Japan or France to task or take them to any court of law when the colonial powers were in occupation of the islands in the South China Sea. It is only lately that Beijing has been critical, for example, of Vietnam and claims from other countries. It would appear from its statements that China does not recognise the claims of those who succeeded to the rights of the colonial powers either as in the case of Vietnam. Secondly, with the withdrawal of the US from the region there was no other strong power which could challenge China's presence in the South China Sea. The absence of a power stabilizer has encouraged China to become more assertive. When Vietnam, one time its communist ally, tried to block China's maritime ambition in the Paracels, for example, it took Hanoi to task. In fact, China has, on many occasions, resorted to force to settle its maritime claims with Vietnam.
In December 1973 China went to war against Vietnam when it seized the Paracels from an embattled and weak South Vietnam. Although the US was still in Vietnam it did nothing to stop the invasion. As a result Vietnam lost an important maritime outpost. Since then China has taken various legal steps, including drawing straight baselines around the Paracels in 1996, to make the islands its inalienable territory. While the legal status of the Paracel Islands remain contested, unless some drastic changes happen to the geo-strategic regional environment as well as power asymmetry, it would be difficult for Vietnam to repossess the islands. In 1979, China mounted a land offensive against Vietnam. Although the outcome of the battle was not conclusive, as some analysts have implied, it became quite clear to many security policy analysts that China would not have second thoughts with regard to using force on weaker nations when it comes to the issue of territorial integrity. As if the 1979 Iand offensive was not enough for China to flex its imperial muscle, in March 1988 it attacked Vietnamese forces at sea in the Spratlys. Since then China has made it quite clear to Hanoi that it would not tolerate Vietnam or any power from nibbling at any Chinese territory in the South China Sea or the Spratlys.
Thirdly, China's interest in the South China Sea has strategic undertones. The maritime area has always been China's weakest flank... partly because its navy has until very recently been weak. In the early part of the cold war China depended on the Soviet Union to protect its maritime sector. With the Soviets temporarily out of the strategic global picture, China has to take measures to strengthen the Navy and defend its own maritime territory. Until it began to deploy troops in the Hainan Administrative area in the later part of 1970s, the South China Sea remained China's weakest sector.
The Spratlys are important in terms of economic potential. They are believed to be rich in minerals such as manganese, oil, sunken treasures as well as fishing grounds. The islands are also strategically located to provide staging areas for surveillance, sealane interdiction and other naval operations that could disrupt traffic from the Malacca straits to southern China and Taiwan. During the Second World War the Japanese built a submarine base in the islands and used it as a staging post for attacks on Malaya, Vietnam, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. The potential for conflict over the islands could be quite high as it was shown in 1988 when the Chinese PLA Navy clashed with the Vietnamese counterpart. More recently, of course, is the regional concern over Chinese deployment of permanent naval elements to the Mischief Reef, a subject which has evoked vociferous protests from the Philippines and ASEAN.
It becomes apparent to many strategic thinkers in the region that some forms of CBMs be introduced in the area. The primary concern in the Spratlys is how to manage China, an emerging maritime power bent on claiming a rightful place in history vis-a-vis the South China Sea. The theory behind the CBM process is to allow for a policy of constructive engagement of China by peaceful means. This theory is based on various assumptions. Firstly, it is possible to prevent military conflicts between the contesting powers. The attitude of the claimants provide a strong basis for confidence. The other claimants are quite friendly with each other. Whiie it is true they have deployed military forces on the disputed islands in their control, they have not battled each other for control. China is the only exception. Secondly, there is some evidence that the contesting ASEAN countries are prepared to sit down and discuss the sovereignty issue among themselves.
