The WG was asked to give further consideration to the draft paper IALA Guidelines (Vol.II) Basic AIS Services (BAS) (AIS 16/7/1) and AIS16/7/2 (Vulnerability of AIS).

 The WG noted the document, excluding items that are incomplete or with comments. The WG also noted the proposal to absorb the BAS aspects in the revision of A-124 (AIS16/12/5 refers). The WG proposed that further information be provided as to the purpose of the document and that guidance in terms of where the suggested model should be applied is provided as the revision process is developed.

 The Committee agreed that this additional material should be prepared at AIS17.

(sections 7.2 and 7.3 refer)

 Although the WG was unaware of any incidents of deliberate interference, it was agreed that there is need to document and monitor vulnerability. It was agreed that further work is required to define the causes of accidental interference and that the types of potential interference should be included in AIS Installation and Operational Guidelines.

It was also suggested that a mechanism to analyse and report Accidental and Deliberate Interference should be developed. The Committee agreed to address this matter at AIS17.

 The WG was requested to consider the mismatch found between 'ITU 1371-1- Annex 5 - Use of Application Identifiers within Binary Messages', reflected in IALA Guidelines/Volume 1, Part I, Ed. 1.2. (Sept 2003) Operational Issues -

section 8.4 and Annex D.

 The Operations Working Group suggests the situation could be clarified by agreeing to the IMO prescribed message size. It is recommended that the message numbering should be consistent between all related documents.

 The Committee agreed that no action was appropriate from IALA, but that the situation should continue to be monitored.

 The Working Group reviewed input papers AIS 16/4/6 (Seminar Report - IALA Long Range Tracking Seminar) and AIS 16/4/3 (Report on the 9^th Session of the IMO Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR)).

 The application of LRT for both security and purposes consistent with SAR, VTS and SRS was noted and the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Seminar were endorsed.

 In the COMSAR paper, it was noted that as there may be a number of recognised service providers there is a need for a defined level of acceptance for LRT data, including temporal and spatial accuracy and latency for the receipt of positional data.

 It was also noted that IMO MSC expects to receive input on proposals for an organisation to coordinate the introduction and operation of LRT. This issue will be reviewed as more information becomes available.

　

 The Secretariat is requested to provide feedback, via the IALA Representative to IMO, to COMSAR that there is a need for a defined level of acceptance for LRT data, including temporal and spatial accuracy and latency for the receipt of positional data.

 The WG reviewed input paper AIS 16/12/2 (AIS Capacity) describing the capacity of AIS systems and noted the IALA Guidelines on The Aspects of the Training of VTS Personnel Relevant to the introduction of Automatic Identification System (June 2003).

 There was general agreement that there is a lack of training for the Mariner and Shore Station personnel on AIS and that a simple document for providing AIS information, including links to key literature, should be prepared and placed on the IALA website.

 It was further noted that AIS 16/12/2 could assist in planning the introduction of regional and national systems and could help the mariner to maximise the use of AIS onboard the vessel.

 A draft document entitled "An Introduction to AIS" (AIS16/output/01) was prepared and approved by Plenary.

 The Secretariat is requested to include the draft document entitled "An Introduction to AIS" (AIS16/output/01) on the IALA website. In addition, hard copies should be provided to the International Chamber of Shipping for distribution to their members. Consideration should be given to including it in Admiralty List of Radio Signals (ALRS) Volume 5 and other national equivalents.

 The WG reviewed input paper AIS16 /12/3 (Input Note from ANM on Use of AIS Data). It was noted that the initial deployment of AIS shore stations was to provide an enhanced surface picture for VTSOs to interact with ships.

 Many authorities are now reporting that the monitoring of "close track data" from AIS offers significant opportunities to better plan their infrastructure and deliver enhanced levels of service. This may include the deployment of AtoNs to better reflect ships' routing and the identification of inappropriate routing.

The WG:

 The Secretariat is requested to forward the comments on AIS as a Traffic Monitoring Tool to ANM and the ANM Committee Chairman (Duncan Glass) requests committee members provide him with any additional comments or input.

 A small drafting group agreed to review the AIS section of the IALA NAVGUIDE, in the context of the entire document, and provide input to ANM6.

 B. Pettersson, B. Kelloway and N. Ward were asked to review the AIS section of the IALA Navguide, in the context of the entire document, and provide input to ANM6.

 An open discussion was held at AIS16 on the availability of AIS data. This was stimulated by discussions at IMO on the AISlive.com website and within administrations on the provision of AIS data to interested parties.

 There was general agreement that the distribution of AIS data was subject to the ITU Radio Regulations, which place restrictions on the re-transmission of information and are implemented in the laws of member states of ITU. However, the level of enforcement varies from one country to another and it is recognised that is difficult to control data published on websites.

 Some countries are taking legal action against those publishing AIS information under data privacy laws and enforce licensing requirements for receivers, others consider that since the data is broadcast, there is freedom to receive it and it can be used in business. It is generally accepted that the availability of low-cost receivers makes it impossible to prevent access to AIS data and the information about shipping movements can, in any case, be obtained by other means.

 Some countries (e.g. Japan, Australia) provided statements of their national policy on AIS Shore Station licensing and authorisation. Many administrations (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Russia, Finland) provide data for purposes such as SAR, coastguard and customs, but may charge commercial users, such as shipping companies for selected data.

 The European Commission considers that the Safe Sea Net directive meets the requirements for availability of AIS data. Russia has central control over the availability of data gathered regionally. The US Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard have been funded to provide the information for security purposes. It can also be used for safety, but re-use for other purposes is illegal.

 The Committee will continue to monitor this situation.

 A presentation by the Japan Coast Guard was provided to aid in the discussions of the AIS Committee.

 The presentation highlighted the characteristics of the waterways in Japan, noting specifically both the Natural Environment and Vessel Types. Despite developments of Laws and Regulations; Navigation Support Systems and distribution of papers and seminars, no reduction in maritime incidents occurred. The JCG then carried out detailed studies to examine the situation, checking to see if on-shore navigation support was sufficient. This led to the development of the Electronic Navigation Support System (ENSS), using AIS.

 The presentation included a demonstration of the use of ENSS.

 A copy of the presentation was included on the CD from AIS16.

 The provisional agenda for AIS17 was circulated and agreed as amended. (see Annex 8)

　

 Difficulties with AIS data accuracy were highlighted by Russia. Specifically, the question of how VTS Operators should respond when they identify inaccuracies through their traffic monitoring activities - i.e heading inaccuracies, position accuracy and synchronization issues (Slot numbering and UTC). Another common inaccuracy is incorrect message transmission.

 Experience on how VTS operators respond to these concerns were provided. For example, in China, VTS Operators have been advised to be aware of data accuracy problems and to use all information available - i.e. use AIS to identify ship, other data collection tools for traffic monitoring.

 Through discussion, three distinct classes of problems were identified:

 It was noted that IMO has indicated that administrations are responsible for the integrity of the VHF data link (VDL) in their areas. It was also noted that the subject was considered at COMSAR 9.

 An additional concern of jamming and spoofing was noted. (section 8.2 refers)

 The Committee agreed that this is a topic that has implications at many levels, and could possibly be responded to in the revision of existing documentation, however the issues need to be documented and discussed. Members were asked to provide reports on experiences with data inaccuracies, for initial analysis and compilation into a table at AIS17.

 Members were asked to provide reports on experiences with data inaccuracies in AIS as input to AIS17 for further review. A round table discussion will be held on this issue at AIS17, and initial analysis of the data will be undertaken.

 The Secretariat was asked to bring the issue of concerns of data accuracy to the attention of the VTS Committee (VTS22).

 As there was no other business, the Chairman closed the meeting. The Chairman thanked all members, especially the WG Chairmen for their excellent work, as well as the IALA Secretariat staff and Secretariat to the Committees for their assistance during the week.