Safety of Life at Sea

 This galloping increase in the volume of commerce particularly of energy supply by tankers has sharply raised the implications of disasters in the choke points of Hormuz, Malacca and South China Seas for safe and unrestricted passage which is a basic requirement for the safety of SLOCs particularly for Japan, Korea, Taiwan and now China who are ouvertly dependent on oil supplies. During the Iran-Iraq tanker war (1980-88). 543 tankers were attacked of which 80 vessels including eleven Indian tankers were sunk. This man made disaster cost a further 200 billion US dollars in hull insurance which increased the price of oil from 12 to 25 dollars per barrel which in turn slowed down the growth of developing economies.

　

 Moreover IMO conventions for safer and cleaner seas have been enacted which merits being taken into account while considering integrated regional search and rescue organisation with access to satellites for ensuring Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) . UNCLOS creeping jurisdiction impinging on innocent passage through territorial waters, transit passages through international straits and archipelagos, naval activities such as seeding anti submarine devices as also mines in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of other countries and the legal issues relating to hot pursuit of pirates and terrorists as also the shipment of nuclear waste through territorial waters and straits could be the casus belli for conflict in the Indian Ocean.

　

Maritime Security

　

 Maritime Security is both multi-dimensional and multifaceted and involves military and non-military issues. Military security issues are naval threats, arms trafficking, piracy, narco-terrorism and safety of sea lanes and also non-military security issues encompassing the exploitation of fishing, sea bed minerals, offshore oil and illegal immigration. In addition, maritime security includes environmental protection, nuclear and ballistic missile issues as also multinational maritime management as the oceans of the world are all interconnected and hence indivisible. Hence, maritime security can be broadly defined in a national security context to include the protection of the nations oceanic interests.

　

 In the current environment, we do not have the luxury of making clear - cut distinctions between continental and maritime objectives such as energy security, privatisation of ports, ship building, delimination of extended maritime of extended maritime space, legal and regulatory mechanisms in the maritime zones, protection of marine environment, pollution and the security of dual-use oceanographic data.

　

 The collapse of the Berlin Wall has triggered the current phase of economic globalisation which is being driven by information technology. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, a decade later, focussed on the security dimension with greater force. This is being described as 'the third wave' of the ongoing multi-dimensional process of globalisation by utilising the oceanic highway. Professor Barnet of the US Naval War College stated 'globalisation is splintering the concept of national security as also generating new markets for both supra and sub national security providers for which naval forces offer an unique response'.

　

 The emphasis also shifted from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific as also from geo-strategy to geo-economics which was accelerated by the advent of multiplying ocean trading blocs which brougth in its wake broader strategic and economic participation with an annual traffic of 80,000 ships sailing through the Indian Ocean and navigating the choke points of Hormuz, Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and the South China Seas. There have been 150 collisions at sea during the past 4 years with 97 bulk carriers lost and 562 casualties. In addition, there were 335 attacks by pirates mostly in South-East Asia and 16 ships hijacked according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) located in Malaysia.

　

 The most likely challenges to be faced by maritime forces will be found in a variety of asymmetric warfare options. There are six broad asymmetric warfare threats that need to be taken into account by security planners.

　

Technologies in SLOC Security Management

 The rapid technological growth over the next 20 years will greatly increase the use of space and earth-based remote sensing for several ocean monitoring applications. The space based remote sensing industry will experience the fastest growth in both numbers and capability as more countries enter a field which was once the preserve of the US and Soviet militaries.

　

 While not experiencing similar rapid growth, earth-based remote sensing systems will continue to provide detailed ocean data to maritime customers which will include both friends and adversaries.

　

 Remote sensing has become increasingly dual use and receives a wide range of ocean monitoring information.

　

 The information gained from space-based remote sensing systems will significantly improve the survellance of SLOCs activities such as the following:

　

Asian Navies and SLOC Protection

 China is currently one of the major players on the Asian Pacific SLOC scene. The dependence of China and other regional economies on SLOCs will be increased in the coming decades. An uninterrupted flow of shipping will be critical to the survival and prosperity of China and all Asian countries. Given the expansion of maritime commerce, countries would require a Navy capable of power projection in regional waters. But in fact, few countries have the economic resources to build and maintain a navy with true reach in Asian Pacific waters. The feasible choice for the regional countries is therefore to seek multinational cooperation. There are only two regional navies which have the endurance and expertise in providing SLOC security. These are the navies of Japan and India. The Indian Navy is being further modernised and with its array of platforms is in the best position to monitor the crucially important Indian Ocean SLOCs. Similarly, the Japanese navy can undertake missions in the East Pacific.

　

 There is alsao a role for the navy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese naval force is also being modernised and could become a regional naval power in the coming decades. But China at the moment has not the capacity to defend SLOCs by itself, and hence prefers to maintain the status quo and to enjoy the SLOC security guarantees provided by the US.

　

Conclusion

 The international environment of 2020 will likely be one where world economic competition and tensions will be high but with armed conflict still remaining a possibility. Competition over resources, water availability, regional dominance, terrorism, insurgency, ethnic confrontations, guerilla warfare, low-intensity conflict, inter-intra tribal warfare will challenge Sloc security.

　

 Only by collective cooperation among regional countries can regional SLOC security be guaranteed. As oceans are an integral whole, no country can defend the wide radius of the sea lanes by themselves. In many ways, SLOC is the classical multilateral maritime security interests and provides the most basic demonstration of how a nations maritime security interests extend beyond their waters.

　

 Japan needs secure sealanes between itself and Southeast Asia and the Middle East. But no one in Asia, including the Japanese wants Japan by themselves to do the job of guaranteeing the security of these sealanes.

　

 China also needs the sealanes but again no one expects China to defend their SLOCs irrespective of their inability to do so. Asian countries have clearly a shared security interest. In recent years, there has been a demonstrated willingness to work together with others in defending SLOCs especially by anti-piracy patrols, Search and Rescue, narco-terrorism etc.

　

 There have been several regional official and semi official organisation engaged in maritime security issues. The Transportation Working Group under APEC has taken a number of initiatives to facilitate maritime commerce. The ARF jointly with USA and India co-hosted the ARF maritime seminar in Mumbai (Bombay) in January 2001 where both China and Japan were represented.

　

 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium and its associated workshops have led the way in operational workshops including SLOC protection among regional navies since its inception in 1988.

　

 The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has been active in promoting maritime cooperation. The Maritime Cooperation Working group under CSCAP drafted the 'Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation' vide CSCAP Memorandum No. 4. ARF is presently the main Pan Asia-Pacific security forum.