Epilogue

 Indo-Japan relations are something of a roller coaster enigma. The ancient association, although embedded in history has seldom seen any other facet other than one of fondness and affinity. But this has never concretized into a solid relationship perhaps due to the Cold War division and divergent world views which has hindered the growth of their partnership.

　

 Moreover the Indo-Japan bilateral relationship has been on a low key as they had less opportunity to meet even in the corridors at regional and multilateral forums for discussing bilateral issues. One such forum is APEC formed in 1989 with Australia opposing India's inclusion. Similarly, India has been denied membership of ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). On the other hand, Japan interacts with most Northeast and Southeast Asian Nations through a number of regional and multilateral institutions. It is only recently India has been admitted to the ARF and is also a full dialogue member of ASEAN.

　

 On the other hand, the Indian Ocean is undoubtedly of vital importance to Japan's energy requirement and trading routes for its European markets. But her interest and understanding of the Indian Ocean is comparatively limited. Japan's foreign policy is focussed on the Pacific where her security and commercial interests are protected by the United States. Therefore Japan's contribution to the problems in South Asia and Middle East is in the capacity of an ally of the United States rather than an independent actor. Hence her interest in the Indian Ocean Region remains outside the radar screen of Japan's foreign policy orientation.

　

 The preeminent super power, the United States has her pre occupation in Afganistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Nato as also other failing states in Africa and South America. Hence she requires friendly democracies to share some of the burden. It was in October 2001, that Japan's Diet passed legislation allowing Japanese troops to support US military action outside its 1000 mile security perimeter as also developed new roles such as Kata Minesweeping (1991), UN Peace Keeping (1992 & 1995) and Kata of escorting vessels carrying processed uranium (1983) and other maritime missions. It was clear that in spite of US willingness to support her allies at all times and under any circumstances, there was a requirement for regional navies to take on roles particularly in the Indian Ocean for the security and safety of the Sea Lanes of Communication.

　

 This paradigm shift was announced when the US Secreatary of State, Colin Powell saw 'the need for meaningful cooperation with India's regional navy to ensure a steady flow of oil from the Gulf and at reasonable prices'. He added that 'India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery and that that we need to work harder and more consistently to help India in this endeavour'. This was further supported by the National Security Advisor Condolezza Rice's statement that 'India's potential as a stabilising force in South Asia and her role in economic development as she becomes a major economic player'.

　

 Hence both India and USA are building a new relationship to ensure the stability and security in the Indian Ocean which is being translated into action by a dozen separate groups for mapping and implementing a purposeful path for Indo-US Cooperation. USA is an active member of several Asian Institutes and the recent visit of President Bush to Indonesia and Thailand is a demonstration of this policy.

　

 India which is by far the most significant player in the Indian Ocean still remains outside the diplomatic radar of Japanese policy. The visit of Mr. Yoshiro Mori, the then Prime Minister and the Japan-India Joint Declaration of December 10, 2001 during Prime Minister Vajpayees visit reiterated the need for deepened economic relations as also Comprehensive Security Dialogue for conducting frank and lively discussions as was done by this group at the Kawamura Institute dialogue and the current Ocean Security dialogue which has been initiated by Mr. Akiyama Chairman of SoF.

　

Recommendations

 The Indo-Japan Joint Declaration of December 10, 2001 needs to be given 'dentures' as undermentioned to implement the Joint Declarations of the two Prime Ministers to take their bilateral relationship to a qualitatively higher level: