In countering the threat of maritime terrorism, port security (particularly in commercial ports, with their traditionally more open access and high traffic volumes) is clearly the greatest challenge. This is even more so since the maritime terrorist threat with the most serious consequences is the import in commercial ships/containers of Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological.) There are 361 ports (50 of them major ports) in the United States, through which pass each year $750 Billion in cargo (equal to 20 percent of the U.S.

economy). These ports receive six million cargo containers ― only two percent of which have in the past been physically inspected by Customs, and all of which could carry terrorist personnel, explosives, guns, or WMD.⁸ The problem is clear ― how to ensure that commercial ships/containers are not used as a terrorist tool. The problem is also real, not just hypothetical ― the Al Qaeda explosives used to blow up U.S. Embassies in two East African countries in August 1998 arrived by ship in Kenya.⁹ In late September 2001, Italian authorities discovered an Arab man in a container onboard a ship about to sail for Halifax, Canada, equipped with satellite and mobile telephones, a computer, an aircraft mechanic's certificate, and plans and security passes for airports in Canada. In May 2001, U.S. Senator Bob Graham (Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee) revealed that 25 "extremists" had recently entered the U S hiding in cargo containers.¹⁰

　

The United States is taking action to enhance port security against maritime terrorism through changes in organization, operations, and technology. Organizationally, President Bush proposed on 6 June the creation of a new cabinet Department of Homeland Security, which would include several of the agencies most critical to port security, such as the Coast Guard, Customs, and Immigration and Naturalization Services. The first element of enhanced port security is, of course, improved intelligence sharing, now and under the new Department in the future, between these agencies, as well as others such as the FBI, CIA, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Naval Intelligence. Initial operational measures taken to tighten port security have included establishing port security zones landward and seaward (including 24 hour patrols and even random underwater sweeps), and increased law enforcement personnel and responders. Since September 2001 , the U.S. Coast Guard has required 96 hours advance notice of entry to U.S. ports for certain vessels of concern. More difficult in heavy trafficked (and unionized) busy commercial ports are the necessary measures to restrict free access to piers and to screen personnel working in ports. Also, a new program of Sea Marshals has now been established, to board and inspect selected ships at sea and escort them to and from ports. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives have recently passed a bill (currently in conference to agree on a single text) requiring the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct vulnerability assessments on U.S. and foreign ports (with entry to U.S. ports potentially denied to ships coming from foreign ports lacking antiterrorism measures.) That bill also requires that a cargo identification and screening system be developed and maintained for all containers shipped to or from the United States.¹¹

　

The U.S. Coast Guard has, since September 2001, assumed a leading role in U.S. ― and international ― initiatives to enhance port security. The Coast Guard has traditionally played key roles in port organization through its missions as Port Captains, Marine Inspection, and Marine Pollution Control, but port security previously was less than two percent of daily Coast Guard operations. Since September 2001, port security has grown to between 50 and 60 percent of daily Coast Guard operations.¹² The Coast Guard has extended the security zone to seaward through such measures as the 96 hour advanced notification requirements for port entry, and has requested authority to stop ships 12 miles (instead of 3 miles) from port. In November 2001 , Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy presented the 162 nations of the UN's International Maritime Organization in London with several key proposals to improve maritime security against the terrorist threat.¹³ The IMO backed proposals to require automatic identification systems (transponders) to be fitted on all larger ships, to require security plans for ships, port facilities and offshore terminals, and to require assessment of vulnerabilities of ports to terrorist attacks. However, the IMO nations have yet to approve two other proposals ― the sharing of information on the ultimate ownership of vessels, and requiring all seamen to receive background checks, and to carry verifiable identification documents (fraudulent certificates for seamen have been a serious problem).¹⁴

　

The U.S. Customs Service, along with the Coast Guard, has also been acting to address the potential threat from the six million containers now entering U.S. ports each year largely uninspected. The key to this is the concept of "point of origin" inspection and certification of containers destined for U.S. ports. As described by the U.S. Customs Commissioner, the goal of the "Container Security Initiative" is to reach agreements with the governments of the 20 major world ports that account for 68 percent of all container traffic to the U.S., to provide U.S. Customs personnel to assist national port personnel in inspecting and certifying "high-risk" containers before they are shipped to the U.S. (eventually, containers would also use container identification tags with anti-tampering devices and GPS technology tracking ability.)¹⁵ In March 2002, the U.S. sent Customs inspectors to the three largest Canadian ports (and Canada sent its inspectors to two U.S. ports). In September, the U.S. signed similar agreements for "point of origin" customs inspections with Singapore, Malaysia (for the ports of Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas in Johor), Hong Kong, and Japan (for the ports of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya). Similar agreements have been reached for major ports in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany. Although some nations may resent this U.S. push for a more intrusive customs inspection presence in foreign port security, not to mention the associated costs of technology improvements, the fact remains that only "point of origin" inspections offer the prospect to reduce the remaining cargo arriving in U.S. ports to an amount low enough to be practically inspectable. As with U.S. national requirements for double-hulled tankers, it is likely that the international shipping community and other nations will eventually conclude that they cannot afford to have their shipments to the world's largest economy delayed or even blocked from entering.

　

Several significant vulnerabilities to maritime terrorism still require addressal. First there is a need for improved technologies for port security-in command and control and communications, surveillance sensors (radar and sonar), perimeter detection sensors, unmanned surface vessels (such as SAIC's Unmanned Harbor Security Vehicle),¹⁶ and even unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance of port areas, as well as affordable inspection technologies for container screening (such as SAIC's Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems [VACIS]). The traditional shipping industry practice of openly providing sensitive information on hazardous cargo must be curbed. The IMO still must come to grips with the widespread problem of fraudulent certificates for ships and seamen.¹⁷ Future port development worldwide must eventually address the great problem today of the proximity to ports of dangerous industrial areas ― refineries, petroleum tanks, and chemical and hazardous waste facilities.¹⁸ The international legal regime to detain and prosecute terrorists must also be enhanced, particularly through the adherence of all nations to the 1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome Convention).

　

There is a clear need for international cooperation to deal with the threat of terrorism in the inherently international environment of the seas. This cooperation of course begins with cooperative international military, political, and economic action to root out known concentrations of terrorists and their support networks at their source. In critical straits, such as the Strait of Malacca, regional cooperation in patrolling against maritime terrorism and piracy addresses common threats. Regional or sub-regional agreements, help to counter-terrorism, such as recent NATO Ministerial agreement on fighting terrorism, the May 2002 Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines Anti-Terror Agreement, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter.¹⁹ Assistance to nations to build their own anti-terrorism capabilities - such as the recent U.S. provision of a Coast Guard cutter and patrol boats to the Philippines ― is also important.²⁰ In recent years in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command has emphasized increasingly multinational military exercises and cooperation which, along with traditional bilateral ties, can assist nations in contributing to the common regional fight against terrorism (as well as other transnational threats). In the final analysis, maritime terrorism is a common and global threat to the people and economic prosperity of all civilized nations, and thus requires international cooperation in response.