Session 1-2
Suspicious Vessels in Japanese Waters: Details and Recent Incidents
Yukinobu Tomonaga
1. |
History, background and details on incidents of suspicious vessels in Japanese waters |
(1) The suspicious vessels appearing frequently in Japanese coastal waters are believed to be smuggling people and goods into and out of Japan, as part of North Korea's ambitions to reunify the Korean peninsula. (As stated above, North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-Il admitted that the ships are of North Korean origin at the Japan North Korea summit in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002.) This covert activity began shortly after the end of World War II, when the ships were treated as illegal trespassers. Statistics indicate that the first sightings occurred off the coast of Yamagata Prefecture in the Sea of Japan. Since then 21 cases of such incursions have been confirmed, and countless other cases are suspected but unverified.
(2) With the end of the Cold War, the socialist Soviet Union disintegrated to be replaced by a capitalist Russia, while China retained its socialist framework but embarked on a path of gradual capitalist reform. North Korea quickly found itself the only remaining country in Northeast Asia unaffected by the wave of capitalist reform sweeping the globe, an unreconstructed Communist dictatorship. In the late 1980s, North Korea's economy began to crumble. With the withdrawal of funding from its biggest sponsor, the now-defunct Soviet Union, in the 1990s North Korea faced complete economic ruination, with vast numbers of its people dying of starvation. In desperation, North Korea began producing narcotics, stimulants and counterfeit foreign currency to prop up its tottering regime.
(3) The Korean Peninsula was liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and soon split into two independent states: the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north. However, because diplomatic relations between Japan and the Koreas had been cut off, the flow of goods and people between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, which had once been brisk, was banned, and no communication among the respective governments existed. In 1965, Japan and South Korea normalized relations, along with migration and trade (subject to bilateral regulation). With North Korea, however, Japan has never restored normal diplomatic relations, and diplomacy with the North remains irregular to this day. Thus with no regular relations between the two countries, and given the history between them, the Japanese public was unconcerned about the problem of suspicious vessels in Japanese waters, viewing the issue as no more than a matter of illegal migration. Even when arrested, these illegal entrants were punished lightly or even released, under the Immigration Control Law and the Alien Registration Law.
Position: Executive Director, Maritime Disaster Prevention Center
Education: Japan Coast Guard Academy graduate
Tomonaga joined the Japan Coast Guard in 1966. He was assigned to the Japanese Consulate in Pusan as Consul and to the Cabinet Information Research Office in the Cabinet Secretariat as Investigation Officer. In the Japan Coast Guard, he held positions as Director of the Guard and Rescue Department, 2nd Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, Japan Coast Guard (JCG), Commander of the 8th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, Director-General of Guard and Rescue and Vice-Commandant for Operation until his retirement in 2002. He was in command at the scene of the 1999 intrusion of two spy ships into Japanese territorial waters off Noto Peninsula and the 2001 spy ship incident in the East China Sea.
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(4) In 1987 a Korean Airways passenger Jet exploded in the skies over Southeast Asia. The testimony of Kim Hyun-hee, a woman arrested by the South Korean authorities as a mastermind of the attack, establishes that Lee Une, a Japanese woman working in North Korea as Kim Hyun-hee's Japanese language instructor, had been abducted in Japan and taken to North Korea by boat. With Kim Hyun-hee's testimony, the image of "a Japanese national abducted and taken to North Korea by ship" is emblazoned clearly on the minds of the Japanese people. Even before this horrifying incident, stones of similar abductions of Japanese citizens had surfaced and were confirmed in affidavits by North Korean agents who had switched to South Korean allegiance. However, the Japanese public only half-believed them until Kim Hyun-hee's arrest.
(5) In 1998 a case came to light in which a shipment of illegal stimulants was transferred from a North Korean ship to a Japanese ship at sea and smuggled into Japan. Like the suspicious ships discussed earlier, the North Korean ship sued for this purpose was stripped of external markings. After this case was exposed, numerous arrests were made for trafficking of stimulants from North Korea. These worrying developments gripped public opinion as a serious problem threatening the very security of Japanese society.
(6) In March 1999 a P3C of the MSDF discovered two suspicious ships in Japanese waters in the Sea of Japan off the shore of the Noto Peninsula. One Self-Defence Force ship and one patrol boat pursued the vessels, but the two ships were unable to effect the crucial ship-detention procedures and a 20-hour sea chase came to naught. It was subsequently confirmed that the escaped ship entered a port on North Korea's east coast. The incident marked the first time since the establishment of the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) that a Japanese patrol boat fired a machine gun (although they were warning shots only, aimed at sky and sea rather than the hull of the boat) and was the MSDF's first police action at sea. The event also prompted progress on a number of measures. First, the authorities in question carefully examined measures to take when a suspicious vessel ignores an order to stop. Second, efforts are underway to boost the speed of patrol boats and outfit them with bulletproof exteriors and more effective weapons, and existing high-speed craft are being reallocated. Finally, Article 20 of the Maritime Safety Agency Law (Use of Weapons) was revised to establish the conditions under which weapons may be fired with intent to harm.
2. |
Overview of suspicious vessels and the government's response |
(1) "Suspicious vessels" exhibit the following characteristics:
・ They are often 100t-class fishing vessels with the names and registration numbers of Japanese fishing vessels.
・ They carry numerous antennas but no fishing gear on their decks. The stern is split down the middle, suggesting double doors.
・ Normally they appear to be simply cruising, so it is impossible to tell whether a violation of Japanese law is in progress without detaining the vessel.
・ They do not respond when ordered to stop.
・ They are armed and use arms to evade capture and may blow themselves up when in imminent danger of capture.
(2) The policing of Japan's territorial waters is the responsibility of the MSA, which is tasked under Article 2 of the Maritime Safety Agency Law with the enforcement of Japanese law at sea and investigation of crimes committed at sea. In the incident of the suspicious ships off the Noto Peninsula coast in March 1999, the MSA patrol boat ran out of fuel and was unable to pursue the vessel, so an MSDF vessel earned on the pursuit in its stead. The MSA is responsible for the first line of response to suspicious vessels, as it is the competent policing authority; the Japan Self-Defense Forces may take over the chase only if it is recognized that the MSA is unable to do so, or would have clear difficulty in doing so (Manual on Joint Response to Suspicious Vessels (Defense Agency)/MSA, December 24, 1999)
(3) The government's response policy is "to take necessary measures, including firm interception, boarding and searching...ochof any suspicious vessels, navigating the waters surrounding Japan, suspected of being foreign vessels involved in serious crimes" (Cabinet Decision on Response to Suspicious Vessels Navigating the Waters Surrounding Japan, November 2, 2001). If the suspicious vessel is plying Japan's territorial waters or EEZ, and does not respond to an order to stop and submit to boarding and searching, the authorities may, according to Article 74, Section 3 of the Fisheries Act, fire warning shots, then further warning shots using machine guns or cannon. The authorities are to fire first into the air, then into the sea, then ultimately at the ship's hull if a response is still not forthcoming.
(4) As explained above, the Maritime Safety Agency Law has been revised to enable the MSA to fire with intent to harm when intercepting suspicious vessels in Japanese territorial waters. At the same time, measures were considered to enable the MSA to fire at the vessel's hull in a way that causes no harm to people. In the dramatic pursuit off the Noto Peninsula, warning shots fired into the air and sea had no effect, so the patrol boat was clearly forced to fire at the hull. However, the MSA hesitated to fire at the hull before the commission of a crime could be demonstrated, for fear of harming the vessel's crew. For this reason the MSA upgraded the performance of its weaponry and ordered training in weapons fire, to enable greater accuracy in shooting. The agency also directed that shots on the hull must be aimed away from sections containing the crew's quarters.
3. |
Overview of the incident of the suspicious vessel off the coast of Amami Ohshima (see attached illustration) |
Just after 5 PM on December 21, 2001, the crew of a MSDF P3C patrol plane spotted a vessel they judged to be a foreign fishing vessel in Japan's EEZ in the East China Sea to the northwest of the island of Amami Ohshima. The crew took photographs, which were then analyzed by the Director of Marine Defense. As a result, the vessel was deemed suspicious, with high probability that it was of North Korean make, and information about the suspicious vessel (position: 230km northwest of Amami Ohshima) was related from the Defense Agency to the MSA at 1:10 AM on December 22. The MSA immediately dispatched patrol boats and aircraft and began pursuit. The chase took a great deal of time, as the vessel had moved a great distance from its originally reported position and the seas were rough (a 20mps wind and 4m waves were prevailing on the South China Sea). Nonetheless the MSDF's P3C aircraft continued surveillance of the vessel.
6:10 AM: |
An MSA plane reached the skies over the location of the vessel, 100t-class fishing vessel. The vessel ignored instructions to stop and continued in a westward heading. Although the vessel resembled the one sighted off the Noto Peninsula in March 1999, this vessel displayed a Chinese ship name and port of registration (the Noto Peninsula vessel had been marked with a Japanese ship name and port of registration): Cho-ryo 3705 and Sekiho. Officials in neighboring China and South Korea were contacted, and China's Public Security Department responded that the vessel was not registered in China. |
12:48 PM: |
The 180t PS Inasa arrived and issued repeated orders for the vessel to stop, but the suspicious ship's crew ignored the instructions and continued to flee on a zigzag path. The PS Inasa was later joined by the 180t PS Kirishima, the 195t PS Mizuki and the 230t PM Amami, with all four of these vessels giving chase. |
2:22 PM: |
The Inasa fired continuous warning shots into the air and sea. Crewmen of the suspicious vessel stood on the bridge furiously waved something looking like the flag of China. |
3:11 PM: |
The vessel crossed the boundary between the Japanese EEZ and the Chinese EEZ. |
4:13 PM: |
The Inasa and Mizuki fired 20mm cannons at the hull of the vessel in warning, while repeating instructions to stop. |
5:24 PM: |
An outbreak of fire was seen on the vessel. |
5:25 PM: |
The vessel stopped. |
5:51 PM: |
The fire was extinguished. |
5:53 PM: |
The vessel started to escape, then stopped, then started to flee again. |
9:35 PM: |
The Mizuki fired warning shots at the hull of the vessel. |
9:36 PM: |
The vessel started to flee again. |
10:00 PM: |
To restrain the vessel's attempts to flee, the Amami and Kirishima hemmed the vessel in, making contact with the vessel on both sides. |
10:09 PM: |
The vessel began firing shots at the Amami, Kirishima and Inasa, wounding three crewmen on the Amami The Amami and Kirishima made an emergency retreat and identified a rocket fired from the vessel. |
10:10 PM: |
The Inasa, which had been on standby, fired directly at the vessel as a firefight broke out. |
10:13 PM: |
The crew of the suspicious vessel exploded and sank their own vessel, setting 15 crewmembers adrift. Because of rough seas (13kps northwesterly wind in 4m waves), the crewmembers could not be rescued Two corpses were later collected; the fate of the remaining crew is unknown. |
During this entire episode the three patrol boats fired 600 20mm shells and sustained 175 shots between them. On September 11, 2001, the suspicious vessel was raised from the sea and the MSA and National Police Agency (NPA) initiated investigations. Of the 21 suspicious vessels that had been confirmed to that date, this was the first ever captured.
(1) The activities of these suspicious vessels constitute covert action with the backing of their home country. Their crews are criminals of conscience, who believe their actions are meritorious and proper. The vessels are purpose-built and outfitted with a range of weapons, including hand-carried missile launchers, rockets and machine guns. The crews are also capable of exploding and sinking their own ship to destroy the evidence when they cannot evade capture. These people constitute a terrorist organization, as they do not hesitate to defy the rule of law in other countries, even to the extent of murder. Their actions are not only a political and military act against South Korea but also a means of propping up their faltering economy by trading in drugs. Naturally it is important to investigate fully the issue of these suspicious vessels, to grasp the truth and clearly apportion blame, but the issue is much broader. Japan must raise awareness of this issue as a member of that global community and carry out persistent and unflagging political and diplomatic efforts, both at home and with all related countries, to ensure that these reprehensible activities stop.
(2) Japan's historical position has been fortunate. The nation has only rarely been attacked by foreign enemies. Surrounded by ocean on all sides, Japan is scarcely wary of events on its borders. According to depositions by former North Korean agents who defected to South Korea, the reason for these incursions is that Japan's territorial waters are easier to trespass into than the land territory of the capitalist South. Moreover, the nation's Sea of Japan coastline is only lightly populated, offering numerous locations that are ideal for entering the country illegally. This is why sightings of suspicious vessels and abduction of Japanese citizens both occur on the Sea of Japan coast. Raising alertness to these dangers among the Japanese public and strengthening the nation's monitoring system are issues of crucial importance.
(3) During the more than 10 years since the collapse of Cold War structures, the number of ships traversing the waters around Japan has increased remarkably. Unfortunately this commercial expansion has been accompanied by a rise in piracy, smuggling, criminal activity aboard ships and violence. Because of the sparseness of surveillance on the high seas, the oceans may well become a favorable venue for criminals, where their chances of success are high. Because we live in an age when weapons are in plentiful supply and can easily be bought the scenes of crime at sea are becoming increasingly dangerous for the competent authorities to police. The suspicious vessels discussed here once carried only light firearms, but in the 1990s they began to strengthen their arsenals. As the authorities took firmer steps against the worsening problem of these crimes, the criminals have responded with ever more formidable self-defense capabilities. Public security agencies must always ensure that their offensive and defensive equipment and systems are always superior to those of the outlaws. From the public's point of view, the use of warning shots using machine guns and artillery may seem like overkill, but light arms are inadequate for warning shots at sea. Maritime police authorities in countries throughout the world are adopting these tactics for this reason.
Track chart of a suspicious vessel
(拡大画面:95KB) |
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