Heightened concern over maritime terrorism predates the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, as such concern has been intense since the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen in October 2000. However, the heightened alert status since the 11 September attacks has resulted in serious and sustained attention to the broad potential scope of maritime terrorism-to commercial shipping as well as naval vessels, and in ports as well as at sea. This new appreciation of the potential scope of the maritime terrorism problem is leading to organizational, operational, and technological initiatives by the United States and others to address the problem, and also leading the United States and other nations to enhance international cooperation against maritime terrorism.

　

Terrorist events of the past two years have provided the United States and the international community a sobering wake-up call on the potential scope of maritime terrorism. An appreciation of the breadth of this threat is essential to understanding the nature of organizational, operational, and technological changes needed to counter the threat - as well as the essentiality of enhanced international cooperation.¹

　

The great majority of world trade is transported by ships, and the volume of seaborne trade is expected to double in the next fifteen years. In an increasingly globalized world, this means that maritime terrorism can render vulnerable a central component of the global economy that is the basis for global prosperity and economic development. In short, the potential for maritime terrorism is not a peripheral problem that can be ignored or wished away, but a central threat that must be addressed.

　

For analytic purposes, this paper will break down the broad scope of the maritime terrorism problem into two major areas of threat - threat to naval vessels and naval bases, and threats to commercial shipping, both underway and in ports. To date, the most publicized threats to naval vessels have been suicide small boat attacks ― such as that on the USS Cole in 2000, and the recently revealed plots by Al Qaeda members based in Morocco to attack US and UK ships in the Straits of Gobraltar.² But there are other maritime terrorist threats to naval vessels, at sea or in port, such as aircraft (manned or unmanned), underwater swimmers with explosives, or even a terrorist mini-sub. Maritime terrorist threats to commercial shipping include threats import (in the U.S. or overseas) and underway (on the high seas, or in straits/restricted waters). Commercial shipping includes not only merchant ships-including oil and chemical carrying tankers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, and ships transporting nuclear materials for reprocessing ― but also passenger ships such as large cruise liners and passenger ferries.

　

　

In addition to potential maritime terrorist acts by suicide small boat, aircraft, or swimmers (similar to those possible for naval vessels), there are numerous "high profile" options for maritime terrorism on commercial shipping. Suicide small boat attacks, like that on the USS Cole, could also be directed at commercial shipping. Indeed, at this writing, there is strong suspicion that the October 6, 2002 explosion and fire aboard the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen was such an attack. Beyond the immediate ship targeted by such an attack, the potential costs to the marine environment and to the global oil and shipping markets are serious indeed. Another possibility is that, like the commercial aircraft used in the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, terrorists could seize a merchant ship and use the ship itself as a weapon, driving it into other ships, into port or commercial facilities (including refineries), or into oil/gas platforms at sea. Similarly, a cruise ship could be hijacked, with up to thousands of passengers onboard.³ Oil/gas platforms at sea could be attacked or seized by maritime terrorists, with the loss of hundreds of lives and ― as with commercial ships such as oil/chemical tankers, LNG carriers, and nuclear material transport ships ― the creation of an environmental disaster far worse than that of the Exxon Valdez. Maritime terrorists can also use commercial shipping and containers to transport weapons and even personnel. The Al Qaeda terrorist network has been report to own 23 ships, and a major multinational "Leadership Interdiction Operation" (LIO) in the Arabian Sea/Horn of Africa area has been underway since the fall of 2001 to prevent Al Qaeda personnel from escaping by sea.

　

The most serious threat of maritime terrorism is the use of commercial shipping and containers as a delivery platform for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As will be elaborated below, maritime terrorists could use commercial shipping/containers to import a nuclear weapon, "dirty" bomb with radiological material, or chemical and biological weapons.

　

The U.S. experience with countering the maritime terrorism threat to Naval vessels has been intensive since the October 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole and involves aspects that also have relevance to many aspects of commercial shipping's defense against maritime terrorism. Since the Cole attack, the U.S. Navy changes to antiterrorist force protection (AT/FP) policies have focused on several critical areas. Intelligence doctrine, and alerting procedures (tactics, techniques and procedures) have been improved, as has training.⁴ Action is ongoing to improve sensors and armament to deal with the detection and close-in terrorist threats to ships. Perhaps most important, and of most relevance to also countering maritime terrorist threats to commercial shipping is enhanced port security, from the gate to the waterfront. This includes increased standoff zones seaward of the piers (for example, the Los Angeles Times reports a 500 yard security zone and a 100 yard no-go zone being established.)⁵ Pierside, there are increased security patrols and barriers. At the entry to the naval base/port, enhanced entry security and barriers provide a first line of defense landward. For naval vessels underway at sea, recent enhanced defense against the maritime terrorist threat includes the stopping and searching of suspicious vessels in the Arabian Gulf/Horn of Africa area ― with the explicit official Notice to Manners warning that "any perceived hostility to U.S. or official coalition naval units will result in the destruction of the commercial vessel." Since September 2001, the U.S. has also maintained a ship on patrol in the critical Strait of Malacca to counter terrorists or piracy (the threat of pirates approaching or boarding ships in such critical restricted waters being virtually indistinguishable in action from a maritime terrorist act.)⁶ Indeed, in mid-April 2002, the U.S. ship then in the Strait of Malacca was joined by a warship of the Indian Navy in a joint patrol.⁷ These anti-terrorism/piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca have not resulted in any terrorist or pirate seizures, but the deterrent effect is suggested by a decline in the Malacca piracy numbers in recent months.