They hobbled American maritime flexibility, and encouraged China.
In February 1992, China's rubber-stamp parliament reaffirmed China's claims in the South China Sea, and asserted China's right to use force. Evidence came to light in 1995 that China had seized Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, which the Philippines also claims. Mischief Reef is well within the 200 n.m. Philippine Exclusive Economic zone. Had the US Navy still been in Subic Bay, that seizure would have been unlikely. In the early months of 1999, the Chinese built more permanent structures on Mischief Reef. These include a four storied structure, a wharf, radar, gun emplacement and a helipad. China claims these are mere fishermen's shacks. Some shacks.
The Philippines' ASEAN partners have done little to support the Philippines. That's partly because they think the Filipinos are architects of their own misfortune. The Filipinos evicted the US navy from Subic, and then three years later tore up Chinese reef markers in a transparent effort to embroil the United States in their claims in the Spratlys. The United States has long made it clear that it does not support those claims; nor in the 1960s did the US support the Philippines in its dubious claim to Sabah (North Borneo), now part of Malaysia.4
China's negotiating tactic is to set aside sovereignty issues in favour of joint exploration and development; in other words, to wait until China's power is so great that the ASEANs will bow to the inevitable. Uncertainty is another tool in the Chinese arsenal. Despite repeated Indonesian requests, Beijing has refused to delineate its territorial claims near the Natunas. Nor will China agree to deal with the other claimants on anything other than a bilateral basis.
Those who see grounds for hope in China's 'willingness' to negotiate bilaterally are wishful thinkers. How can tiny Brunei, for example, 'negotiate' with China when Brunei lacks either external support or military capability? In bilateral negotiations with any other claimant, China holds all the high cards because it is the only great power, nuclear-weapons state and member of the UN Security Council with territorial claims in the South China Sea. (As a member of the UNSC, China could veto any military action against it under the UN charter.) These attributes all contribute to the psychological dimension of power. Nineteenth century stuff perhaps, but no evidence exists that the Chinese think they are on the wrong side of history, however much President Clinton might hope otherwise.
A legal face on a strategic issue
