At present the region lacks effective arrangements and the necessary capacity to implement the concept for the maintenance of ocean security and protection of the marine environment. Current weaknesses include: lack of political and social will, lack of maritime awareness; ineffective arrangements for maritime jurisdiction and enforcement; differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea; weak regional participation in relevant international legal instruments; and the lack of capacity to implement appropriate measures to ensure the security of the ocean environment. These weaknesses occur both at a national level and at a regional level.

　

 At a national level, many regional countries lack the capacity to provide adequate security in waters under their national jurisdiction and to implement international standards. New international measures for ocean security are generally optimized for developed countries and challenge the capacity of developing countries that may have other priorities of poverty alleviation and development.

　

 At a regional level, the region lacks established procedures and frameworks for information exchange and for operational coordination to provide maritime security. In particular, there is a lack of established arrangements for cooperation both between neighbouring countries and between the coastal States and the so-called "user" States whose ships and trade pass through the waters under the jurisdiction of the coastal States.

　

 Developed countries need to assist developing countries with building their capacity to deal with maritime security threats. However, the latter countries are concerned that such assistance could lead to some loss of national sovereignty and independence, as well as the risk of their becoming subservient to the interests of the developed countries and major partners in the cooperative arrangements.

　

Capacity in this context involves the following:

　

 Increased national capacity to provide ocean security will help in building political and social will, as well as assisting in developing the necessary institutional arrangements and legal frameworks. Against this background, this paper will make recommendations for building the capacity of regional countries to maintain ocean security and protect the marine environment and resources in a comprehensive manner

　

　

 Our "Securing the Oceans" concept seeks to apply the principle of comprehensive security in the maritime domain. It includes perspectives of marine environment protection and peaceful uses of the ocean within an integrated system that also provides for law and order at sea and the safety and security of shipping and seaborne trade. This concept has a focus on the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea and Indonesian and Philippine archipelagic waters where the sea lanes crucial to both Japan and other East Asian countries are located and which are beset with environmental and resource problems. Effectively we are looking at the chain of semi-enclosed seas of East Asia¹, the archipelagic chain running from the Kamchatka Peninsula to northern Australia and the approaches to this area from the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Most of these waters are within the excusive economic zones (EEZs) or archipelagic waters of a coastal or archipelagic State. This paper argues that a major problem with providing maritime security in this complex geographical area is that most regional countries lack the capacity to provide maritime security in their own waters let alone to cooperate effectively with other countries in the provision of regional maritime security.

　

 When we talk about a new concept of ocean security that includes all perspectives of the marine environment, we are effectively talking about a new maritime regime for the seas of East Asia and the broader Western Pacific. Back in 1991, the eminent British scholar in international security studies, Michael Leifer wrote a seminal paper on the importance of maritime regime building in East Asia.² His paper promoted the ideal of a stable maritime regime in the region with the free and uninterrupted flow of seaborne trade and nations able to pursue their maritime interests and manage their marine resources in accordance with agreed principles of international law and without the risks of tension and conflict.

　

 Now, some thirteen years on, we are still far from the ideal of Leifer's stable maritime regime. To some extent, maritime disorder prevails in the East Asian region. This includes unregulated pollution of the marine environment, over fishing, marine environmental degradation, and widespread illegal activities at sea, including piracy, smuggling and the threat of maritime terrorism. Maritime cooperation remains underdeveloped in East Asia and as Mark Valencia has noted, there is an "absence of robust multilateral maritime regimes" in the region.³ The new concept of ocean security under consideration at this meeting on securing the oceans for the future is now a welcome new initiative to provide a stable maritime regime in East Asia along the lines of that proposed by Leifer.

　

 The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) created a system of oceans management based on national rights and obligations. This system was particularly compelling for enclosed or semi-enclosed seas with UNCLOS Article 123 requiring States bordering such seas to cooperate in the exercise of their rights in these seas and in their performance of a range of duties, including the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the conduct of joint programmes of scientific research. This UNCLOS Article potentially provides the "umbrella" for the type of cooperation envisaged under our "Securing the Oceans" concept. However at present, this system of oceans management is ineffective in the East Asian seas because of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, few agreed maritime boundaries, and countries acting largely in their own self interest. Maritime jurisdiction is a divisive aspect of ocean politics in the region. Maritime law enforcement, particularly in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, and maritime security are problematic when boundaries between adjacent maritime jurisdictions are not agreed. The lack of agreed jurisdiction inhibits maritime security in the region, complicates maritime enforcement, leads to unchecked degradation of the marine environment and facilitates illegal activities at sea, including possible maritime terrorism.

　

 At present the region lacks effective arrangements and the necessary capacity to implement the concept for the maintenance of ocean security and protection of the marine environment. Current weaknesses include: lack of political and social will, lack of maritime awareness; ineffective arrangements for maritime jurisdiction and enforcement; differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea; weak regional participation in relevant international legal instruments; and the lack of capacity to implement appropriate measures to ensure the security of the ocean environment. These weaknesses occur both at a national level and at a regional level.

　

 At a national level, many regional countries lack the capacity to provide adequate security in waters under their national jurisdiction and to implement international standards. New international measures for ocean security are generally optimized for developed countries and challenge the capacity of developing countries that may have other priorities of poverty alleviation and development. The latter countries face a particular difficulty with implementing the legal regimes that have been developed at an international level. The old adage of international environmental management: "Think globally, act regionally" applies here. This reflects the thought that with maritime security as with many other areas of international regime building, the global thinking has largely been done and the challenge now is to apply these principles at the regional and national levels. It is not hard to come up with good ideas on what needs to be done at a global level but it is much harder making these ideas work at a regional and national level.

　

 At a regional level, the region lacks established procedures and frameworks for information exchange and for operational coordination to provide maritime security. In particular, there is a lack of established arrangements for cooperation both between neighbouring countries and between the coastal States and the so-called "user" States whose ships and trade pass through the waters under the jurisdiction of the coastal States. Capacity building at both the national and regional levels will be an important "first step" towards implementing the "Securing the Oceans" concept.

　

 Developing countries face considerable difficulties in developing their capacity to provide maritime security. A description of the process of capacity building may be found in Chapter 37 of Agenda 21.⁴ Although this description relates to capacity for managing and protecting the marine environment and its resources, it might also be usefully extended to capacity building for other areas of oceans management, including maritime security:

　

 Capacity-building in developing countries requires cooperation between these countries and relevant international organisations, regional associations and with developed countries, as well as among the developing countries themselves. The aim of this process is to enhance the capacities of developing countries in the areas of data and information, scientific and technological means and human resource development. Capacity is usually regarded as including at least three elements: human resources, institutions and enabling environment. It is much more than simply training although the availability of human resources with the appropriate skills, education and training is obviously an important element of capacity, as is also technical cooperation. Chapter 37 of Agenda 21 goes on to note that:

　

 The dimensions of comprehensive maritime security under the "Securing the Oceans" concept for which capacity building is required include the following:

　

 The notion of capacity building for maritime security cooperation is not new in the region. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in particular, has been extremely active in recent years with capacity-building, particularly in Southeast Asia, with maritime training and exercises with regional maritime security forces. The JCG also offers training for foreign personnel at its training institutions in Japan; is assisting both Malaysia and Indonesia with developing national coast guard forces; and has hosted Port Security Seminars in Southeast Asian countries in order to assist the implementation of the SOLAS/ISPS Code which came into effect on 1 July 2004.

　

 The JCG has taken a leading role with the development of the Asia Maritime Security Initiative 2004 (AMARSECTIVE 2004) agreed at a meeting of the Heads of Asia Coast Guards in Tokyo in June 2004⁶ and the more recently agreed Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)⁷. All ASEAN nations, Japan, China, Korea, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are working under ReCAAP to set up an information network and a cooperation regime to prevent piracy and armed robbery against ships in the regional waters. ReCAAP is a very significant achievement for the region that provides the basis for regional cooperation to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships. It includes an authoritative definition of "armed robbery against ships"⁸ and provides for the establishment of an Information Sharing Center (ISC) to be located in Singapore.

　

 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has taken a number of capacity building initiatives. In February 2003, APEC Senior Officials endorsed a Counter Terrorism Action Plan (CTAP). This lists specific objectives and expected outputs by APEC economies to secure cargoes, to protect people in transit, to secure ships engaged in international voyages, to ensure the security of international aviation, to halt the financing of terrorism, to enhance cyber security, to secure energy supplies and to protect the health of our communities.⁹ The CTAP recognizes that capacity building and the assessment of needs are essential to its successful implementation. It encourages all APEC members to both identify their capacity building needs and outline what expertise they can offer other APEC members in the area of capacity building.

　

 The Secure Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region (STAR) initiative developed by APEC provides for the protection of ships and cargoes; promotes the introduction of ship and port security plans; provides for the accreditation of seafarer manning agencies in the region; promotes cooperation on fighting piracy; sets standards for ship borne detection equipment and technology; and pays particular attention to energy security including the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The first STAR conference held in Bangkok in February 2003 cited the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of governments as essential to the success of the program.

　

 Maritime security is mainly handled in APEC through the Transportation Working Group (TPTWG) and the Maritime Security Experts Group. The latter group's discussion at the 24^th TPTWG held in Bangkok 16-20 August included discussion of the training under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and the capacity building needs of APEC economies in the maritime security arena. Earlier the APEC High Level Meeting in Maritime Security Cooperation held in Manila, 8-9 September 2003, had drawn up an indicative list of capacity-building needs of APEC economies related to the implementation of maritime security measures and agreed to present this to International Financial Institutions. At the recent APEC Summit held in Santiago, Chile, President Bush and six other leaders launched the ISPS Code Implementation Assistance Program to assist fellow APEC members in complying with the ISPS Code through technical assistance and grants, which will be provided beginning in 2005.¹⁰

　

 The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) launched by the U.S. earlier this year is another regional development that has significant capacity building implications. It arose from a U.S. concern that the littoral states adjacent to the Malacca and Singapore Straits lacked the capacity to provide sufficient security for the shipping and seaborne trade passing through those straits. It postulated some involvement of the U.S. in providing that security but mainly due to sensitivities of sovereignty on the part of Malaysia and Indonesia in particular, it was not well received in the region at least initially. Major elements of the RMSI include increased situational awareness, information sharing, a decision-making architecture and interagency cooperation¹¹.