Under international law, a legal regime governing the Straits to promote international cooperation is Article 43 of UNCLOS. Article 43 prescribes that "user states and states bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate; a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of international navigation; b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships." Article 43 is a provision, which lays out a general principle to promote international cooperation on straits used for international navigation. Many legal issues arise from the interpretation of Article 43, but it is agreed that it is not a binding mechanism to enforce cooperation, but an exhortatory one to encourage the beneficiaries to be committed to the safety of navigation and to keeping the straits clean.

 The logics for the implementation of Article 43 with respect to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore can be given as follows.

 First, there exists a big gap between the littoral states and the user states in terms of use of the Straits, a disparity which does not meet the principle of "user pays." The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are straits used for international navigation. More than 20 states use the Straits. The littoral states are primarily responsible for keeping their territorial waters safe and clean, even though the Straits are polluted by bilge, ballast, wastes, and oil from the ships passing through the Straits. However, as shown in Table 1, main users of the Straits are mostly extra-regional states, other than Singapore, and the littoral states defray the costs of keeping the Straits safe and clean.

 Second, the littoral states alone are not capable of paying costs of keeping the Straits safe and clean due to the lack of resources to implement Article 43. The establishment and maintenance of necessary navigational and safety aids, and the prevention and control of pollution from ships passing through the Straits, and the enforcement of security measures cost a tremendous amount of money, which is beyond the capacities of the weak economies of the littoral states.

 Third, keeping the Straits safe and clean is a transnational agenda, since both littoral sates and user states greatly benefit from shipping routes in the Straits. The primary stakeholders are the littoral states, and user states which are the direct beneficiaries of the Straits. Traffic volumes in the Straits are expected to continue to increase, as the regional economy rapidly grows. For the littoral states, the Straits are a primary source of their economic growth, as much of their economy rests with sea trade, and they take advantage of the Straits which connect Europe and Asia. The user states, including Japan, Korea, and China, are heavily dependent on the Straits for their export driven economies.

 Ensuring maritime security in the Straits is a global issue that goes beyond the capacities of states to address individually. Like other global issues such as infectious diseases, environment pollution, security in the Straits should be dealt in the same context from a global governance perspective.

　

 Given its significant status of the Straits as global shipping routes, a number of safety measures for vessel traffic are in place. Among them is the Ship Reporting System in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (STRAITREP), which has been implemented since 1981. The Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) between One Fathom and Horsburgh Lighthouse, and navigational aids in the Straits, such as buoys, beacons, and lighthouses, help ensure the safety of vessel traffic.

 Of great concern in this regard is the Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) Project, which aims to ensure navigational safety and protect the marine environment in the Straits. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), in collaboration with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), funds the project as part of their programs to protect the global environment. The littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore take the lead of the project. The project was first designed as part of the project "Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas" which was initiated by GEF, UNDP, and IMO. The core of the MEH project is to link the Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC), the Electronic Chart Display, and the Information System to the database and the Automatic Identification System. For the project, the IMO is the executing agency, and the World Bank is the implementation agency. Out of three parts of the project, the first project, the Marine Electronic Highway in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, is under way, and will be followed by the second project in which the MEH will extend to the Persian Gulf. The MEH project will be completed when the MEH covers the East Sea of Korea.

　

 Of grave concern that matters in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is security. The Straits are one of the most vulnerable chokepoints to maritime terrorism and piracy attacks. The importance of the Straits is not limited to the littoral states and regional states. As mentioned earlier, the Straits would enormously affect the global economy if any disruption takes place due to their status of major global shipping routes.

 As part of security efforts by the littoral states, in July 2004 Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia agreed to launch coordinated patrols in the Straits, named "Operation Malsindo." Seventeen ships from the three countries patrol their respective waters in the 900km long Straits and coordinate their moves via a new 24-hour communications link. For the first time warships from the three countries are allowed into one another's waters when pursuing pirates.

 In addition, extra-regional states, mostly trading states such as Japan, Korea, China and the U.S., are also making a wide range of efforts to address the security concern. Of chief concern is to combat piracy, which poses a great threat to navigational safety in Asian waters. To this end, littoral states and trading states establish bilateral or multilateral ties and conduct a various forms of cooperation. Among them is capacity building of coast guard agencies in the littoral states which lack law enforcement resources. As a way of cooperative readiness, they conduct joint exercises and hold international conferences to promote cooperation.

 A significant recent achievement as a result of concerted efforts to combat piracy is the "Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (or ReCAAP)," which was agreed in Tokyo on Nov 11, 2004. Aiming at the enhancement of cooperation among Asian countries in fighting piracy, the ReCAAP includes; general obligations of contracting states; the establishment of the Information Sharing Center; functions of the Center; information sharing; fields of cooperation, including arrest and extradition of pirates, mutual legal assistance; capacity building assistance. Out of regional arrangements so far, it would serve as the strongest mechanism to bring regional efforts together since it obliges the participating states to implement obligations.

 In this regard, Japan has taken an initiative for regional cooperation efforts. Recognizing the significance of cooperation with the littoral states and the rest of states in the region in the wake of the Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999, the Japanese government took an initiative in promoting regional cooperation. Conscious of its limited role in direct response to piracy in the Southeast Asian waters, Japan's strategy has focused on the enhancement of cooperation with the littoral states in the region.

 To this end, Japan has been actively involved in the capacity building of coast guard agencies in Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippine, by providing vessels and technical assistance in maritime affairs, and by educating law enforcement skills.

 A barrier to promoting international cooperation among the littoral states and the regional states is sovereignty concern. The littoral states fear that greater cooperation might infringe their sovereignty. By the same token, the right of hot pursuit is limited to the territorial waters of a state. The sovereignty concern often keeps regional states from cooperating in a concerted manner and delaying law enforcement activities.

　

 Recognizing the importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a lifeline to its economy, the Korean government has deep interests in ensuring the security of the Straits. Ensuring maritime safety is vital to the Korean economy, given its heavy dependence on sea trade, to the extent that sea transportation accounts for 99.7% of the nation's trade. Of particular concern, Korea imports 96.9% of its energy from other countries, of which approximately 90% of energy, such as petroleum, LNG&LPG, is shipped through the Straits. In line with such significance, the Korean government considers security in the Straits a national agenda.

 One overriding concern with the Straits is geographical distance, which is thousand miles away, and is out of reach of security activities. For that reason, the Korean government gives great weight to promoting cooperation with littoral states while it enforces forceful security measures to ships passing the Straits.

 In terms of piracy attacks, although the number of its victim ships reported to the IMB remains low --- three incidents in recent three years --- the actual number is believed to be significantly higher since shippers are reluctant to report incidents. The anti-piracy measures being implemented include enhancing the awareness and prevention of piracy. In an effort, the shipping industry and government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF), the Korea Coast Guard, and the Navy have formed a council to share information and discuss an effective response to piracy. In the wake of the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the MOMAF, a lead agency in combating piracy, has pursued to promote the Council to a governmental council by expanding its members and functions to include maritime terror, in addition to piracy.

 The Korean government has been committed to building a comprehensive maritime safety information network, "the General Information Center on Maritime Safety & Security (GICOMS)" which is part of programs to enhance maritime domain awareness. The cores of the project include; building the Vessel Monitoring System to monitor vessels off shores and in oceans in connection with satellite systems; building a consolidated information system for the strategic use of information on maritime safety and disaster by bringing together 33 separate information systems managed by enforcement agencies; building maritime information systems for the implementation of maritime safety regulations, such as Port State Control (PSC), ISM Code, ISPS Code. Launched in 2003, with the budget of $ 4.73 million, the project will be completed by 2008. The GICOM is expected to enable agencies to respond swiftly to sea accidents and enhance maritime safety.

 Regarding anti-piracy measures, the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) allows agencies to obtain information on the ships entering the waters vulnerable to piracy. The Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), which has been in place since 2004, allows shippers under attack or threat of piracy or terrorism to push a button and send a cover alert to the MOMAF's Operation Center, providing detailed information on the victim ship in a real time. After analyzing the information, the MOMAF swiftly disseminates the information to the relevant domestic agencies and the littoral states enabling them to properly respond.

 Due to its limited direct role in responding to piracy in the Southeast Asian waters, like in Japan, the Korean government's strategy focuses on promoting international cooperation with regional states by actively involving in joint efforts to address the piracy problems. Furthermore the Korean government has made efforts to build a multilateral framework to bring regional states together in combating piracy.

 In terms of international cooperation in operational activities, the Korean Navy established a cooperation tie with the Indonesian Navy in 1999 and with the Singapore Navy and the Malaysian Navy respectively in 2001. The Korea Coast Guard (KCG), responsible for law enforcement at sea, also has built cooperation relationships with regional coast guard agencies of Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore, for joint efforts for combating piracy. It is negotiating with the Indian Coast Guard to build cooperation relationships and further plans to extend cooperation relationships to coast guard agencies in Thai and Vietnam.

 In Oct 2004 the KCG conducted a joint anti-piracy exercise with the Malaysia Marine Police in the Malacca Strait for the first time. The joint exercise aimed at promoting mutual readiness against piracy and enhancing cooperation between the two coast guard agencies. It plans to conduct a multilateral exercise with the littoral states this year.

　

 Of the challenges to promote cooperation to secure the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, a funding mechanism for security and safety measures would matter most. The littoral states off the Straits have voiced a long-held position that trading states or user states should financially shoulder the shared burden of the protection of the waterways on the mutual benefit basis.

 A number of international conferences were held to discuss ways to implement Article 43 under UNCLOS after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force in 1994, and many suggestions in this regard were put forward. However, there was a great divergence of views among the stakeholders as to the arrangements to practically work out Article 43. The cores of arguments are about a few key issues such as funding mechanisms and the scope of user states to share burden. Furthermore, a question of which state takes the lead in governing the mechanism remains when a mechanism to implement Article 43 is built.

 In this regard, Asian states need to consider the establishment of a new maritime organization in Asia, as opposed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Tentatively named the Asia Maritime Council, which is a permanent international organization in nature, should be established to address a number of increasingly significant maritime issues in Asian waters, including the integrity of maritime domain, illegal fishing, disputes over the exploitation of marine resources, piracy, ocean pollution, and the safety of navigation.

 The logic behind this suggestion is that the IMO is not an appropriate international agency to deal with specific maritime matters in a particular region of Asia, given the feature of the IMO which aims to facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, the efficiency of navigation, and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships. The Asia Maritime Council, composed of the representatives of Asian states and user states of shipping lanes in Asian waters, is designed to coordinate a variety of maritime issues, including the promotion of cooperation for straits used for international navigation in Asian waters.

 Like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia" (or ReCCAP), which is a multilateral agreement to combat piracy and armed robbery in Asia, the Asia Maritime Council should be formed by a multilateral agreement.

 For funding, the participating states of the Asia Maritime Council need to create a funding source, namely the Asia Maritime Fund, which will be a primary source to support the activities of the Asia Maritime Council. With regard to contributions to the Fund, one solution is the combination of the ways of financing by the UN and the IMO. The main source of funds for UN is the contributions of member states, which are assessed on a scale approved by the General Assembly. The fundamental criterion on which the scale of assessments is based is the capacity of countries to pay. This is determined by considering their relative shares of total gross national product, and adjusted to take into account a number of factors, including their per capita incomes.

 The IMO budget is unique. Costs are shared between the 164 member states primarily in proportion to the size of each one's fleet of merchant ships. The biggest fleets in the world are currently operated by Panama and Liberia, and so they pay the biggest shares of IMO's budget.

 Limited to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, by applying the way of the IMO first, the contributions of states can be assessed primarily in proportion to traffic volumes by flag states in the Straits. Panama is the biggest user of the Straits in terms of traffic volumes by flag states and followed by Singapore, Liberia, Malaysia, and Cyprus. However, the actual beneficiaries of the shipping lanes in the Straits are quite different from the flag states due to flag of convenience ships. For the actual beneficiaries, they are Japan, Singapore, China, Greece, Germany, and Korea.

 In order to address the gap, the way of the UN can be employed, in which, as discussed earlier, the fundamental criterion is the capacity of countries to pay. In the same context, the share of contributions of each state in Asia can be determined in proportion to traffic volumes by shipowners. This is the way to share the burden according to a principle that the beneficiaries pay costs. The shipowners are the actual beneficiaries of the shipping lanes in Asian waters and mostly affluent states that have ability to pay. There will be some overlaps in states by combining the two different criteria, but they can be adjusted by taking account of other factors.

 Another funding source of is a voluntary contribution by the shipping industry. Shipping associations, together with trading associations, directly benefit reinforced security and safety measures by governments. Apart from the governmental level, they need to be allowed to make contributions to the Fund. However, it is not desirable that shipping companies should share the costs on the individual basis by their traffic volumes. States are primarily responsible for the costs of the safety of navigation and the security of shipping lanes. Moreover, additional costs for shipping companies will have a significant impact on trade worldwide by increasing shipping costs. As a consequence, it will result in the higher costs of global trade.

　

 This paper suggests a number of ways for burden sharing for keeping the Straits of Malacca and Singapore safe and clean. It is acknowledged that the agenda of securing the Straits is a global governance issue which is beyond the capacities of individual states. The agenda should be dealt from an ocean governance perspective, from which stakeholders need to fulfill their obligations necessary for keeping the oceans safe and clean.

 Given a significant divergence of views and no marked developments in a number of international conferences over the past years, the agenda should be discussed at the governmental level and in regional cooperation regimes such as ASEAN and APEC.

 In addition, there should be in-depth studies at the practical and the academic levels as to ways to address the issues which arise from mechanisms for burden sharing. The thing that matters most is the commitment of the littoral states and the user states together to ensure the safety of a lifeline to Asia and the global community.