Interfaces with External Powers

　

 The USA, as has been mentioned earlier, is a major player in the Indian Ocean and in the Asia-Pacific. Not only does it have vital strategic interests in these regions but it also deploys considerable maritime power to support and safeguard them. India shares some of these interests, in particular, those pertaining to the fight against terrorism and the safety of seaborne commerce. The Indian Navy has been carrying out joint exercises with the US Navy for about a decade and their scope has been increasing to ensure that the desired level of interoperability is reached between both navies. The two nations have also executed joint patrols in the Strait of Malacca, with their warships escorting high value cargo vessels. These included not only oil tankers but also ships carrying LNG, iron ore, fertilizers and container ships. Exchanges of personnel and delegations have also increased and a Defence Policy Group meets regularly to oversee all military interactions and to establish closer interfaces in military cooperation. Despite differences of opinion in some matters, it is very unlikely that these interfaces will diminish as there is convergence of interests between the two countries at the strategic level. In fact, they are likely to become stronger.

　

 On a different plane, India and Russia also have a strong relationship in military cooperation flowing from shared interests. This interaction, ongoing for nearly four decades, is now transforming itself into joint ventures dedicated to the development and production of major weapon systems which could also be exported to third countries. The Indian Navy has quite a large element of ships, submarines and weapon systems of Russian origin but it is only now that it has embarked on joint exercises with the Russian Navy. This should become a regular feature of the relationship since Russia also depends heavily on the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific SLOCs for its trade and is concerned about their safety. India also has institutionalized defence cooperation mechanisms with countries such as the U.K., Russia, France and some others and ships of the Indian Navy have exercised with those of several other navies, both littoral to the region and external to it e.g. U.K., France, Australia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Iran, Oman, Thailand, Japan and Phillipines. There is need for such interactions to continue and, in fact, increase as they add to confidence and mutual trust and to greater capability in countering the threats. In this context, the level of maritime interaction between India and Japan is, unfortunately, quite insignificant considering that both countries share common strategic interests. It is very desirable that this unsatisfactory situation should be rectified speedily. Being critically dependent on its imports from the Gulf and on its overseas trade for its economic prosperity, Japan should have a vital interest in the safety of these sea lanes. India, with its credible maritime power and favourable geographical location, should be a natural ally, especially as it also has the same critical interest in the safety of its own oil lifelines and trade. In fact, just as India is the only credible maritime power in the Indian Ocean region, so is Japan in the East Pacific region and the roles that maritime forces of these two countries must play in proactively countering terrorism at sea must be both, cooperative and coordinated. This is feasible in the context of our interactions, both under the forum of CSCAP, which is charged with issues concerning safety of shipping in ports and harbours and at sea, and the ARF which looks at security issues in a larger perspective.

　

India's Neighbourhood

　

 Both in the Gulf and in the ASEAN region, India has important economic and political interests, and naval interactions with these countries through ship visits, exchange of personnel and joint exercises, enhance them. As the largest maritime force in the Indian Ocean region, the Indian Navy needs to play a proactive role in furthering maritime cooperation. The gathering of ships hosted by it frequently, under the name MILAN, has begun to attract participation from many regional and other navies. An international fleet review held in Mumbai in 2001, had as many as 25 navies represented, including from Japan. Such cooperative programmes must be encouraged. India has friendly and cordial relations with all countries in the region except Pakistan. Ships of the Indian Navy have assisted Sri Lanka in times of natural disaster and other difficult times. In Maldives, it was only the timely intervention on our naval and airborne forces which saved the legitimate government from being overthrown in a coup. Indian naval ships have carried out patrols of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Mauritius at that country's request and ensured offshore and coastal security for the African summit conference in Mozambique some months ago. All these deployments are part of a proactive programme of maritime cooperation.

　

Pakistan

　

 Pakistan alone, of all India's neighbours, continues to remain hostile. The reasons why this is so need not be elaborated here, and it would be enough to say that it is quite unlikely that this confrontationist and hostile attitude will change in the foreseeable future, given the contradictions and compulsions in Pakistan's society and ruling military establishment. Therefore, the Indian Navy, like its sister Services, has to be prepared to cope with any military eventualities. The main strength of the Pakistan Navy lies in its submarines and aeroplanes equipped with ant-ship missiles, but broadly speaking, India enjoys the required superiority in maritime power. As long as this is maintained, the level of deterrence will be adequate to dissuade Pakistan from embarking on any misadventure. The same degree of superiority must also be maintained by the other components of our military forces. Pakistan is developing the port of Gwadar on the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz through Chinese assistance. This, by itself, would not be an issue of great significance except that Pakistan's President has stated that ships of the PLA Navy would be allowed to use the port facilities whenever Pakistan 'felt threatened.' This pronouncement has sinister overtones and needs to be factored into our security calculations, given that India's oil lifeline can easily be threatened by hostile elements operating out of Gwadar. However, it is highly improbable that any conventional conflict, should it come about, would lead to its escalation into a nuclear exchange, as is feared by some, including in Japan. Both countries have enough awareness of the consequences of any such bizarre actions and have enough checks and balances in place to prevent even accidental lapses.

　

China

　

 As far as China is concerned, India's relations with that country have fluctuated from 'very friendly' before the war of 1962 to 'adversarial' thereafter, but in the new emerging world order, things have begun to change. Both countries now realize that economic and technological growth are the real keys to power, and that military confrontation can only hamper both. India is aware that China is going to be one of the two biggest economies in the world by 2020 just as China realizes that India, its existing GDP of about $ 600 billion growing at six to seven percent per annum, could itself be a quite formidable economic power in the same time frame. Both countries appreciate that the Asia-Pacific economic environment revolves on the interfaces between the major economic players viz. China, Japan, ASEAN and India. Strategically, China, India and Japan are essential ingredients of the Asian chessboard along with the USA and Russia. So, there has been a visible improvement in Sino-Indian relations. It is not realized by many that India-China trade already exceeds $ 5 billion and is likely to increase to $ 10 billion by 2005. This may be compared to the $ 2.5 billion trade between India and Russia or between India and France. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that there are outstanding boundary issues to be resolved between the two countries as also the transfer of nuclear and missile technology from China to Pakistan. In addition to the Gwadar port programme mentioned earlier, China is also assisting Myanmar in developing its port facilities. Hitherto, the PLA Navy's profile was largely coastal, but it has now more oceanic ambitions. Its programme of modernization under which submarines and destroyers have been and are being acquired from Russia, as also its own indigenous shipbuilding warship building plans, have already made it possible for the PLA Navy to deploy at long distances. Availability of port facilities in Myanmar and Pakistan will give it an Indian Ocean capability which it does not presently have. Its interests and postures in the region of the Spratly Islands and in the Taiwan Strait are also well known, with implications on countries littoral to that area. With increase in its oil imports from the Gulf, China is aspiring to become a player in Indian Ocean region. As far back as in 1993, when China first began to import oil, the Director of the General Staff Logistics department of the PLA Navy is reported to have said "... we can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the Indians." In short, while India does not, anymore, view China as an adversary or as a threat, the implications of its maritime postures have to be analysed very carefully, just as they have to be watched in Japan, in the ASEAN region, and, indeed, by America.

　

 Notwithstanding the above, China's expanding economic interests also make it critically dependent on the maritime trade routes both in the Indian Ocean and in the South China Sea. It is desirable that its seagoing capabilities be also integrated in the cooperative arrangements which must be worked out without much delay. Even though the deployment potential of its naval and coast guard forces is largely confined to the offshore and coastal areas, the PLA Navy can make significant contribution in ensuring security of sea lanes in the South China Sea area, possibly in cooperation with the Japanese MSDF. With India, Japan and China being members of CSCAP and ARF multilateral groupings, it should be possible to formulate mutually acceptable cooperative arrangements.

　

India's Maritime Capabilities

　

 The India Navy is the only regional seagoing force in the Indian Ocean with integral air capability. Thailand operates a small aircraft carrier but mainly in its eastern waters. The Indian Navy also operates a fairly large number of surface ships and submarines, and can sustain both types at sea for adequate periods. Along with vessels of the Coast Guard, ships of the Indian Navy can be deployed for ensuring safety of sea lanes not only near the Indian coast but also at distances quite far away. India is also well positioned in the Northern Indian Ocean, sitting astride the east-west shipping routes, and able to mount surveillance over them at several points stretching from its Lakshwadeep Islands in the west to the Great Nicobar Island in the east. This beneficial position affords several advantages in easy deployment and sustenance of naval forces, from the Gulf coast in the west up to and including the Strait of Malacca, thereby providing a maritime capability which no other navy in the region can have. It needs to be appreciated that of the as many as 600 ships which transit past the Great Nicobar Island every day, as many as 50 to 60 are oil tankers, most of them moving to and from Japan, and their number is likely to rise to 150 or more by 2020. Even ships which do not carry oil or other energy products, transport other critical cargoes of raw materials and manufactured products and their numbers will also see corresponding increase. Any disruption in the movement of these ships and their cargoes can have very adverse effect on the economies of East Asian countries very. India's maritime forces have the ability to safeguard the security of these shipping routes so that the interests of countries littoral to the Asia-Pacific region are protected. India's capabilities in hydrography and oceanography, which are important elements in exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, are also relatively, comprehensive and will further improve in the next two decades. These are important factors which can be exploited to mutual advantage in regional cooperative arrangements.

　

Recommendations

　

 In any maritime cooperative arrangement, some essentials need to be recognized. The first of these is that there must be a degree of political convergence. Just as there is such an understanding between India and the USA, so must India and Japan develop a relationship flowing from mutuality of interests. Fortunately, such convergence already seems to be there. There is similarity in the approach of both countries in countering threats of terrorism, in maintaining safety of the sea lanes and in coping with assertive Chinese postures, as and when these are encountered. It is, therefore, necessary that this level of understanding should translate itself into strong and enduring maritime cooperation arrangements. A bilateral military relationship is neither feasible nor necessary, but there is no reason why the two countries and their navies cannot evolve a similar cooperative mechanism as exists, for example, between the USA and India. There should be a dedicated Maritime Cooperation Group at the governmental level and an Executive Steering Committee between the Indian Navy and the MSDF. While the former would concern itself with larger issues of policy, the latter would plan and oversee operational interactions within the policy framework. We should be able to promote mutual trust and confidence through frequent meetings, share information on matters of common interest especially concerning piracy and terrorism, participate in the training programmes of each other on a reciprocal basis, carry out joint exercises to develop interoperability, make regular ship visits and, finally, carry out joint patrols, at selected times and in selected places as mutually settled. For example, Indian ships can escort high value Japanese merchantmen in Indian Ocean waters, and the MSDF could do the same for its own and Indian vessels in the South China Sea or elsewhere in East Asian waters. As the cooperation develops, we can upgrade the interaction to deputing observers to the exercises conducted by each maritime force. There can also be an element of technological cooperation inbuilt into the overall maritime relationship. As mentioned earlier, this arrangement will be entirely compatible within the multilateral security cooperative framework of the CSCAP and the ARF and with the relationship that both countries have with the USA, such an interface being conducive to the desired cooperation. It will also be necessary for the Japanese MSDF to play a more proactive role than it has done so far in maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.

　

 The MSDF of Japan has already assumed responsibility for its maritime security interests up to 1000 miles from the country. It has also deployed in the Indian Ocean in the context of Japan's support to the USA in the war against terrorism. Admittedly, the law under which this has been permitted is only valid for a two year period and is a major move forward from earlier inhibitions. That notwithstanding, the first steps in overcoming the apparent hurdles in its constitution have already been taken. The emerging maritime situation is potentially serious and calls for unique measures more in tune with the needs of the time. Conditions must, therefore, be created which will facilitate, rather than hinder, cooperation with like minded countries to counter threats which could be very damaging to national interests.

　

Conclusion

　

 To conclude, India has extensive maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region, from the Strait of Hormuz in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east. In the emerging global security environment, it has to be an important player on the Asia-Pacific scene, interacting, economically and politically, with China, Japan and ASEAN countries and, of course, the USA. As it grows to become one of the major economies in the world, the only real threat that it faces comes from Pakistan which it can easily counter by maintaining the required military superiority over that country. However, there are other threats which are gathering strength and give every indication of being more dangerous. They include terrorism, which is also assuming a serious maritime dimension covering a broad spectrum of sea based activities, and the threat posed to the safety of sea lanes through which critical cargoes of energy must move, any disruption of which will have serious repercussions on the economies of the entire region. Japan, which depends on the Indian Ocean and South China Sea lifelines for its growth and prosperity, will be one of the worst affected. It is not surprising that at the recently held summit meeting of APEC, there was more emphasis on such terrorism than on any mechanics of trade. Countries which have common interest in countering these threats must come together and formulate suitable mechanisms through which this can be done. Maritime interaction, flowing from cooperation and coordination, can make a substantial contribution to the larger interface. Navies with credible seagoing capabilities, such as India and Japan, have an essential role to play in such coordinated efforts to ensure the safety of sea lanes, and in countering maritime terrorism of which, piracy and hijacking, are only two constituents. Considering that there has been open acknowledgement at the highest levels that we share common strategic interests, the level of maritime cooperation between the two countries has been well below the required threshold. It is necessary that this deficiency be rectified. There is no more time to be lost.