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Session 4-1
MARITIME INTERESTS AND THREATS FROM AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
Vice Admiral P.S.Das, Indian Navy (retired)
 
Introduction
 
 In the days when they ruled the world, the British realized that control of sea lanes, stretching from the mother country to their far flung colonies, was critical to maintaining their suzerainty. Towards this end, Britain maintained a chain of bases, stretching from Gibraltar in the west to Hongkong in the east, from where they deployed naval flotillas capable of dominating these waters, with India being somewhere in the centre. When the time came for them to leave their Indian colony in 1947, they planned that the newly independent country should sustain the arrangements put in place by them so that British interests could be safeguarded. This facilitated rapid expansion of the Indian Navy which grew from a small force of about a dozen small vessels and assorted minor craft, to an ocean going fleet comprising an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and seventeen frigates and destroyers, all contemporary to vessels being operated by the British Navy, in a period of just fourteen years. The Indian Navy, thus, became the most credible naval power in the region. However, from its earliest days, India has faced repeated threats and conflicts on its land frontiers and, consequently, had to focus on ensuring the integrity of its land borders. The insurgency in Kashmir, aided and abetted by Pakistan, has also added to this land fixation. But things have now begun to change and there is growing realization that maritime power will play an increasingly important role in India's security calculus in the emerging global security environment.
 
The Emerging Security Environment
 
 The global security environment is no longer Euro-centric and is now focused on Asia-Pacific. Seven of the ten most populous countries of the world are located here as also some of its largest standing armies. Almost all present and potential major global players viz. the USA, China, Russia, Japan, ASEAN and India are relevant to this theatre. The largest economic congregation, the APEC, covering 38 percent of global economies, is also an Asia-Pacific entity. With China having been identified as a potential challenger to its long term interests, and some of the potentially largest economies of the world located in this region, the USA has no option but to establish and maintain capabilities in Asia which can safeguard its long term interests. The Bush National Security Strategy of September, 2002, categorically affirms that America would never again allow its military, economic and technological prowess to come under challenge. Since the only possible challenger is in Asia, the USA will now want to be a dominant and permanent player on the chessboard of Asia-Pacific. It already has such a capability in the Pacific through its military presence, and treaties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, apart from its economic interests and interactions in the APEC forum. It has to achieve a similar position in Asia. The USA now has military presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and its naval forces provide powerful capabilities which can be brought to bear from the sea. It will also seek to have influence over the region's energy resources, including their production levels, pricing and distribution, and safety of the sea lanes through which they move. Additionally, America s war against terrorism is also linked to this region as a large number of radical Islamic terrorist groups are located here and draw sustenance from formal and informal institutions. The defeat of Taliban in Afghanistan, and the consequent disruption in Al Qaeda activities, has only led to the emergence of sympathetic organizations in several countries of the region, most notably, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The 'madarsas, which are breeding institutions for most terrorists, have not disappeared, nor have the 'front' organizations which support this activity through funds and weapons. The attack on the American destroyer, USS Cole, in Aden, a similar planned but aborted mission in Singapore some weeks later, and the suicide bomber attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen, provide proof, if any is needed, that terrorism has already acquired a serious maritime dimension. There is increasing evidence of links between the Al Qaeda terrorists and pirates, and the methods being used by both, are now far more sophisticated, cruel and potentially destructive.
 
 The Indian Ocean is one of the major theatres of Asia. It is also the highway to the Asia-Pacific. The strategic imperatives of America : to have a dominating presence in Asia, to exert influence over its energy assets, to ensure safe movement of commerce and to counter radical Islamic terrorism, are inextricably linked to this vast stretch of water. The countries of concern are all littorals of this sea space, the bulk of the enforcing capabilities are at sea or sustained from the sea and safe movement of vital cargoes requires the sea lanes of communications to be made secure. It is in this overall context that India has to look at its maritime interests and the threats which confront it, or are likely to be faced, in the coming years of the 21st century.
 
The Indian Ocean
 
 Nearly half of the entire seaborne commerce of the world moves across the waters of the Indian Ocean. It is also interesting that while 75 percent of all shipped cargoes in the other two great oceans - the Pacific and the Atlantic - are moved between and to countries littoral to them, in the Indian Ocean, this same percentage goes to countries external to the region. Even more important, as much as 20 percent of this commerce is in the form of oil and gas. Consequently, countries outside these waters, and especially those with critical needs of energy, have a natural interest in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region. For example, 70 percent of Japan's needs of oil are met from the Gulf and Korea is equally dependent on imports from this region. The USA itself imports 20 percent of its energy needs from here. Even China is now an importer of Gulf oil and its requirements are going to increase. Nearly two thirds of the world's LNG trade is shipped through the South China Sea to Asian markets. Other critical raw materials driving the economies of Asia such as coal and iron ore also transit through the SLOCs of the Indian Ocean-South China Sea, consigned to countries in North East Asia Thus, the entire Asia-Pacific region is critically dependent on the energy resources of the region and on the safety of their movement, through what can easily be described as the 'arteries' of the regional economies. As much as 65 percent of the world's discovered oil reserves and 35 percent of its gas are located in this region which accounts for 40 percent of global oil production annually. These are very important and critical assets. There are also resources below the sea which are still to be discovered and exploited. These existing and potential resources lend great strategic significance to the Indian Ocean region.
 
 At the same time, almost the entire littoral area suffers from serious vulnerabilities. The sea lanes entering and exiting from these waters pass through several narrow passages e.g. the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait etc, creating 'choke points', literally, making it possible for rogue states and non-state actors to interdict or disrupt shipping, thus, jeopardizing the safety of cargoes moving across the important east-west trade routes. The consequent disruption or dislocation in the trade chain will have very serious implications on the economic growth of most major economies. Some of these details have been highlighted in the presentation prepared by Admiral Roy. It is not surprising that the British attached the importance that they did to control of these seas. Most littorals have been nation states for less than fifty years, and religious, ethnic and societal discords plague most of them. The fact the many are ruled by authoritarian regimes and are dependent on 'single product' economies, especially in the Gulf region, adds to their fragility. The example of Saudi Arabia, where per capita incomes have dropped sharply in the last decade even as employment has soared to over 25 percent, is not unique. In fact , this is one reason for the growth of radical Islamic movements and 'madarsas' which, ultimately, fuel terrorism around the world. Many countries in South West Asia, South Asia and South East Asia are now well known for the presence of terrorist organizations with clear linkages to one another.
 
 On the one hand, therefore, the Indian Ocean region is a theatre of great strategic significance and a region in which many countries external to it have a stake. On the other, most of its littorals have fragile and potentially unstable societies ruled by authoritarian regimes which can suffer destabilization, economically and politically, possibly, through violent means. As the largest democracy and most stable country in the region and one with important economic and technological growth imperatives, India has, at the same time, to be seen as a credible power and also be able to safeguard its own interests from regional turmoil and instabilities.
 
India's Specific Concerns
 
 India has some specific concerns in the Indian Ocean. As many as 3.5 million Indian citizens work in the Gulf countries, contributing over $ 10 billion to the Indian economy annually. Our interests require that the area remains stable so that their work environment is secure and their contributions are not affected in any adverse manner. All Gulf littorals are Islamic countries with whom India's own very large islamic population, larger than that of either Pakistan or Bangladesh, has many interfaces. These include, in a positive sense, religious interaction as in the 'Haj' pilgrimage but also activities inimical to our interests such as the funding of 'madarsas' and fundamentalist organizations in India, both of which fuel terrorism. Several such institutions are known to be funded in this manner from Saudi Arabia, including in places as far away and isolated as the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Another vital concern is India's dependence on oil imports from the Gulf. Over 70 percent of India's annual oil consumption is imported and the figure is likely to go up from 80 million tons this year to 150 million tons by 2020. Any stoppage or interdiction of this oil will have crippling impact on the country's economic growth. The safety and security of this lifeline is, therefore, critical to our interests. It is equally important that our offshore oil assets, spread over an area of over 48,000 square kilometers, are protected from any attacks or encroachments by hostile elements. The same holds true for the nearly 4,000 odd tankers which come to our ports every year. Their number is likely to grow to over 8,000 by 2020 and the area under offshore exploitation will also increase considerably by that time. There are prospects of oil and gas discoveries on the eastern seaboard of India and in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Further, 95 percent of India's overseas trade moves through the medium of the sea, including vast tonnages of coal, iron ore and other raw materials and manufactured products going out of the country or coming into it. Safety of the sea lanes, the coastal offshore areas and our ports and harbours through which this trade moves is, therefore, vital to the security of our national interests. In earlier times, the emphasis was on securing our assets against naval or military threats but the major threat now is that posed by terrorists and non-state actors, with or without the direct or indirect collusion of some states. In this new scenario, ships and ports can be targets of terrorist attacks, or used as conveyances for terrorist activities, or utilized as delivery systems/weapons for terrorist attacks. Not only coastal areas but even the open sea can be used for terrorist attacks which could also target coastal or island habitats. Indeed, it would be unwise to exclude any activity at sea or in ports from the reach of determined terrorists.
 
 India shares maritime boundaries with three of its South Asian neighbours and with four countries of the ASEAN. While boundaries have been delineated with all of them except with Pakistan and Bangladesh, there is potential for discord once capability to exploit underwater resources becomes technologically feasible at affordable cost. The existing irritants of poaching and smuggling can then transform themselves into larger issues as nations compete for precious mineral resources and raw materials. Yet another concern relates to piracy and hijacking of ships. As has been mentioned earlier, these are now assuming menacing proportions and are not confined to mere robbery. Increasingly, force is being used and crews killed before the ship is taken away to be deployed for transport of drugs, arms and explosives. Much of this activity is taking place in waters of the Indian Ocean, especially off Indonesia and in the Strait of Malacca and in the South China Sea. Interestingly, even as incidents of routine piracy such as boardings, robberies etc have shown a decline in the Strait of Malacca in the last three years, those in which ships have been taken over outright, have gone up five-fold. Such ships are then used for illegal activities such as smuggling of narcotics which, in turn, lead to procurement and transportation of arms and explosives. These, ultimately find their way to terrorist movements. Much of the LTTE terrorism in Sri Lanka has been fuelled by arms and explosives brought into the east coast of that country in this manner and procured from the sale of narcotics taken out of Myanmar. Explosives for the series of bomb blasts which hit the city of Mumbai in India in 1993 had also been brought in by sea. Located between two of the major narcotics producing centres of the world, the Golden Triangle in the east, fuelled from Myanmar, and the Golden Crescent in the west, centered on Afghanistan, India is particularly exposed to this sinister threat. Terrorists now have access to sophisticated arms and equipment such as GPS, SATCOM, Night Vision Devices and shoulder fired missiles. They can utilize even more potent weapons and move about in vehicles such as high speed craft and helicopters. Therefore, the entire world of maritime terrorism has now acquired a much more military complexion, requiring a compatible response. Finally, the Indian Ocean region has witnessed considerable militarization in the last decade. Iran and Singapore now deploy submarines and Malaysia will soon join this group. Even the smaller countries deploy ships and craft fitted with sophisticated missiles, and modern aircraft like Mirages and F16s, can be found in the inventory of many air forces. This enhanced military capability in India's proximity has to be taken note of. Along with other concerns, it creates a security environment in which India must interact proactively with many countries, both external to this region and littoral to it. Maritime power has to be an essential ingredient of these interfaces, especially between countries which share common interests and depend on the sea for their economic sustenance and growth.







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