In the past, when international society faced specific problems, it drew on topics one problem at a time to devise solutions in isolation. International relations consisted of solving each problem by negotiating the interests of each side to reach an agreement. Each issue was dealt with on its own in a self-complete system, or regime, such as the trade regime or the environmental regime.

 After the collapse of the Cold War, the standoff between East and West came to an end and the old framework for international relations, which was built around the needs of military security, was discarded, and efforts began to replace it with a new, post-Cold War framework in which problems were solved through international coordination.

 Amid these developments, observers began to question the usefulness of the old regime system, as various regimes, such as the environmental and trade regimes in the WTO, came into conflict with each other. A new order was needed that extended across multiple regimes, giving rise to the governance theory. International society shifted from the regime theory to the governance theory, and the concepts used to deal with security issues changed so that security could be pursued from an integrated, multifaceted perspective.

 The ocean has many self-contained regimes of its own. First among these was the land and sea regimes, followed by a multitude of regimes for navigation, the environment, fishing and so forth. An opposition also existed between the legislative regime and the enforcement regime. Each regime focused strictly on the people who used the sea and gave no consideration to those living on the land. The land regime and ocean regime were completely separate from each other, which is one reason why the world was so slow to respond to marine pollution originating on land and piracy occurring at sea. Moreover, as seen in the high seas fisheries, the legislative regime and enforcement regime were divorced from each other as well.

 The move toward governance for the ocean is driven by the need to coordinate among the interests of various parties in ways that supersede individual regimes. In particular, the flag state principle, once a centerpiece of international law, was revised, touching off a surge of movement toward governance. In fisheries, for example, provisions were made for boarding and searching foreign fishing vessels on the high seas, as nation-states exercised their right of enforcement as treaty organizations. These moves represented a first step toward "governance without government." In response to the threat of terrorism at sea, revisions to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) convention were debated, with some parties arguing that national governments can board and search third-party vessels on the high seas to protect the safety of people on land. These movements provided a foothold for achieving governance through preventive action.

 At this point, however, ocean governance is only applied piecemeal, as a way of compensating for the limitations of the flag-state principle. The traditional order of the sea continues to be upheld. The purpose of this symposium is to discuss ways of constructing a new order of the sea that protects security while serving the interests of the international community in common.

 Recent years have seen increasing attention given to the revision of the flag-state jurisdiction. The IMO is currently deliberating on revisions to the SUA convention that would include measures to control the transport of weapons of mass destructions (WMD).

 Ocean governance is an all-encompassing issue, and 'securing the oceans' will be impossible without an interdependent approach to problems of both sea and land.

 Changing the framework for managing the ocean opens up a Pandora's box. The danger is that moves toward radical change may cause massive confusion as nations seek to carve up new parcels of marine territory for themselves. It is important to create a marine order that serves the interests of the international community in common but does not make residents of coastal areas apprehensive. This is the issue at hand in "securing the ocean."

 Attacks on oil tankers jeopardize the environment and threaten a body blow against the global economy. Commercial vessels could also be hijacked and used to attack other vessels, as well as installations such as ports and oil storage facilities. The threat of marine transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists is also serious.

 In 2003, when the United States established the Department of Homeland Security, one of its objectives was to ensure the safety of ports. Port patrols were stepped up and the US Coast Guard required all vessels calling on American ports to notify them within 96 hours of their arrival.

 Yet the world has over 4,000 ports, and some 46,000 vessels ply the oceans. In the United States alone, about 6 million containers are stored at the nation's ports. Customs officials can only inspect about 2% of this total. Because inspection at the point of shipping is especially important, the United States is concluding shipping port inspection agreements with a number of countries.

 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code in December 2002 which requires the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to be installed in every vessel.

 In the Asia-Pacific region, a so-called Asia Pacific Maritime Operational Cooperation (APMOC) framework needs to be established, to conduct joint monitoring of sea-lanes and choke points. This in turn will require efforts toward regional security building, including further confidence-building between countries. NATO is pursuing this through the foundation of a Joint Standing Naval Force.

 The problems of piracy and armed robbery at sea are intensifying in the Indonesian side of the Malacca-Singapore Straits. According to a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there have been cases of pirates firing on small oil tankers with heavy artillery. Since 9/11, fears have grown that pirates and terrorists are joining forces. An LNG tanker passing through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be hijacked and used by terrorists as a weapon. An event such as this could cause incalculable damage to the global economy.

 Maintaining the security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore requires some curtailment of sovereignty over territorial waters.

 SUA convention stipulates that countries have the right to enforce the law if an event deemed to be an attack is committed within their territorial waters, and may detain the attackers and transfer them to other countries. While this convention enables countries to respond effectively to armed robbery and terrorism, so far in the Southeast Asian region only Vietnam has signed onto this convention.

 Calls for a revision of the SUA convention and its protocol came in the wake of 9/11, and in 2002 the IMO began deliberating on proposed amendments. One proposed revision empowers countries to board and search vessels, even outside territorial waters, if said vessels are suspected of supplying weapons to international terrorists.

 In December 2002, a decision was adopted to suppress terrorism and other acts that threaten international maritime security. An annex to SOLAS convention was amended to mandate the use of ISPS code and AIS.

 However, the SOLAS revision does not specifically address security in key international straits, so negotiations between states bordering the straits and user states will be needed.

 Cooperation Agreements to protect the security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may be concluded on the basis of Article 43 of UNCLOS, which states, "User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate. " It should therefore be possible to conduct joint and integrated patrols, escort vulnerable vessels and conduct spot investigations of ships suspected of terrorism, without compromising the sovereignty of user states.

 More work is needed to divide the burden among user states. Japan is contributing significantly in this regard.

 The ocean continues to be a scene of tension between the contrasting principles of freedom of the high sea and territorial sovereignty. The problems of the ocean must be addressed as problems for our very civilization, and countries must work together for their common interest.

 The South China Sea provides extremely vital sea-lanes, as roughly half of all of the world's trade flows through these lanes. The South China Sea contains numerous choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait. and the Lombok and Makassar Straits.

 The South China Sea has been called a focal point for international disputes. Major current disputes center on sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. Complicating these disputes further is the United States' assertion of right of free passage. The Taiwan Strait is another potential source of conflict.

 Problems of sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea are complicated, as they include the rights to exploit resources on the ocean floor, the extent of EEZs, drawing the boundaries of the continental shelf and questions of jurisdiction.

 Piracy and armed robbery in the South China Sea form a growing threat to navigation in the region. Incidents of hijacking have also occurred in Manila Bay.

 Terrorist elements such as Al Qaeda and Jemaa Islamiyah are known to be operating in the Philippines and are said to be spreading into Thailand and Cambodia. The danger of war from international terrorism is mounting in the South China Sea and the archipelagic waters of the Philippines.

 If terrorist attacks were to spread into the archipelagic waters of the Philippines and surrounding sea-lanes, they would be met with almost no effective defense. On the other hand, there is a problem associated with the archipelagic waters of the Philippines that under UNCLOS they are recognized as such but under the domestic law of the Philippines they are considered as internal waters. Environmental damage is also feared if archipelagic waters are recognized as archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP).

 Professor Magallona proposed the establishment of more organized forms of cooperation, based on the provisions of Article 123 of UNCLOS regarding semi-enclosed seas.

 Southeast Asia accounts for 2.5% of the surface area of the world's oceans and 5% of the world's population, with 270 million people living in the countries bordering its seas.

 The environmental importance of the region is enormous. Of the world's 51 types of mangrove, 45 are found in this region's rich ecosystem. Its fisheries account for 23% of Asia's total and 10% of the worldwide catch.

 Moreover, Southeast Asia's sea-lanes are extremely busy, as this region is one of the most productive in the world. Although the size of the reserves is unknown, the region's ocean floor is known to hold substantial oil fields.

 These rich and bustling seas suffer from increasing environmental degradation and resource depletion. Over the past 70 years, the region's mangrove forests have shrunk 70%. Experts expect them to disappear entirely by 2030. victims of shrimp farming and coastal urban development. Coral reefs and seaweed beds are also heavily damaged. Another problem is overfishing: The total catch needs to be slashed by 50% from current levels to enable sustainable fishing. Marine pollution is worsening, but virtually all of the pollution sources are based on land. Few of the region's countries have established any facilities to deal with the effluence of organic pollutants. Among the major causes of pollution originating on land are rising population density, industrialization and urbanization. Although these problems desperately require a strategic approach to environmental preservation, no legal framework exists for regional cooperation. The problem is not lack of resources to fight environmental degradation but a lack of political leadership. Southeast Asia badly needs regional cooperation on environmental security.