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Overview of Discussions
Session 4: Panel Discussion
(Forming and Implementing New Concepts in Security)
The basis of forming new concepts in security
4-1 In today's panel we heard discussions touching on the issue of sovereignty, and most of the comments pointed out the downsides of sovereignty. I think it is high time for a review of the way we look at sovereignty. If too much emphasis is placed on sovereignty, countries will attempt to solve all of their problems on their own, creating an isolationist tendency. This would be unfortunate, as solutions to the problems of marine security, and especially security of the environment, demand limitations on national sovereignty.
Of course, there are dangers in discarding national sovereignty and entrusting powers to international bodies. It may be advisable to change the way claims are expressed, so that new powers can arise. With the birth of new international conventions, new approaches to solving environmental issues may become apparent, and problems can be solved through international coordination.
This was the thinking behind UNCLOS. This convention was based on a curtailment of sovereignty in some areas, coupled with an extension of power in others. The time has come for nation-states to reconsider the balance between rights and responsibilities.
4-2 People, of course, did not live in the sea originally, and historically the sea has been treated as something held in common. In the debate leading to the formulation of UNCLOS, the idea of the "common heritage of mankind" played a prominent role. Although the language of the convention speaks directly of the deep seabed, the "common heritage" idea may also be interpreted as applying to the oceans as a whole, with some scholars claiming that signatory coastal states are obligated to manage their EEZs. Of course, there is the interpretation that the coastal states have certain rights over these seas areas as well.
The oceans are not discrete entities but a single, worldwide, contiguous body. Although UNCLOS divides the ocean into areas of different legal standings, it is best not to over-emphasize this aspect, lest we create new difficulties that might hinder the cause of addressing environmental issues, and in some cases of addressing security issues. The framework of sea areas with different legal standings found in UNCLOS might give the impression of being unnatural or arbitrary, so I feel that ways need to be found to tackle security issues with an approach that takes these shortcomings into account.
4-3 I believe these discussions have clearly laid out the basic approach to new concepts in security. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, the late founder of the International Ocean Institute (IOI), was famous for coining phrases. For example, she spoke of "the equilibrium principle" in UNCLOS and "trusteeship" in the EEZs. By "trusteeship" she meant that coastal states entrusted their sovereign right over the waters under their jurisdiction "for the good of mankind" as "the common heritage of mankind." The basis of the EEZ concept was to impart to coastal states not only the right but the duty to manage these waters, not as a means of projecting exclusive sovereign rights over jurisdictional sea areas.
To ensure that national sovereignty does not work against the cause of international cooperation on security and the environment, ocean management must be considered in light of the perspectives that Dr. Borgese outlined. If we set lofty ideals, our goals may be criticized as unrealistic in today's international society, yet it is just as unrealistic to expect sovereign states to solve global problems when they place their own sovereignty above all else. In the final analysis, basing discussions on unrealistically high ideals may turn out to be the most realistic approach. I think that if we bear these thoughts in mind, we can appreciate how important it is to lead discussions based on the principle of governance as described at the beginning of the conference.
4-4 The principle of equilibrium is absolutely vital, and we must always remember that the purpose of new concepts in security is to secure the ocean for the security of all humanity. I do disagree somewhat, however, on the matter of "trusteeship." Despite the extraordinarily high expectations for UNCLOS, one of the real problems with the EEZs is that the management and other duties stipulated are far beyond the capabilities of some coastal states. To implement a new concept in security, measures will have to be taken to enhance the management capabilities of those countries. Support for coastal states may have to become a duty of signatory states.
Several tasks must be undertaken to boost the management capabilities of coastal states. First, systematic arrangements are necessary. One core element of capacity building is the establishment of a system for collaboration between government offices. Norms developed in some countries can be spread to other countries, for example. The second requirement is resources. These include personnel resources, information resources, and enforcement resources such as coast guards, all of which are sorely lacking in many coastal states. The third requirement is a legal framework. In order for management capability to be raised, both domestic and international laws must be in place. In some cases it may be unclear whether international conventions are to be adopted in domestic law or transferred to a regional framework. Moreover, further effort will be required to harmonize the various rights and duties enshrined in domestic law and international conventions.
4-5 I wonder if this discussion isn't getting too obsessed with the interpretation of UNCLOS. A convention is after all a living document, which allows for adjustment as circumstances change. Even in territorial waters, UNCLOS circumscribes national sovereignty with duties that must be executed according to the convention. International environmental laws limit sovereignty. Although national sovereignty extends 12 nautical miles from shore, certain responsibilities are attached to this sovereignty. Directly or indirectly, coastal states are required by the convention to secure the ocean.
Although the national interest is presumably more important to coastal states than securing the ocean, these states cannot ignore international interests. Even so, calling upon coastal states to maintain the safety of their sea-lanes and secure the ocean is unreasonable without some sharing of the burden. We have to think about the rights and duties of international society as a whole, not merely about those of coastal states.
Coast guard cooperation
4-6 I'd like to comment about cooperation between coast guards. A variety of programs are under way in the South China Sea, but almost nothing of the sort in Northeast Asia. I suppose this is due to the problems of the Korean peninsula. If we hold this conference again next year, I hope that we will choose "cooperation between coast guards" as one of the themes. In military terms such programs might seem insignificant, but we can position such programs as a peacetime, civilian endeavor. South Korea has a coast guard, and the Japan Coast Guard has a long history of service. In China, some five or six agencies are concerned with the ocean, scattered among different ministries. A proposal calls for the integration of these units.
4-7 Adopting cooperation between coast guards as a theme is correct. A number of circumstances have conspired against such cooperation in this region, but I think in the future we need to give priority to this theme. The view that coastal states may need assistance in boosting their management capacity is also an important point. For example, we need to respond to non-traditional threats, such as threats to fisheries and unlawful activities at sea.
In the appendix to Professor Bateman's thesis, a few items touch on the subject of regional security workshops. Seven years ago at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 1996 I think it was, an excellent idea was proposed, that regular exchanges of information be held on ocean security, including human security and environmental security. The members were agreed on it but nothing was done. Needless to say, these initiatives cost money. I also think we need to get countries in the region into the habit of cooperating. If a four-day program of workshops were held, for example, the financial outlay would be small, and the benefits would be immense. If these initiatives could be made into regular events, it would be possible to steadily enhance capabilities for marine activity in this region.
4-8 The Japan Coast Guard has been collaborating for some years now with its Chinese counterpart, which is the Department of Public Safety. However, the field of cooperation is narrow, as it deals strictly with illegal migration. I have heard that China is in talks with corresponding authorities in South Korea as well. Because mechanisms for cooperation already exist, I believe this is feasible. In research on measures against piracy, conclusions have been stated that collaboration between Japan and China is extremely vital.
4-9 Coast-guard cooperation deserves close attention. It is my understanding that the coast guards of five North Pacific countries-China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States-have inaugurated regular meetings. On measures against piracy, enforcement agencies in East Asia began a series of experts' meeting in 2000. So far, however, more wide-ranging regional activities are lacking. This is partly because the region's various maritime authorities differ slightly in their roles, from enforcement to rescue and pollution prevention, so regional conferences were always difficult to organize. Today, however, each of the countries in the region either has a coast guard or is in the process of organizing one. The time when it is possible to promote the creation of a regional coast guard network is fast approaching.
Future themes for debate
4-10 Several people have advocated multilateral cooperation on and joint action by coast guards. Certainly these initiatives are highly important in realizing the concept of securing the ocean; in fact they are absolutely essential. We must, however, avoid taking a narrow view of security in which the aspect of military security is forgotten. This is why discussions of naval cooperation must remain part of the debate.
Professor Bateman delivered a thesis on ocean peacekeeping (OPK), in which he suggested that OPK is best handled by coast guards at this point. However, when Shigeru Ishiba, Director General of Japan's Defence Agency, visited India this year, George Fernandes, India's Minister of Defence, suggested that Japan, India and indeed all the nations of Southeast Asia could collaborate on OPK, with a view to building confidence and promoting transparency. I think it would be useful to leave room in our discussions for naval cooperation aimed at building confidence.
Dr. Weeks' paper offered a description of NATO's Standing Operation Force. Dr. Weeks feels that a standing multilateral force in this region is out of the question right now, but I would like to hear his views on naval cooperation.
4-11 NATO is promoting a standing naval force. NATO already has a committee, is itself an organization for military cooperation, and has an established chain of command. No comparable structure exists for the Asia-Pacific region. While such a thing cannot be ruled out, considerable bafflers would have to be surmounted to establish a standing force. Creating a formal chain of command would be a real challenge. A more likely scenario is a non-permanent, ad hoc approach, featuring cooperation on sea-lanes (especially choke points) and the like.
4-12 We cannot exclude naval forces from the frame of discussion. If we hold another conference next year, I hope we can include coast guards and navies in the discussions of international cooperation.
4-13 Strengthening systems of cooperation among coast guards is vital. There is no need for further conferences on this point-we urgently need to move to the implementation phase with all possible speed. I do not foresee any policy problems emerging from the work of advancing collaboration. I propose compiling a list of research centers and think tanks in this region and studying what kind of information we can expect these institutions to supply.
4-14 Cooperation among coast guards and navies is a problem for the operational phase. This suggests that we need to examine items like the flow of information and methods of control, but in fact these have already been studied and a cooperative relationship is already in place. In environmental matters, a cooperative relationship already exists with respect to specific problems. When problems arise during actual implementation, we will have to be ready to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of their impact.
For example, in controlling piracy, the form of cooperation will differ markedly depending on whether our counterparts are China or the nations of Southeast Asia. Do we concentrate on comparisons and study? Do we advocate the adoption of the ocean government concept? Or do we seek to widen the area of research beyond this region to other oceans? In each case we will have to examine and clarify which elements to incorporate in the cooperative framework. If we can specify those elements, we can include those elements in the concept of governance and specify what we mean by the concept of security.
4-15 If we cast our net too wide we end up with an approach that is unworkable in practice. For example, in the discussion of marine pollution, if we describe MEH as useful in maintaining the security of the ocean, it will be possible to obtain funding and support.
However, one problem with cooperation between navies and coast guards is that the personnel may turn over almost completely every two years, which is detrimental to continuity. Even at the West Pacific Military Symposium, different people take part every year. There is plenty of cooperation happening but not much integration. I believe this group has the ability to offer some real added value.
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