Professorial Research Fellow, the Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong

　

　

 This paper outlines some basic proposals for developing good order at sea. It suggests that the key to promoting cooperation and establishing an effective maritime conflict prevention system lies in developing wider maritime awareness in the region, including a greater appreciation of the complexities and problems of marine environmental management. In effect, this is similar to the need perceived in the U.S. for maritime domain awareness as an essential element of Homeland Security. It recognizes that comprehensive knowledge of what is happening at sea is an essential element of maritime security although at a regional level, this knowledge and understanding can only be acquired through cooperative activities. Few coastal States possess sufficient capability to meet their maritime monitoring and information needs from their own resources.

　

 There have been several initiatives in regional forums over the years related to developing maritime knowledge and information exchange. However, due largely to the lack of both commitment and resources, few of these have matured into effective operational systems. The paper describes some of these initiatives and the problems that have prevented their full implementation. A major problem has been the failure to recognize the interconnected nature of the maritime environment and the need for cooperation to maximize the common good of Ocean Security.

　

 A possible way ahead involves a "building block" approach to achieving a higher level of maritime awareness, including an appreciation of the benefits of cooperation. This might be a three-tiered approach starting with some basic initiatives to promote maritime awareness and information sharing such as inter-agency and multilateral regional security workshops and marine information directories, and then moving through digital databases to an ultimate objective of real-time maritime surveillance and information exchange. These activities might lead to, or be associated with, the implementation of more ambitious arrangements for cooperative maritime security such as the ocean peacekeeping project developed by researchers at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo between 1996 and 2000. However, this paper suggests that coast guards may be more preferable than navies for implementing such a project.

　

 Maritime awareness is generally lacking in the region at present but is fundamental to the implementation of a stable maritime regime and an effective regional response to terrorism and piracy. An action plan to build an effective maritime conflict prevention system might start "small" with some modest awareness building activities as suggested in this paper.

　

　

 The principal challenge for Ocean Security in the Asia-Pacific region is to build a stable maritime regime, which provides good order at sea, reduces the risks of conflict and allows regional countries to pursue their legitimate maritime interests in a safe and secure manner. Developing this regime requires a much higher level of maritime cooperation than exists in the region at present.

　

 If anything maritime disorder rather than order prevails in the region, particularly in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas of East Asia¹. Conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction exist throughout these waters and naval budgets continue to grow at a fast rate². Land-sourced and ship-sourced marine pollution continue unabated and marine habits are being destroyed. Major problems exist with combating illegal activity at sea such as piracy, drug trafficking and people smuggling. Fish stocks are being depleted and illegal fishing is prevalent in many areas. The maritime geography of East Asia means that a system of unilateral exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and sovereign resource rights³ is unlikely to provide an effective system of oceans management and marine environmental protection. The "Securing the Ocean" concept developed by the Institute for Ocean Policy, Ship and Ocean Foundation (SOF) is a welcome initiative towards building maritime order in the region.

　

 This paper outlines some basic proposals for an action plan to develop good order at sea. Past experience with regional maritime cooperation suggests that a "top down" approach is unlikely to be successful. A "bottom up" approach may be preferable⁴. The "bottom up" or "building block" approach was evident in the original agenda of measures for confidence building and preventive diplomacy agreed by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at its second meeting in Brunei in August 1995.⁵ However, the achievement of these measures seems to have been off the agenda in recent years. This paper suggests that the key to promoting cooperation and establishing an effective maritime conflict prevention system lies in developing wider maritime awareness in the region. The maritime strategic geography of the Western Pacific with its many islands, busy sea lines of communication (SLOCs), rich resources and overlapping zones of maritime jurisdiction dictates the importance of a common understanding of the marine environment and its many complexities, particularly legal and physical. The development of this understanding requires a high level of cooperative activity to achieve an integrated management system that meets the needs of Ocean Security.

　

 With the War on Terrorism and the priority accorded Homeland Security, a new expression has entered the maritime strategic lexicon of the United States. This is maritime domain awareness. It means knowing what is going on in the maritime environment. What shipping is in the area? What is it doing? Where is it going? What is the cargo? What other maritime activity is out there? It is an integrated approach to maritime security that ties in threats of maritime terrorism, illegal immigration, drug smuggling, illegal fishing and marine pollution. It suggests the fundamental importance of having good information on which to base risk assessments.

　

 The implementation of maritime domain awareness, if applied at a regional level, would requires the following⁶:

　

 With vast intelligence and surveillance capabilities, the U.S. is able to collect the necessary information from its own resources with only limited assistance from its immediate neighbors, particularly Canada. The situation is quite different for countries in the Western Pacific and East Asia that generally have several close neighbors, adjoining maritime zones and limited ability to collect maritime information and data. For these countries, any attempt at gaining greater awareness of their maritime environment has to be a cooperative endeavor. The perceived need of the U.S. for enhanced knowledge and awareness of the marine environment has important lessons for the region. These include a demonstrated requirement for better institutional arrangements and improved inter-agency collaboration to collect, manage and exchange maritime information.

　

 There are other factors to consider. The current focus on countering terrorist activities and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) dealing with maritime security, particularly the new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, highlight the importance of good maritime knowledge and awareness. The changes include accelerated implementation of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to ensure that ships over 300 tons are fitted by the end of 2004⁷ and mandatory fitting of ships alert systems that will see most vessels fitted by the end of 2004 and the remainder by 2006⁸.

　

 It is all very well to have ship security alert systems in highly controlled waters off the coast of Europe or North America but the effectiveness of these systems in areas such as the South China Sea is less than sure. Even if the Maritime Administration of the ship's flag State can identify an appropriate agency in a particular country to take action on the alert, there can be no guarantee of an appropriate response. Cooperative arrangements to provide the necessary response are simply not available in the region at present.

　

 Comprehensive knowledge of what is happening at sea is an essential element of maritime security. At a national level, this is required in waters under some degree of national jurisdiction i.e. internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf, as well as archipelagic waters for an archipelagic State. It is also important to have information on the approaches to those waters. Only the smallest and most insignificant coastal State can say that it has no interest whatsoever in what happens at sea beyond its national jurisdiction. Background information on the full area of interest is essential to make risk assessments and establish a baseline against which activities out of the ordinary can be assessed. Long-range identification and tracking of ships at sea is a measure that fully contributes to maritime security, including the security of the ships themselves.

　

 Few coastal States possess sufficient capability to meet their maritime monitoring and information needs from their own resources. Hence there is scope for regional cooperation, particularly in areas where neighboring countries have common interests and adjoining maritime zones, and they can cooperate without feeling they are compromising their national security or giving away vital intelligence information. This is the situation in most parts of the Western Pacific although previous initiatives for a cooperative approach to gaining maritime knowledge have been frustrated by political sensitivities and lack of both resources and commitment.

　

 Cooperation with building maritime awareness offers a number of benefits. First, it means better maritime knowledge. This leads to improved marine safety and search and rescue capabilities and a better regional ability to control marine pollution and illegal activities at sea, such as piracy, drug smuggling and arms trafficking. There is strong anecdotal evidence, for example, of a high level of ship-sourced marine pollution in the South China Sea due most probably to the lack of an effective maritime monitoring and enforcement regime. Secondly, a cooperative approach to this task contributes to regional resilience. It shows that despite political differences, regional countries can work together to address a common problem, including the threat of maritime terrorism. Lastly, cooperative activities are a valuable confidence and security building measure (CSBM).

　

 Multidisciplinary and multinational education and training in maritime affairs conducted at a regional level would make an important contribution to developing regional maritime awareness⁹. It would also help build cooperation and dialogue between agencies both at a national and regional level. In 1996 the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group agreed a proposal for regular workshops on regional maritime issues.¹⁰ One of the major objectives of these workshops was to develop greater awareness and knowledge of maritime issues within the Asia-Pacific region and their security implications. Although the CSCAP Steering Committee later endorsed the workshop proposal, funding could not be found and the proposal has not been implemented.

　

 The importance of maritime awareness and the processes to develop such awareness is not a new idea. There have been several initiatives over the years related to developing maritime knowledge and information exchange in regional forums, both Track One and Track Two. However, due largely to the lack of both commitment and resources, few of these have matured into effective operational systems.

　

 The ARF's list of CSBMs and preventive diplomacy measures mentioned earlier included maritime information databases. A maritime information database would enable regional countries to collect and collate data about maritime traffic, environmental issues, piracy and smuggling. Data relating to regional environmental security might, for example, include information on the management of the shipping and storage/disposal of toxic materials. Hydrographic and oceanographic resources in the region are limited and a multinational program that collected information on key maritime areas where it is currently lacking was recognized as an endeavor for the common good. China accepted the task of implementing the database that was subsequently established in Tianjin with a website at: www.arfmarinfo.org. However, the database is no longer up to date due to inadequate funding and the website appears to have lapsed.

　

 The IMO has introduced a mandatory ship reporting scheme for the Malacca and Singapore Straits¹¹ referred to as STRAITREP¹² and Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the IMO have also agreed to go ahead with the establishment of a Marine Electronic Highway for the Malacca and Singapore Straits¹³. This integrated system includes electronic nautical charts, positioning systems, AIS transponders, as well as the provision of meteorological, oceanographic and navigational information. It makes an important contribution to the safety of navigation and security of shipping using the straits and allows for maximum information to be available to ships as well as shore-based users such as the vessel traffic control systems managed by adjacent coastal States. It is an example of the arrangements that might be required elsewhere along the "steel corridor" between Singapore Strait and ports in Northeast Asia.

　

 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) has developed a Maritime Information Exchange Directory (MIED)¹⁴. This provides guidelines and a signals format for reporting specific maritime information between member navies. It includes a separate section for each member State, including points of contact for reporting information on marine pollution, search and rescue, humanitarian activities, suspicious activities indicating narcotics trafficking, high seas robbery and fisheries infringements. However, not all countries supplied the relevant information and many country sections are incomplete¹⁵. The U.S. Coast Guard 14^th Coast Guard District, based in Hawaii, has also developed a document similar to the MIED called the Combined Operations Manual for Regional Non-Defense Security.¹⁶

　

 An APEC study was conducted in 2002 of the arrangements for oceans management and policy in APEC member economies. This information was collected primarily as a basis for cooperative oceans management under the formula of the Seoul Oceans Declaration agreed by APEC Maritime Ministers at their meeting in Seoul in April 2002¹⁷. However, with some minor amendments, it could also benefit maritime security cooperation.

　

 The Philippine delegation to the Workshop on Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM) held in Cairns, Australia in June 2003¹⁸ made a proposal for an eco-system-based, large eco-regional ocean governance mechanism for the seas of East and Southeast Asia. The implementation of such a mechanism would require a comprehensive agenda for practical cooperation including with the safety of navigation, marine scientific research and the establishment of a monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) system.

　

 In the mid-1990s, the Information Technology Division of the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) developed the Strategic Maritime Information System (SMIS). This was a database of open source, maritime information covering Southeast Asian and Australian waters, including map depictions, maritime boundaries, reports of incidents at sea, port details, data on some 32,000 merchant ships over 1,000 GRT which operate in the region, major routes and shipping movements. Table 1 showing data on the movement of ships with dangerous cargoes in Southeast Asia is an example of the type of information provided by SMIS. This type of data is important for risk assessments and to manage maritime security but unfortunately work on SMIS was suspended several years ago due to lack of sponsorship.

　

 A Regional Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime (RMSSAR) was originally suggested in the early 1990s¹⁹. This would help ensure the safety of shipping and sea borne trade; assist in creating a stable maritime regime; contribute to the preservation of the marine environment; and develop a framework of cooperation that could provide the basis for dealing with higher order contingencies that might arise in the future. However, many difficulties were identified. These included the lack of any clear commonality of interest between possible member countries, the differences in national organizational arrangements for undertaking surveillance, and regional sensitivities to particular issues, including fishing and disputed maritime claims.