We shall now try to draw the consequences of the situation as it has evolved.

　

　　It would be quite superfluous to Aamend all the Articles of the Law of the Sea Convention that deal with Aflag State control. Progressive interpretation and implementation may take care of the problem. Where now there is a balance between flag State, coastal State, and port State control and enforcement, that balance may shift towards port State control. If port State MOUs today are based on the notion that primary responsibility rests with the flag State, with port States playing a supplementary secondary safety-net role, this relationship will be reversed, with the port State having primary responsibility, and the flag State receding in importance, until it is finally phased out.

　

　　The port State control system certainly can still be strengthened and improved. Ways of establishing a regional support infrastructure for shipping that embraces elements such as insurance and P&I and identifying the continuing part that bodies such as the Asian Ship-owners= Forum, the Association of Maritime Education and Training Institutions in Asia Pacific and the Asia Marine Consortium can play are being studied right now.²⁴ Inter-regional cooperation among various regional arrangements will respond to the needs of a global industry.

　

　　The port State control system thus will be a vitally important component of ocean governance with regard to shipping. The limitation of the system is that it is applicable only to ships voluntarily in a port or offshore terminal of a State party. Ships moving or anchored at sea are out of reach. It is here that the system needs to be complemented.

　

　　Piracy and armed robbery at sea were discussed in some depth during the second session of the General Assembly=s consultative process (UNICPOLOS II). IMO=s role in the suppression of piracy was highly appreciated. Contributions such as AGuidance to Ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,²⁵ which contains advice on concrete measures that could taken onboard to prevent attacks or, when they occur, to minimize the danger to crews and ships, were found to be extremely useful. But it was also pointed out, that, despite these efforts, IMO had no power of implementation and enforcement, and thus had been unable to halt the phenomenal increase in incidents.

　

　　Considering the demonstrated inability of affected coastal States to cope with the problem unilaterally, there was unanimous agreement on the recognition that the problem, and all the related problems of crimes at sea and of enforcing compliance with agreed laws, rules and regulations, could only be solved on the basis of regional cooperation. IMO=s role in developing a regional approach was highly commended. A series of IMO missions to affected areas, and regional seminars²⁶ all had stressed the importance of regional co-operation and co-ordination in the fight against piracy and armed robbery. The 1999 Singapore meeting thus had concluded that authorizing local commanders to respond in concert with other agencies and regional security forces without the need to gain prior approval, together with regular joint patrols and surveillance activities, could help prevent attacks. Co-ordination could be achieved, it was agreed, through a raft of practical measures such as the exchange of officers, the sharing of common radio frequencies, and agreeing in advance to follow common practices and pre-arranged operational procedures.

　

　　Japan=s contribution to the UNICPOLOS II discussions was outstanding. Japan had organized a regional conference on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships, in which 17 countries participated. The Conference had adopted three important documents: AThe Tokyo Appeal, advocating cooperation among coastguards and navies, as well as a plan for strengthening the self-defence capability of ships; a Model Action Plan, with concrete measures to be implemented in the short term; and guidelines to facilitate regional cooperation entitled AAsia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000. On the basis of this latter document, the Japanese Coast Guard had conducted joint exercises with India and Malaysia. These exercises covered communication, search and rescue, interception, and boarding. At the Regional Experts Meeting on Combating Piracy, held in Kuala Lumpur in November 2000, Japan had offered to accept students from the Asia region at the Japan Coast Guard Academy. Students from Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have jointed the school since April 2001.

　

　　Thus everything pointed in the direction pursued by the IOI discussion paper submitted to UNICPOLOS II, but the IOI paper attempted to go one step further. The IOI paper suggested the establishment of Regional Coast Guards within the institutional framework of a revitalized Regional Seas Programme. This idea, considered highly controversial and unrealistic only two or three years ago, when it was first introduced in the Euro-Mediterranean Process, would seem quite logical today.²⁷ As a matter of fact, it would provide the only practical response to the threats of globalized crime at sea. In the Asia Pacific Region it would appear mandatory and urgent.

　

　　The IOI study is based on Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration²⁸ stating that APeace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible. They are the threefold basis of sustainable development.

　

　　The IOI study also attempts to respond to the current emphasis, by the international community, within the UN system and outside of it, on the need for implementation and enforcement rather than the making of new laws and conventions.

　

　　Thirdly, the IOI study is in accordance with universally recognized need for integrated management, at all levels, including the regional level.

　

　　Implementation and compliance enforcement at the regional level involves much more than the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. It involves the whole slew of Conventions listed in the Port State Control MOUs; it involves the suppression of Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUUF). Obviously it would be absurd, and extremely wasteful, to envisage a separate enforcement system for each one of these Conventions. One regional coast guard would be sufficient for the enforcement of all. This, again, means operational integration of different convention regimes in a regional context. The IOI study develops an illustrative model showing how a regional coast guard could practically be integrated into the Regional Seas Programme.

　

　　The model has a number of components. Over-all policies and activities of the Regional Coast Guard would be determined by the Meetings of the Contracting Parties. Ministers of Defence, or Secretaries of national coast guards or navies would have to be included in the high-level (ministerial) segments of such meetings. Tasking Commissions would have to be established for strategic planning and other highly technical functions of this new institutions. These tasking commissions would be serviced by Regional Activity Centres (RACs) as they already exist within each Regional Seas Programme.

　

　　The IOI model proposes a number of other technical details, which, however, obviously would vary from region to region, depending on existing infrastructure, cultures and needs.

　

　　Regional Coast Guards thus would be the counterpart, or complement, to the Port State Control systems. While these systems cover ships voluntarily in ports or offshore terminals of Parties, the Regional Coastguard would cover ships outside such venues.

　

　　Regional Coast Guards would be the second essential component of ocean governance regarding shipping.

　

　　The third essential component must deal with the registration of ships. If it is correct to assume that the globalization of the shipping industry and the growing numbers of ships registered under flags of convenience are eroding the validity and usefulness of national registration, the logical consequence would be to think of some form of international registration. The most suitable international institution to assume this task would be IMO.

　

　　To assume responsibility for the registration of ships obviously would add an enormous burden for which IMO might not be prepared at this time. The arising extra costs would be covered by registration fees, which, beyond covering the real costs might even be a source of a modest extra income which could be utilized for other services, including training, etc. It would be impossible, however, for IMO to assume liability for ships flying its flags. For this, the governance system needs a fourth component. This would be constituted by the insurance industry.

　

　　As it tries to overcome its own, quite critical problems - the unprecedented damage inflicted on it on September 11, which is forcing a considerable sector into bankruptcy, is only a foretaste of things to come - the industry has to expand into new sectors and increase the shrinking area of Ainsurability. The coastal zone, where the vast majority of humankind is living in this century, and which, at the same time, is the most exposed and vulnerable zone on the globe, is likely to be a main target for the expansion of the industry. Risk reduction, improved risk management and disaster response are in the common interest of the coastal manager and the insurance industry. The timely integration of the insurance industry, as a major Astake holder, into (Aintegrated coastal management( would advance this common interest. AIntegrated coastal management includes shipping and the management of ports and harbours.

　

　　As cited above, the establishment of regional support infrastructure for shipping Athat embraces elements such as insurance and P&I... is already under consideration. With the globalization of the shipping industry, it is only the global insurance industry that can assume the liability. The open-registry States most certainly cannot do it.

　

　　The system one could envisage would consist of a number of components, from micro mutual insurance schemes of the Grameen banking type to national or regional companies up to the re-insurance system, and complemented by industrial mutual self-insurance system such as the former TOVALOP and CRISTAL tanker self-insurance systems.²⁹

　

　　An ocean governance system for shipping, with its four major components, such as we have tried to design it here, is not a figment of imagination or a pie in the sky. It responds to the needs of today and tomorrow and is built on existing institutions and ongoing developments and trends. Not all four components need to be implemented all at once. They might be implemented one by one, flexibly, wherever the opportunity arises.

　

　　UNCTAD=s concern for the equitable participation of developing countries in the shipping industry would have to be reviewed in the light of the changed situation. The goal, today, cannot be the establishment of national fleets, but the full participation of experts from developing countries in the global management of the industry. This can be enhanced through training and education

　

　　But the vision of the whole should never get lost, for Athe problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole. Eventually, the whole system might be codified in a Protocol to the Law of the Sea Convention.