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III.
This brief review of the existing ocean governance with regard to shipping, especially in the Asia Pacific region, taken together with the continued growth of tonnage and economic value of shipping, might make it appear that all is well and there is nothing to worry about. This, however, is not the case. Not all is well. Globalization, liberalization, privatization and deregulation have all contributed to making the rich richer and the poor poorer.
 
  Technological developments: the sheer size of ships, the sophistication of their high tech equipment, including electronic navigational charts, global positioning system equipment, automatic identification system transponders, etc., and the concurrent transformation of modern ports, have made it more difficult for poor countries to participate. UNCTAD=s attempts to enhance equity in international sea-borne trade and to increase the participation of developing countries through the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences has clearly failed. That Convention is simply no longer applicable, as more than 50 percent of the trade is now being carried by lines outside the Conference system, and the very concept of a national fleet has become obsolete in a globalized system where ownership has become anonymous and can no longer be identified. Ships may be registered in one state, owned by multinational consortia and manned by multinational crews. Liability becomes elusive.
 
  Over 30 percent of ships are now registered under flags of convenience - and the number is still growing - without any genuine link between ship and flag State, and thus making flag State control a pipe dream. This affects, in particular, the Asia Pacific region, as shown in the following tables.
 
Table 12. Use of Flags of Convenience in the Strait of Malacca (by Owner and Capacity)
Parent Country Capacity (million DWT) Capacity of Fleet Flagged Out (Percentage)
Japan 432 62
Greece 102 67
United States 97 77
Great Britain 90 91
Singapore 88 50
Norway 68 32
South Korea 66 67
Hong Kong 63 85
Bermuda 40 100
Denmark 39 56
Taiwan 39 22
Malaysia 36 3
Adapted from: John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).
 
Table 13. Use of Flags of Convenience in the Spratlys (by Owner and Capacity)
Parent Country Capacity (million DWT) Capacity of Fleet Flagged Out (Percentage)
Japan 471 62
Greece 90 65
Great Britain 79 90
Hong Kong 72 80
South Korea 70 64
United States 70 73
Singapore 67 49
Norway 62 33
Taiwan 53 31
Denmark 51 45
China 43 15
Bermuda 32 100
Adapted from: John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).
 
Table 14. Use of Flags of Convenience in the Strait of Sunda (by Owner and Capacity)
Parent Country Capacity (million DWT) Capacity of Fleet Flagged Out (Percentage)
Indonesia 22 50
Japan 15 72
Hong Kong 10 63
Greece 8 57
Taiwan 6 28
South Korea 6 63
Singapore 6 67
Great Britain 5 100
United States 3 97
Norway 3 45
Adapted from: John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).
Table 15. Use of Flags of Convenience in the Strait of Lombok (by Owner and Capacity)
Parent Country Capacity (million DWT) Capacity of Fleet Flagged Out (Percentage)
Japan 114 30
South Korea 40 53
China 25 8
Taiwan 18 15
Hong Kong 17 52
Greece 12 36
Australia 12 19
Norway 8 21
Great Britain 7 100
United States 7 99
Adapted from: John Noer and David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).
 
  In spite of the ILO=s continued efforts the plight of seafarer remains undiminished as documented in Alistair Couper's recent book Voyages of Abuse: Seafarers, Human Rights and International Shipping.16 Unwholesome working conditions, lack of payments and, above all, abandonment of penniless, destitute seafarers in foreign ports, are as common as ever. All these factors lead to an unacceptable average of 2,207 deaths per year among the seafarers of the world.17
 
  The effectiveness of IMO=s legislation to enhance the safety of ships and the conservation of the marine environment is endangered by upsurge of piracy and armed robbery at sea which is linked to globalized criminal cartels engaged in the multi-billion business of the illegal transport of drugs, arms, and persons. Piracy has risen 57 percent between 1999 and 2000; and acts of violence resulting in injury and death have risen, in the same period, from 24 to 99 and from 3 to 72, respectively.18
 
  Incidents of piracy are also becoming more costly in economic terms, as pirates are increasingly efficient at targeting high value cargo and sometimes vanish with entire vessels. Also the marine environment is often put at risk by acts of piracy and armed robbery, as it is common practice among pirates to leave captain and crew bound and gagged, if not murdered, on board as the vessel continues navigating unattended. It is not difficult to imagine the potential environmental implications of such situations, particularly when they occur in straits or near coastlines.
 
  Last not least, organized crime groups are increasingly becoming involved in acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The piracy industry, in fact, is becoming as globalized as any other industry. Groups increasingly cooperate with one another on all geographic scales and combine various aspects of their activities, including drug trafficking and the smuggling of humans and small arms, in order to rationalize their operations as well as penetrate and develop new illicit markets.19
 
  Occurrences are concentrated in West Africa, Malacca Strait, South China Sea and South America, as well as some Ahot spots. Thus, in 2000 Indonesia accounts for one fourth of all incidents, Malacca shows the fastest growth in incidents, and Bangladesh the second highest growth rate.20 It should also be noted that:
 
X the majority of the reported cases for 2000 are within the waters of developing nations;
 
X a large proportion of these attacks occurred in straits;
 
X the majority of affected nations are currently engaged in either internal or external low- to medium-intensity conflicts which involve maritime jurisdiction issues;
 
X the majority of these nations have large maritime areas under their jurisdiction within which they are not able to ensure maritime security.21
 
Additional data, regarding the Asia Pacific region, is shown in the following figure.
 
Figure 1. Attacks in South East Asia and Far East - 1 January To 31 December 200022
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  The over-all threat to the existing system is what I would call the twilight of flag State control.
 
  The Law of the Sea Convention, as well as all other instruments of international law, still rely fully on the concept of the equal sovereignty of States. Unquestioned flag State control is an apanage of the equal sovereignty of States, which may apply even to Afailed States But obviously, Asovereignty in the 21st century cannot be what it was in the 17th when the European nation State rose from the ashes of the Thirty Years= War and the Treaty of Westphalia and when Western International Law was born.
Globalization23 and interdependence are transforming the concept of Asovereignty= just as they are transforming everything else and the concept of flag State control just is no longer viable.








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