The sealanes stretching from the Middle East via the Malacca/Singapore Straits, the South China Sea and the East China Sea to Northeast Asia are vital to inter- and intra-regional trade(Figures 1 and 2). For Japan, freedom of navigation along these sealanes is the fundament to its economic security in terms of imported oil, and trade with Southeast Asia and Western Europe. And to the United States, it is critical to the mobility and flexibility of its Seventh Fleet, and thus to the defense of its allies - Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. Yet new threats to sealane safety and security loom on the horizon including potential interstate conflict, creeping jurisdiction, environmentally-related restrictions, and piracy.

　

　　These threats present Japan with difficult policy choices. In the post Cold-War era, it is tentatively seeking a more assertive role in regional and world affairs. And the United States is encouraging it to do so. However, lingering suspicion and apprehension based on Japan's behavior in World War II, and domestic sensitivity to a foreign defense role constrain its actions and options. This paper provides the relevant background, delineates the relevant interests of each of the major players, elaborates the threats to the sealanes, and suggests ways forward in reducing these threats, as well as Japan's possible roles in doing so.

Southeast Asia is important as a transit route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, between Japan and other countries of Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and between Northeast Asia and Australia/New Zealand². Intra-regional shipping, much of it by relatively small vessels, significantly increases the volume of traffic along some of these routes. There are about 45 international straits in Southeast Asia, 25 of which might be considered as "major" straits. The most significant, in terms of use or of strategic importance are Malacca/Singapore, Luzon(consisting of three Channels - Bashi, Balintang, and Babuyan); Formosa; Torres, Sunda, Lombok, and Obai-Wetar in Indonesia, and San Bernardino, Surigao and Balut in the Philippines.

　

　　There are about 40 international straits in Northeast Asia, many of them separating the islands of the Ryukyu and Kurile Island chains. Among the most critical are the two Korea Straits, separating South Korea from Japan; Osumi Strait between Kyushu Island and the northernmost Ryukyus; Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido; and Soya Strait between Sakhalin and Hokkaido. The only strait where there is a problem of alternative routes is Korea Strait(East and West). The most viable alternative is Tsugaru Strait; other alternatives are Soya Strait and one of the passages through the Kurile Islands.

The Europe-Far East shipping route that traverses the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the South China Sea is one of the busiest in the world. Some 90% of Japan's oil imports move through this region as do most of the oil imports of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Oil moving to China along this route is also increasing. Eastbound tankers proceeding along the Malacca/Singapore Straits through the South China Sea are generally loaded with crude oil from the Middle East and bound for East Asia. They also carry crude oil from Nigeria and Algeria³. The United States Navy also values these straits as well as the archipelagic sealanes through the Philippines and Indonesia as options increasing the mobility and flexibility of its Seventh Fleet. The United States also retains the option of using these straits to transport crude from the Middle East to its west coast.

　

　　If the Malacca/Singapore Straits were to be closed - - completely, or to certain vessels - - the principal link between the Indian and the South Pacific Oceans would be either the Sunda Strait to the South China Sea or the Lombok Strait to the Sulawesi Sea. For example, the alternative route for very large crude carriers(VLCCs), 200,000 - 300,000 gross registered tonnes(grt), and ultra large crude carriers(ULCCs), greater than 300,000 grt, with drafts too deep for the Malacca-Singapore Straits, is through the Lombok-Makassar Straits and the Sulawesi Sea south of Mindanao, through the Surigao Strait and on through eastern Philippine waters. VLCCs could save about 1,000 miles or 3 days by using the Malacca/Singapore Straits, and ULCCs coming from the direction of South Africa could save 200 miles⁴. But the real problem of alternative routes is that most of them pass through either Indonesian or the Philippine archipelagic waters and these countries could, in the worst scenario, seek to close not one but a series of alternative straits at the same time.

Total ship traffic through the Malacca and Singapore Straits of all types and sizes averages more than 150 vessels per day, of which half are ships with sizes of more than 5,000 grt, while those exceeding 30,000 grt make up over 10% of the total. In 1994, 1995 and 1996, the number of vessels passing the One Fathom Bank Lighthouse was 34,446, 30,251 and 31,672 respectively, excluding vessels stopping at Port Klang and fishing vessels⁵. About 35% of these were oil tankers, i.e., 11,069, 8,915, and 9,815 respectively(Table 1). Thus, an average of 30.3, 24.4 and 26.9 oil tankers per day passed through this section of the Straits in 1994-1996. More than 60% of these tankers were larger than 200,000 grt⁶. Traffic in and out of the port of Singapore is particularly heavy. A ship either enters or leaves Singapore harbor on an average of every two minutes. In 1996, 117,723 vessels called at Singapore for an average of 9,000 vessels per month. Traversing Singapore Strait to enter or leave the port is like crossing a busy intersection without traffic lights.

In 1993, crude oil accounted for 58% of the interregional cargo tonnage flowing through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore⁷. Most of it came from the Middle East and went to Japan, with Southeast Asia as a secondary source and the newly industrializing economies as the number two destination. Finished goods, including automobiles, machinery and consumer products, accounted for over 60% of the value of cargoes passing through the Straits.

　

　　Japanese interests owned 27.6 % of the tonnage passing through the Straits in 1993, four times more than any other nation. Greece was second with 6.5%, and the United States was third with 6.2% of the tonnage. The rest of the top ten owning nations are divided between maritime nations, such as the United Kingdom and Norway, and Asian nations, such as Singapore and the Republic of Korea. The majority of owners in large states, e.g., Japan, Greece and the United States, use flags of convenience. As much as 90% of the Malacca/Singapore Straits shipping traffic is purely foreign flagged. Norway, Taiwan, and Malaysia are exceptions.

The current common concern of littoral straits states everywhere regarding shipping is oil discharged during routine passage, and accidental oil spills. Although marine casualties are the most dramatic source of oil pollution, routine discharge of bilge water, cleansing of ballast and oil tanks, and leaks are also important sources of oil pollution. Oil spill incidents in the 1970s stimulated agreement on an Under Keel Clearance(UKC)of 3.5 metres for vessels with a draft of more than 15 metres, and the establishment of a Traffic Separation Scheme(TSS)in three critical areas in the straits. The TSS was adopted by the International Maritime Organisation(IMO) - the present recognized arbiter in such matters - and came into effect in May 1980. It was supplemented by a Japan-supplied US$3 million Revolving Fund for the payment of compensation and damages arising out of pollution of the marine environment caused by oil spills. The TSS was initially very effective in reducing accidents in the straits.

　

　　However, between 1977 and 1992, there were 72 shipping casualties in the Malacca/Singapore Straits, with 60% occurring since 1987⁸. Collisions and groundings were the most common types of maritime casualties(Table 2). Although general cargo vessels account for the largest percentage of casualties, it is the number of tanker casualties(17%)that is of greatest concern to the littoral States because of their potential to cause serious pollution damage to the environment. There have been 54 such oil spill incidents in the Straits since 1975(Table 3). Major incidents resulting in large oil spills include the Showa Maru, which prompted the imposition of the UKC and TSS; the Diego Silang; and the Nagasaki Spirit. The combined spill from these three incidents alone was more than 26,000 metric tons of oil.

　

　　At the end of 1992, two major accidents occurred at the northern entrance of the Straits re-alerting the Straits States to this very real hazard. The response was a series of activities including Malaysia's convening of a National Conference on the Strait of Malacca on 11 November 1993 and an international conference on the same subject from 14-15 June 1994. Then in mid-October 1997, the Straits suffered from the largest oil spill to date---about 28,500 tonnes of heavy marine fuel---from the loaded eastbound tanker Evoikos which collided with the empty westbound tanker Orapin Global⁹. This spill was about the same size as that from the Amoco Cadiz. A 20.5-mile long slick drifted into Malaysian and Indonesian waters. Some 16 agencies, 60 vessels and a team of Japanese experts were engaged in the round-the-clock battle to fight the oil spill¹⁰.

　

　　At the time of the incident, visibility at 8 km was good, the shipping lane was not congested, and the port's navigation equipment was functioning perfectly. The Vessel Traffic System had warned the westbound empty tanker Orapin Global that it was in the wrong lane and warned both ships three times that they were on a collision course. The managers of the Thai-registered Orapin Global claimed that the eastbound Evoikos cut across the lane for westbound traffic at a narrow angle, rather than at a right angle as required by the TSS. The captains of the two tankers were arrested by Singapore authorities and charged with reckless navigation and endangering human lives(failure to take appropriate action to avoid the collision and failure to reduce speed to prevent serious damage)¹¹. And the Orapin Global was impounded by Malaysian authorities when it was found illegally anchored in its waters. But the litany of disaster continues. In early October of 2000, the tanker Natuna Sea ran aground in Indonesian waters about 8 km southeast of Singapore spilling at least 7000 metric tons of oil¹².

Although Malaysia and Indonesia advocate the use of the alternate route east of Bali and Borneo via the Straits of Lombok and Makassar for laden supertankers, very few, if any, follow this advice¹³. Indeed, almost all supertankers on the main oil route from the Arab Gulf to Northeast Asia use the Straits of Malacca and Singapore because it is the shortest route and, if necessary, they can use the facilities of the Port of Singapore, which is a significant logistical and operational advantage. Larger vessels within the range of 160,000 to 250,000 DWT are definitely testing the "officially" recommended draft limit of 18.5 meters when fully laden. Most tankers of the largest size observed in the region, over a quarter million DWT, operate well in excess of any official guideline when fully laden. However, many of the larger supertankers light load, i.e., take cargoes of less than maximum size, to reduce their draft when they sail through the Straits.

　

　　A significant percentage of vessel operators face a close judgment call regarding draft restrictions¹⁴. Loading too deep may ultimately contribute to an accident, while loading too light reduces profits. The decision is a trade-off between cost and safety. Supertankers may take as much as ten miles to stop, and they have little control at very slow speeds due to loss of steerageway. The watch officer may be forced to choose between the risk of a collision in the channels and the risk of running aground by leaving the channel.

　　The dramatic increase in marine casualties in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore since 1992 has prompted angry statements from important political figures in Malaysia and Indonesia. In particular, it has been suggested that the current system is no longer adequate and needs to be revised or at least reviewed¹⁵. Suggestions have also been made to either levy a toll on ships passing through the Straits or to make pilotage compulsory for ships passing through the narrowest portions.

　

　　However, closer examination of the problem revealed that many marine casualties could not be ascribed to a flaw in the TSS or its obsolescence. Statistics provided by all three Straits States revealed that over 90% of the casualties were caused by collisions--not groundings. The underlying reason for the marine casualties was therefore not hazards to navigation but poor seamanship. Apparently, most accidents were caused by ignorance of the basic rules of road such as "the right of way" of ships passing in opposite directions. Some collisions were also due to the inability of the crewmember at the wheel to understand English. This may be due to the hiring of sub-standard crews by "flag of convenience" vessel owners. This cost saving measure is employed because of continuing low world scale shipping rates and the increased costs of operating oil tanker fleets produced by the strict construction and other standards set by the IMO.

In both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, all coastal nations have formally extended their maritime jurisdiction over resources and related activities leaving almost no marine area left unclaimed and many areas where claims overlap. In the South China Sea, six governments have conflicting claims to islands and maritime space: China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei. The South China Sea disputes continue to plague policymakers and defy resolution. China's 1995 occupation of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef and its late 1998 construction of fort-like structures there raised tension in the region ¹ and destroyed the myth that China would only be assertive vis-a-vis Vietnam. Despite China's soothing words and several attempts by the Philippines' at negotiation, China is still occupying the reefs well within the Philippine EEZ and on its legal continental shelf. And it is likely to continue to do so into the indefinite future.

　

　　Although ASEAN officials agreed at their 28 November 1999 meeting on a modified Philippines-proposed draft code of conduct for the South China, China refused to accept it, in part because it includes the Paracels which are occupied by China but claimed by Vietnam¹⁶. China wanted the code to cover only the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal.

　Malaysia also wants the code to cover only the Spratlys. But for ASEAN to exclude the Paracels from the code would be to undercut an ASEAN member vis-a-vis China.

　

　　China has proposed its own code of conduct. Its most distinguishing characteristics are that it would apply to all South China Sea countries, not just claimants. And it would refer to the disputes only as "differences." Moreover it would ban military exercises and patrols as well as arrests of fishers and seizing of boats in disputed areas¹⁷. In particular, China's draft says all South China Sea countries should "refrain from conducting any military exercises directed against other countries in the Nansha islands and their adjacent waters" - - particularly joint exercises - - a probable reference to the recent U.S./Philippine joint exercises, and other planned U.S.-Southeast Asian exercises, and "from carrying out any dangerous and close-in military reconnaissance." The Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia oppose the provision. It would also ban patrols and "seizure, detention or arrest" of fishers and boats in disputed areas, a provision clearly aimed at the Philippines, and also opposed by Malaysia. And it insists that such a code not be legally binding. Moreover, regarding the ASEAN proposal to ban new occupations or building of structures in the Spratlys, China wants a more general formulation that claimants undertake to "refrain from any action that would complicate the situation,"¹⁸ a phrase contained in a 1997 ASEAN-China joint statement¹⁹. Further, China rejects any provisions dealing with co-operative management of living or non-living resources. And even if there is a "breakthrough," the claimants' record of adherence to such agreements as the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and the Indonesian Workshops' Bandung Statement -- both of which barred unilateral actions that would increase tension in the area -- does not instill confidence that they will abide by such a code even if they do approve it. Indeed, existing bilateral codes of conduct between China and the Philippines, and Vietnam and the Philippines did not prevent China from expanding its structures on Mischief Reef, the Philippines from firing at or arresting Chinese fishing boats, or Vietnam from firing at a Philippine aircraft in the disputed area. ³ Without China's adherence, a multilateral code of conduct will be relatively meaningless.

　

　　Shortly before the June 1999 ASEAN and July 1999 ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF)meetings, Malaysia constructed a two-story concrete building and a helipad on Erica and Investigator Reefs, which are also claimed by the Philippines, China, Taiwan and Vietnam. This surprise unilateral action by a founding ASEAN member has several implications. First, it clearly splits ASEAN solidarity on this issue vis-a-vis China. Some diplomats even suspect that Malaysia has cut a side deal with China at the expense of ASEAN. And such disputes among the Southeast Asian claimants will only encourage China to beef up its presence in the area. Second, it violates and perhaps fatally undermines the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and the Bandung Statement. Third, it may presage a new wave of occupations by other claimants, particularly the Philippines.

　

　　The United States weighed in on the issue at the 1999 ARF in Singapore, saying basically "enough is enough."²⁰ The United States fears that these disputes could "drift into crisis" and wants ASEAN to consider concrete proposals to relieve tensions. Secretary of State Madeline Albright warned that, "The stakes are too high to permit a cycle to emerge in which each incident leads to another with potentially greater crisis and graver consequences- -. We cannot simply sit on the sidelines and watch." Another senior U.S. official, worried that time is running out for a peaceful solution, said, "There is a need not simply to have a policy of benign neglect waiting for something bad to happen, but rather to talk about the issue." These statements were made despite China's insistence that "outsiders butt out" and firmly juxtaposed the United States and China on yet another issue. Thus the tenor of the U.S./China relationship may affect the South China Sea process. And President-elect George W. Bush's projected hardline stance vis a vis China, particularly regarding Taiwan, does not bode well for that relationship.

　

　　The need for a code of conduct has been highlighted by near clashes between China and the Philippines, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Vietnam and the Philippines²¹. Indeed Stanley Roth, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs views the South China Sea as one of the negative trends in East Asia and has lamented the fact that no code of conduct has been agreed²². Perhaps not coincidentally, and much to China's chagrin, the United States has agreed to help modernize Manila's armed forces and to resume joint exercises²³. When China warned the Philippines against further provocative acts in the South China Sea, the Philippines Senate President Blas Ople alluded to the US/Philippines 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty and declared that the United States would back it in the event of war with China.

　

　　On 28 January 2000, the United States and the Philippines re-implemented their Visiting Forces Agreement by conducting a joint exercise involving 5,000 troops from both countries. As part of the exercise, a U.S. guided missile warship made a call in Palawan, at the Philippine port nearest to the Spratlys. The second phase which began on 21 February was the largest war game ever between the United States and the Philippines and included naval warfare, an aerial combat scenario, and ground forces maneuvers. The exercises were called Balikatan which is Tagalog for "shouldering the burden together." On 14 June 2000, joint U.S.-Philippine naval exercises began. The intent was to strengthen bilateral defense co-operation and "promote strategic understanding of the challenges we all face-in Southeast Asia."²⁴

　

　　Storm clouds are gathering. Certainly U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen's March 2000 suggestion to Hanoi for U.S.-Vietnamese military co-operation alerted those who see a U.S. strategy of "containment" of China²⁵. And as if to confirm China's worst fears, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, announced that the United States will lead an integrated, multilateral, military exercise in Southeast Asia called "Team Challenge" this year. This could include Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Australia, but would be open to others²⁶. China was invited to send observers but its response was to warn ASEAN members against such arrangements with outside powers and against acting collectively in their own interest²⁷. Adding a new dimension to the imbroglio, India held a series of naval exercises in the South China Sea in October and November 2000²⁸. This included bilateral exercises with Vietnam as well as unilateral trials on its own. This presents a direct challenge to China and could redefine the naval balance of power in the region.²⁹

　

　　Meanwhile, China increasingly views the United States as an obstacle to its goals of unification with Taiwan and control of the sealanes in the South China Sea.³⁰ Indeed China's military strategy seems to be to at least pose a credible risk in case the United States backs Taiwan in a conflict. This involves an increased Chinese presence and capability in the South China Sea and China is clearly building up its naval capability. It has taken delivery of the first of two Russia-built Sovremenny-class destroyers with Sunburn cruise missiles.³¹ These will be the most modern and sophisticated war ships in China's navy. The purpose is to help fill the gaps in the "escalation ladder" from harassment and blockades to anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, to sea denial, and to air superiority. China has already bought Russian kilo-class submarines and is co-producing Russian SU-27 fighter aircraft. The Sovremenny destroyers could threaten a carrier battle group, and the SU-27s could threaten US air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.³² On 26 April 2000, China successfully carried out mid-flight refueling of fighter jets, thus expanding its ability to project power in the South China Sea.³³

　

　　Several conclusions are in order. First, despite the tentative agreement on a code among ASEAN members, ASEAN solidarity on South China Sea issues is fragile and cracks are beginning to show. Indeed, some ASEAN claimants apparently still feel they can get a better deal from China on their own or that their relations with China are more important than ASEAN solidarity on this issue. If and when they negotiate with China bilaterally, they will have to implicitly or explicitly recognize China's claim, thus undermining the positions of fellow ASEAN claimants.

　

　　Second it is too late to prevent the United States from influencing the process. Indeed, by virtue of its renewed Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines and its other less formal bilateral and possible multilateral military arrangements in the region, the United States already has a naval presence in the South China Sea and a publicly stated security interest in freedom and safety of navigation which could be threatened by creeping jurisdiction or clashes over the Spratlys. In China's view, this "complicates" the issue and could be detrimental to regional stability.³⁴

　

　　Third, the current situation is volatile and, could, through an unexpected political or military event, deteriorate into open conflict.³⁵ Worsening of relations between, for instance, Vietnam and China, or Taiwan and China, could foreshadow more fighting in the Spratlys. Incidents also could be triggered by unilateral actions such as further occupations of features claimed by others, the capture of an occupied island from another's forces, unilateral drilling in the area, the capture or killing of fishers in disputed areas, or large, aggressive naval maneuvers. At a bare minimum, the fundamental issues remain unresolved and the area remains a scab over a festering sore, ready to be picked for political leverage.

The interests and positions of the three Straits States-Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore-are not uniform. Singapore's economic success has traditionally depended on trade and export oriented industries. Over 20% of the crude oil passing through the Malacca Straits from the Gulf is bound for Southeast Asia, arriving at Singapore in large supertankers.³⁶ Indeed, Singapore is a major refining center, importing crude in large tankers and exporting product all over the region in smaller product carriers.

　

　　Singapore also has a stake in serving international through-traffic in the Malacca Strait, and a minimum of sensitive coastline exposed to possible pollution damage. The Port of Singapore offers a full range of facilities. With low taxes, competitive prices, cheap bunker fuel, fast turnaround and a minimum of regulations and restrictions, many large vessels call at Singapore for purely operational reasons. Indeed, there is no other comparable port situated right next to the main route of the region. Singapore thus has more economic reasons than fellow Straits states to insist upon commercial freedom of navigation in the Malacca/Singapore Straits. Even more fundamental, however, are Singapore's concerns for local defense, security and navigational freedom for all maritime powers. During the Cold War, it was thought that such navigational freedom would effectively neutralize individual great power influence, and perhaps now, the power of any potentially dominant regional State.

　

　　Two developments, however, have compelled Singapore to reassess its position. First is the increasingly strong feelings and positions of Indonesia and Malaysia on the passage of foreign ships, coupled with the extension of their respective territorial seas to 12 nm, nearly "sea locking" Singapore. Secondly, Singapore can no longer ignore the hazards caused by the increased density of shipping traffic, especially of VLCCs and the potential risk and damage that oil spills entail for the littoral States and their peoples. Indeed, after the October 1997 Evoikos spill, Singapore's Communication Minister Mah Bow Tan said that the present legal regime is inadequate to deal with transiting vessels which commit offenses outside the jurisdiction of states suffering the consequences of such offenses.³⁷

　

　　Indonesia has traditionally been concerned with questions of national integration and internal security, as manifested by its archipetagic declaration, than with pollution from foreign vessels in the Straits.³⁸ Indeed, the founder of Indonesia, President Sukarno long argued that Indonesia would not become strong or secure unless the whole Strait was under Indonesian jurisdiction.³⁹ Indeed, Indonesia considered it a sacrifice to treat the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a unit because Singapore could then have some input in Straits management, which it previously did not have.

　

　　Malaysia has always been more concerned with the control of navigation and the prevention of pollution in the Straits.⁴⁰ According to Malaysia's former Solicitor General Zakaria, "the problem confronting the Straits is basically the question of the safety of navigation.'⁴¹ At the Second Session of Plenary Meetings of UNCLOS III, the Chairman of Malaysia's delegation to the Conference reiterated that Malaysia "was very conscious of the grave danger of marine pollution [and that] so little importance seemed to be attached to the security and other legitimate interests and concerns of coastal States, which should not be expected to bear the cost of damage to the marine environment caused by pollution and accidents."⁴²

　

　　In sum, Singapore strongly supports the concept of the Malacca and Singapore Straits as "straits used for international navigation" as defined in the Law of the Sea Convention and wishes to have IMO take the lead and govern the establishment of a management regime for the straits. While having ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty and recognizing the right of transit passage, Indonesia and Malaysia insist that first and foremost, the Malacca Strait at least is part of their waters and that they must initiate, authorize, and lead the establishment of a management regime there. For Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Indonesia, the Straits are a multiple-use resource. For the user States, the Straits are no more than the shortest trade route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Japan's interest in this issue is clear and unambiguous. Asian sealanes, including the Malacca/Singapore Straits, must be kept safe and secure for its vital trade and oil imports. Maintaining the unadulterated principle of freedom of navigation is paramount. However, given the lingering sensitivities in the region regarding Japan's behavior in World War II, Japan's dilemma is how to ensure such safety and security of navigation without appearing to be overly aggressive and selfish. Nevertheless, Japan is sufficiently concerned about its oil life-line to be safeguarding the sealanes up to 1,610 km from its territory. Such 'safeguarding' could in the future extend well into the South China Sea.

　

　　The interests of the United States in keeping the sealanes safe and secure are more complex. They are in part economic - - for itself and its allies - - and in part "defense." Closure of Southeast Asia's strategic waterways for an extended period could seriously harm Asian economies with which the United States has important trading links.⁴³ The United States worries that these chokepoints could be effectively closed even without being physically or militarily blockaded. For example, if the Spratly area were declared a war zone, shippers would be compelled by prohibitively high insurance rates to reroute their cargoes through the Sunda, Lombok or Makassar straits at higher shipping costs. The "worst case" would be the closure of all four strategic waterways as a result of regional conflict or a failure of international freedom-of-navigation conventions. Such an eventuality would require a detour of oil and other bulk shipments to a much longer route around the southern coast of Australia.

　

　　The shipping industry would be the only winner if such a disruption occurs. Most of the world's idle vessels would have to be called back into service and freight rates might rise by as much as 500%. Japan would be among the hardest hit. Some 42% of its(two-way)maritime trade with a combined value of $225 billion passed these waterways in 1993(Table 4). And if Japan's supplies of crude and liquefied natural gas from the Persian Gulf had to be diverted around Australia, as much as $1.5 billion would have to be added to its shipping costs alone.

　

　　Southeast Asian countries also could be severely affected by an interruption of normal traffic. Some 55.4% of the maritime exports of the region moved through these sealanes in 1993. Singapore in particular could be badly hurt since the indefinite closure of these sealanes would also have the effect of shutting down or severely reducing its port and oil-refining operations. Australia's trade would also suffer since nearly 40% of its exports and 53% of its imports move along these routes. And even with less than 4% of its maritime shipments dependent on these sea lanes, the United States still has a vital economic stake in keeping them open because its own prosperity is linked to the economic health of those Asian countries. American consumers would feel some pain too, as rising freight rates world-wide would make imported goods more expensive.

　

　　Then there is of course the traditional U.S. concern with maximum mobility and flexibility of its air, surface, and submarine forces. Free navigation through, under and over the straits and sealanes of Asia is crucial to the U.S. nuclear strategy in which nuclear-armed and-powered submarines play a critical role. To attack or defend against a nuclear submarine, its location must be known. Indeed, the United States maintains that the invulnerability of its SSBNs and hence their indispensable role in a second strike depends on their ability to pass through straits and sealanes submerged, unannounced and undetected. Thus United States has refused to accede to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty because it includes continental shelves and EEZs in which the United States argues that navigation of any type should be unrestricted.

　

　　Four of 16 strategic straits in the world which are important to the mobility of the U.S. submarine fleet in reaching target areas are in Southeast Asia - Malacca, Lombok, Sunda and Ombai-Wetar. Of these, only the Indonesian straits of Ombai-Wetar and Lombok are physically and politically usable by submerged U.S. submarines. Without secure submerged passage, the submarines would have to circumnavigate Australia or double back to the Timor Sea.

　

　　Also, freedom of navigation may also be taking on a new meaning in U.S. defense plans. A recent report by the U.S. Defense Department concluded that a sea-based component will be critical to the success of both the national and the theater defense systems that the United States is considering building to defend itself and its allies, including those in the Asia-Pacific region, from ballistic missile attack.⁴⁴ Missiles launched from sea-based systems could avoid being misled by decoys by destroying an enemy missile in its boost phase, shortly after liftoff. But to do so the surface ships and submarines carrying the anti-ballistic missiles would have to be rather close to the launch site. This may help to explain the U.S. Navy's growing concern with freedom of navigation issues in the South China Sea. Washington's policy on the South China Sea has evolved from active neutrality to active concern. Involvement is likely to be the next step resulting in a serious new source of tension with China. Meanwhile, the United States continues to encourage Japan to take a more active role in the defense of the region.

　

　　Last but certainly not least are the interests of China. These seem to conflict in both the short and long runs. China uses these sea lanes for some $31 billion in annual trade with other countries. Also China is dramatically increasing its oil imports from the Middle East. Actions that would disrupt or constrain this trade would not be in its interest. Yet it has acted rather aggressively in the South China and East China Seas to assert its claims and establish a presence there, even though resulting conflict could diminish safety if not freedom of navigation for all. On the other hand, some believe China intends eventually to dominate these Seas and in the event of conflict to control or disrupt the sealanes vital to both Japan and the United States.