Fourth, both Europe and Japan freed themselves from dependency on the established civilizations of continental Asia (a dependency engendered by the material goods those civilizations supplied) and achieved political, economic, and cultural autonomy from those spheres of civilization. In short, they established new civilizations of their own that were, we might say, _de-Asianized._
Next, let us examine the differences between Europe and Japan in the early modern era. First, in Europe_s case the source of purchasing power was the American continent, on the far side of the Atlantic Ocean, while in Japan_s case the means for purchasing foreign goods was generated domestically. Because Europe had vast holdings on the other side of the ocean, which it required to sustain its wealth and power, its own population remained relatively sparse. By contrast, Japan was a small country with a large population. Thus, in their relations with East and Southeast Asia, Japan and Europe started from fundamentally different premises regarding land and labor_two of the three basic factors of production.
The modern world system in Europe and early modern Edo society should be seen as developments of comparable significance.
Second, although both regions experienced a production revolution, Europe_s relatively sparse population pointed to capital-intensive methods as the best means for increasing labor productivity. In the context of Europe, therefore, economic development meant boosting the productivity of labor, and the general concept of productivity became virtually synonymous with labor productivity. In Europe, it _was an article of faith that boosting labor productivity was the key to a better society. The Japanese, however, focused all their energies on conserving capital. Hayami Akira provides a concrete example in his study of the sharp decrease in cattle and horses in the N_i district during the early modern era. (Kinsei N_i chih_no jink_keizai, shakai [Demographics, Economy, and Society in the N_i District in the Early Modern Era], 1992.) The reason for the change was that landowners converted pasture to agricultural acreage, thus increasing the land_s productivity with the addition of a large labor force. By the end of the Edo period, land productivity was the highest in the world.
Whereas Europe_s was a labor-productivity revolution, Japan_s was a land-productivity revolution.
Third, the Asian civilizations from which Europe and Japan asserted their independence were two very different cultures. The civilization from whose sphere of influence Europe emerged was that region of Asia along the Indian Ocean, then part of the Islamic world. The object of Japan_s efforts to achieve autonomy was the region rimming the East and South China Seas_China_s sphere of influence.
This difference accounts for some of the disparities in the European and Japanese worldview that subsequently emerged. Under the modern world system, the world order was understood in terms of the dichotomy between war and peace. It is a view that can be traced back to the basic Islamic concepts of dar al-harb (_the house of conflict,_ or non-Muslim lands) and dar al-Islam (_the house of Islam;_ sometimes translated as _the house of peace_). In Europe, this was first systematically articulated by Grotius in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), published in 1625. Grotius_s work served as the basis for the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which in turn laid the foundation for the system of sovereign states. The right of belligerency was legitimized as a basic sovereign right of nations, with the result that military expansion was to continue unabated in Europe for centuries thereafter.
In contrast, the worldview of Edo Japan was embodied in the fundamental Confucian concept of sh_hin, seika, chikoku, heitenka_cultivate the individual, regulate the family, govern the state well, and there will be peace in the world. This derived from the precept underlying Ming China_s relationship with its vassal states. The basic idea, originating in the Confucian classic Daxue (The Great Learning), is that power is ultimately legitimized by the self-control and virtue of the ruler.
