As one of the world's largest givers of foreign aid, overseas developmental assistance, and direct foreign investment, Japan can wave a large economic stick, especially if its actions are closely coordinated with other major powers in forums like the G-7/8 and even APEC. I argued at the time of the drafting of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that Japan should take the lead in developing a series of coordinated political and economic responses that would be applied against any nation that refused to respect the efforts and wishes of the overwhelming majority of the world's nations and conducted nuclear tests. One can only speculate if this would have helped to deter either India or Pakistan from entering the nuclear club in May of 1998 (or if a similar action today might preclude further tests or prevent either from operationally deploying nuclear weapons in the field). Likewise, if national leaders were aware of the type of coordinated economic and political sanctions they were sure to face in response to humanitarian abuses, this could serve as a powerful deterrent to such actions.
This is not to imply that Japanese sanctions alone would have the desired impact, any more than US go it alone sanctions have ever done much good. To the contrary, unilateral sanctions are easily skirted. In addition, a tendency to overuse sanctions and to apply them for domestic political purposes, as the US has often been inclined to do (even against its friends) not only makes them increasingly ineffective but also makes it difficult to gain an international consensus in cases where they are appropriate. On the other hand, a unified approach can serve as an effective deterrent or as a tool to reverse bad behavior once it starts. Who better than Japan to initiate such an effort?
Whether or not Japan wold be prepared to be involved in military operations either to deter inappropriate actions or to punish them once they occur is a subject that the Japanese public needs to debate. It is not clear how much Japan can do within the confines of its current constitution and enabling legislation, either to assist the US in a crisis or to participate in UN or other types of multinational task forces. I would argue that even within the current constitution, there is considerable room for Japan to be a more active participant in international peacekeeping and even peace enforcement activities, at least in a non-combatant role, if not in a combat support or combat service support role (where forces are not engaged directly in fighting but are in harm's way). What is needed most is not constitutional revision or reinterpretation but the political courage to initiate the debate on Japan's collective defense responsibilities and capabilities.
Such a debate must be undertaken carefully and with an eye toward the reaction of Japan's neighbors. But, with a few notable exceptions (China and North Korea being the most prominent), most states in Asia appear open to the idea of greater Japanese military participation in humanitarian operations and even to evacuation operations, reconnaissance, or sanction enforcement measures that would be combat-related.The 1997 revision of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines was a modest step in the fight direction but it was only a small first step. It should be seen as representing the floor, not the ceiling, of what Japan can do in the event of crises that demand an multinational response.
In sum, Japan's major contribution to the current debate over humanitarian intervention versus non-interference should be that of a moderator and facilitator. Japan can also help to outline measures that may contribute to discouraging similar type actions from taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. However, Kosovo clearly demonstrated that political and economic posturing and even the threat of force does not always redress the grievance. NATO's actions in Kosovo have at least raised the question as to what Japan's response would or could be in the event of a similar humanitarian crisis in Asia. This is an answer only Japanese leaders can provide.
Notes
1. Having spent 26 years in the US military, I fully understand how tragic mistakes like this can and do happen, especially in the fog of war.
2. For the author's own comments about US unilateralism and its impact on Asia policy, see Ralph A. Cossa,"Autopilot is Not Good Enough!" in Comparative Connections, Vol.2, NO.1, April 2000. Comparative Connections is a quarterly electronic journal available on the Interact through the Pacific Forum CSIS web site <www.csis.org/pacfor>.
