This is spelled out even more clearly in the Pentagon's December 1998 East Asia Strategy Report (EASR),15 which asserts that "maintaining an overseas military presence is a cornerstone of US National Security Strategy and a key element of US military policy of 'shape, respond, and prepare.'"16 This Report, the latest in a series of four Pentagon pronouncements on East Asia military strategy dating back to 1990, discusses the"critical practical and symbolic contributions to regional security" that bilateral alliances and forward deployed forces play, again stressing the deterrence role, but noting also the role that alliances and force presence play in "shaping" the security environment.17
EASR also underscores US endorsement of multilateral dialogue mechanisms as useful vehicles from promoting confidence and greater understanding in ways that support American national security interests in East Asia. This support for East Asia multilateral institutions has one important caveat, however; such institutions cannot be seen as substitutes for or as threats to US bilateral efforts and arrangements. The US does not see bilateral and multilateral efforts as an "either-or" or "zero sum" arrangement; rather they complement one another.
As post-Cold War regional security dialogue mechanisms such as the ARF emerge and grow, multilateral cooperation will also play a growing role in conflict avoidance and confidence building in the region. Non-traditional challenges may, in fact, most effectively be addressed in such fora since they are less sensitive politically than many of the key traditional security challenges that continue to plague the region. The US can be expected to support such initiatives and dialogues but will keep its unilateral and bilateral options open.
The US will also expect its regional allies to participate when reacting to crises that affect mutual security interests. In the case of Japan, such support would be applied under the revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines and would thus likely remain within the confines of current constitutional constraints. A failure by any ally to do its perceived fair share would put serious strain on that alliance relationship, especially if American lives were being lost in the process.
(These circumstances are not expected to change significantly after November 7, 2000. Save a truly remarkable breakthroughin US-DPRK and North-South Korea relations―beyond the current feel good meetings that are heavier on style than substance―when all the noise generated by the current American presidential campaign abates, there is unlikely to be any significant adjustment in US strategy, policies, or priorities in East Asia. The US national interests that drive the current policy of engagement and presence will not change, even if adjustments are made at the margin and new catch phrases are assigned to time-honored positions and old ones are dropped.)
Implications for Japan
How Japan would respond in the event of future humanitarian crises in the Asia Pacific region is, of course, for the Japanese government to decide, based on the circumstances at the time of the triggering event or events. However, there are steps Japan can take today to promote dialogue on this topic and help minimize the chance that humanitarian atrocities will occur. There are also additional steps Japan must take to be prepared, legally and psychologically, should the international community look to Japan to help support military intervention operations in a future Asian humanitarian crisis.
Japan can take a lead role in stimulating and hosting the debate on the humanitarian intervention versus non-interference issue, both within the ARF and in various track two forums, such as CSCAP and even the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which brings the US, Japan, China, Russia, and the ROK together for security-relateddialogue.18 As a country possessing both pacifist and humanitarian tendencies, Japan can be a credible interlocutor in attempting to find middle ground positions on this thorny issue.
Japan can also take a lead role in discussing, in advance of a crisis, the types of effective non-military responses that, if known in advance, might help deter a potential human fights violator from excessive actions.
