Japan, Europe and the Kosovo Crisis
by Takako Ueta
1. Introduction
The NATO military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia attracted a lot of public attention in Japan and the NATO military operation was headline news. Japanese academics organized conferences on Kosovo. For the Japanese public, the Kosovo crisis started suddenly with the NATO bombardment. Being geographically far away, it was difficult to understand the complexity of an ethnic conflict in Southeast Europe, although the major Japanese papers explained the historical background.
The commitment to pacifism and anti-war feeling which took root in Japan after the Pacific War made it difficult for the Japanese public to understand the reasoning behind NATO's military intervention. They were against any "use of force." In addition, the UN stood as a symbol of peace for the Japanese public and NATO's use of force without the mandate of the UN Security Council was beyond their understanding. Simply put, they could not understand the concept of "humanitarian intervention," which may be defined as follows: "A working definition of humanitarian intervention is that it consists of intervention in armed conflicts for humanitarian purposes with a range of means including armed force."1 In the public's mind, "humanity" and the "use of force" are totally contradictory concepts which cannot be combined together.
At the government level, Japan was unexpectedly involved in the political process towards the end as a member of the G7/8 process. Japan became a facilitating state of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Then, as the president country, Japan hosted the G7/8 summit meeting in Okinawa in July 2000. One of the important issues on the agenda was conflict prevention. As always, Japan was requested to contribute to the post-conflict rehabilitation process of Kosovo. Japan's special participating status in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the structured dialogues with the European Union facilitated Japan's understanding of the situation in Southeast Europe and the policy of the European countries toward this region.
Firstly, this paper explains the relations between Japan and the European institutions. Secondly, it traces Japanese attitudes toward the Kosovo crisis.2 Lastly, it suggests the agenda for future Japan-Europe cooperation.
2. Japan and the European Institutions
On January 13, 2000 at the IFRI (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales) in Paris, the Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono gave a policy speech on Japan-Europe Relations, entitled "Seeking a Millennium Partnership: New Dimensions in Japan-Europe Cooperation." In this speech, he explained that Japan would like to strengthen its political relationship with Europe. The reasons given were that both countries share common values and face the same challenges; as global partners, security issues link them inseparably; and globalization was deepening the economic interdependence between the two.3 Kono proposed three pillars of cooperation between Japan and Europe: "Realizing shared values while respecting diversity;" the "Strengthening of Japan-Europe political cooperation;" and "Sharing the benefits of globalization."4
