The mechanism was established during the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to include all those majors powers in one body pursuing major interests in the region. This was necessary for two reasons:
・The multilateral fora did not sufficiently provide these major powers with the necessary channel of influence.
・There was a need for a "steering group" to bring the chaotic actions of the international community together by providing a political and legal framework for the handling of the crisis: The inclusion of Russia into the peace process, the final readiness of NATO to provide the necessary military clout to make peace, the involvement of many EU countries and the EU itself, as well as many other organizations like, e.g., the OSCE in establishing peace, was a great success for this loose association of five states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany and Italy).
This group was revitalized when the Kosovo crisis worsened. Nevertheless, at this time this circle was not able to overcome the internal cleavages between the Western countries and Russia. This situation weakened the power of the group and encouraged Milosevic not to give in. This was, however, not a failure of the overall approach. After the Contact Group's deadlock and during the bombing of NATO, the diplomatic efforts desperately tried to find an alternative framework for the function exerted hitherto by the Contact Group. There had been discussions to transfer the major responsibility to the UN or the OSCE. Nevertheless, these ideas were soon given up. The G-8 took over, a group of states which is nothing more than an enlarged Contact Group. Despite the fact that it is difficult to give a final assessment of the role of the G-8 in the peace process, it is clear, that this framework played an significant role in Milosevic's decision to finally give in.
IV. Conclusions The Need for Flexibility
The security set-up in Europe is in a state of flux. In foreign policy and security matters, a European federation is still a long way off and the outcome of the current attempt to square the EU's enlargement/deepening circle is not clear. This will have an impact on Europe's outreach. The gigantic effort to develop a political system for up to about 30 states will certainly require much political energy. This will probably limit the EU's clout in foreign policy and security affairs.
In addition, the EU's move into the security and defense business raises new questions regarding the EU/NATO relationship. Nevertheless, in case it will be possible to establish a strong functional interdependence, a strong transatlantic link might be maintained and European-American competition avoided.
The OSCE remains a "sleeping beauty." It is the only organization that has been formally declared a "regional arrangement" under the UN Charter, but has not yet been ready (or been able to mobilize the internal political support) to really move into the area of (enforced) peacekeeping.
EU's CFSP will―at least in the medium term―remain a mixture of national and European policies. This is to be welcomed at the moment for three mutually reinforcing reasons:
