A conceivable temporary solution would be that the EU Presidency assigns an observer to both current European members of the Security Council as soon as there are decisions on the Council's agenda relating to the CFSP framework.
・The Security Council has the option of not only implementing sanctions against countries which threaten peace in certain regions, but also to undertake military enforcement actions. Yet, it is quite uncertain how far the European permanent members of the Security Council can speak for other EU states in support of military action as more often than not only a coalition of certain states is willing to take the necessary military risks. This grouping of states, which usually does not mirror EU membership, will want to be in a privileged position in the decision-making process. As a result, a second structure for coordination will inevitably arise and downgrade the importance of European cooperation in this respect. As military risks are still considered "national risks," it is likely that flexible forms of consultation and coordination, which have little in common with the formal organizational structure, will emerge. The decisions of the Security Council in the Iraq and Yugoslavia cases were formed by a leadership grouping of the United States along with France and Great Britain, the two European states not fully coordinating their policy with other EU members. As long as the EU does not have a "state like" decision-making structure, EU cooperation will have relatively little importance in the UN decision-making.
・A type of permanent EU-imperative mandate for Great Britain and France would be further option. This would, however, officially repeal the basis of equality in foreign and security policy and introduce a problematic second form of representation for the EU states in international politics. Such an "imperative mandate" would also stand in opposition to the independence which members of the Security Council should have in order to fulfill their task within the Security Council.
The question of how the EU Europeans should, or can, have their standpoints represented in the Security Council is not definitely answered with the CFSP system. As such, it can be expected that Germany will continue to attempt to become a permanent member of the Security Council.
This will not be easily achieved. Nevertheless, there are significant signs that the two permanent European members of the Security Council would rather have a permanent German membership than some sort of "imperative mandate" devised by the EU.
If Germany is able to convince two-thirds of the UN's General Assembly that Germany should become a permanent member of the Security Council, contradictory consequences will result: On the one hand, the CFSP's reach would be restricted in major security issues. Yet, on the other hand, a permanent seat for Germany would certainly have a positive effect on European cooperation, Indeed, one important area of conflict between the three largest European states―the status difference vis-a-vis the Security Council―would be diminished.
III. The need for Contact Groups
As shown above, Europe's "organized multilateralism" has its strengths, but also its weaknesses. The major defect is its lack of flexibility and the possibility of internal blockades. This is the reason why flexible groupings in form of the Contact Group or the G-8 played an important role in decisive security questions concerning the Balkans.
