This facilitates the liaison with NATO, because a strict inter-governmental system in defense-related questions in the EU guarantees the full sovereignty of those partners in NATO being members of the EU at the same time.
・With respect to political and military consultations between both institutions, it is Germany's interest to aim for a far-reaching regulation. The practices WEU and NATO have established in recent years should be―as far as possible―transferred to the EU-NATO case and the principles already agreed on taken very seriously. This dialogue should not only be of a military nature as France is inclined to demand. Rather, the political character of the dialogue should be maintained and even remain central. The purpose is to form common views on critical security developments and to promote a common position in the Alliance on crucial security issues.
・Germany would assign a substantial role for NATO's Deputy SACEUR in the relationship between the two organizations as intended in NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. He should have a double function as a strategic planner with access to NATO's SHAPE planning resources and as a potential commander of EU guided operations. Due to the fact that this position rotates only between the British and Germany because France does not participate in NATO's integrated military structure, the first function may in reality be of greater importance than the second. This regulation should avoid unnecessary duplications by the EU in the planning sector and to associate NATO with the EU as effectively as possible.
・The force-planning processes of both organizations should be understood as a whole and the European and non-European part should complement each other. There may not be a separate NATO and EU force planning structure. This again is meant to avoid unnecessary duplication of institutions and to maintain the capacity for coalition operations in the framework of the Alliance.
・A privileged role in EU relations with third countries must be given to the non-EU NATO partners (Turkey, Norway, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Iceland). They should participate in EU's force planning process.
All this is meant not only to establish a system of coordination but to establish functional interdependence between the EU and NATO. If these demands become reality, there is much hope that the transatlantic security relationship can be maintained.
II. The United Nations and regional security in Europe
1. Decentralization by "regional agreements"?
The big number of conflicts the UN had to address after the demise of the bipolar order brought about the idea to promote the "regional agreements" clause in the Charter. Nevertheless, only the OSCE has declared in 1992 to represent such a "regional arrangement" within Europe. Neither NATO nor the EU have been ready to formally join this category. The reason is simply one of freedom of action and is based on the concern that there might be situations where the UN would be unable to deliver the approval despite the fact that there is a extremely serious humanitarian problem, as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo. According to Article 53 of the UN Charter, regional agreements are forced to ask the UN Security Council for its approval to implement action or to use the threat of force to bring about peace. In many cases, such approval requires that the respective regional organizations collate their policies with the UN in order to advance peace initiatives with the Security Council should a conflict escalate.
