Regional security problems cause difficult coordination problems among security institutions. This leads to a dilemma: On the one hand, the prerequisite for an effective policy is a close coordination among security institutions. On the other hand, this requirement increases the obstacles to reaching any agreement. There remains the fundamental question of how this coordination can be put into effect. Nevertheless, there are both positive and negative elements in this complex institutional structure. A major positive aspect is institutional flexibility. Each aspect of a crisis can be addressed by an institution suited for the situation. However, there also have been discernible negative effects. The wars on the Balkans represent examples of how states are able to shuffle discussions and decisions around the many institutions; in that crisis each move towards problem solution got stuck in complex inter-institutional bargaining processes, which took far too long. It was only the readiness of a few European countries and finally the preparedness of the US to get involved in the crisis that finally convinced all Europeans to get committed seriously.
・Secondly, in each crisis situation a precarious consensus has to be reached on the question which organization should play which role in a certain conflict. With regard to military operations, a number of frameworks exist that are capable―though certainly to a hugely varying extent―to politically back up and finally to command a military operation: OSCE, UN, NATO, the EU and flexible coalitions of the able and the willing. In the individual case, the decision to form this coalition is taken against the background of difficult (and maybe varying) assessments of the crisis situation as well as a complex national costs and benefits analysis. The current formula of the EU, that EU will only act militarily, when "NATO as a whole" does not represent a clear answer to the question.
・Thirdly, every institution as well as the nation states have to redefine the relationship between the member states and security institutions. The OSCE, for example, introduced the decision-making role of "all minus one," the CFSP of the EU included the―very limited―principle of qualified majority voting, and even within NATO there is a search for new flexibility. All this modifies the nature of the state/institution interrelationship. Ironically, the process of multi-institutionalization provides new freedom of action for the bigger states playing a major role in all organizations. There is therefore much evidence that the future role (and power) of each West European country will depend on the capability to activate coalitions of countries and/or international organizations for the implementation of its political interests and goals.
One of the major questions in Europe in the near future will be how the relationship between the EU and NATO will work against the background of the EU's willingness to build-up separate security institutions and capacities. The collapse or deterioration of the transatlantic linkage in security matters would seriously affect the way security and defense policy is run in Europe (and beyond). There is no clear-cut answer in the long ran. In the short-run, however, there are endeavors to link the EU and NATO closely in order to avoid such a breach. Germany is one of the most outspoken advocates of strong links and it is likely that because the German position is shared by many other EU-members, these ideas will prevail.
These calls for an effective relationship can be summarized as follows:
・Foreign policy decisions in the EU should be generally taken on a majority basis. Nevertheless, this should not apply to decisions with a defense component. In these cases unanimity should be required.
