If the intervention had succeeded at that time, if we had been able to influence the outcome in any way at that time so that we had some sort of Russia that was open to the outside world, open to western values and ways of thinking, open to world trade and Western ways of governance, literally, tens of millions of lives could have been saved. But that was not to be the case. I do not think there was any possibility at that time to impose western ways of thinking militarily on the Russian people, as we do not have it now. We tend to think we are incapable of meddling in Russian affairs because Russia is a nuclear power, but we ought to bring back to our memory that we failed in that task 80 years ago, when nobody possessed nuclear weapons. The Bolshevik way of dealing with the problem of Modernization of Russia and providing the people of the vast part of Eurasian continent (including the central Asian nations) some sort of governance has failed. But we have not yet found an alternative solution to that task.
China poses the same kind of question. We, Japanese intervened in the Chinese Civil War during the 1930's and learnt bitterly from it. This partly explains our reluctance to meddle in Chinese human fight affairs as light heartedly as the Americans. Many people tend to be very pessimistic about bringing Chinese aboard on human fights politics, but after all, even after the Belgrade bombing, Chinese did not veto Resolution 1244 for Kosovo and we even managed to bring the Russians aboard. If you look at table 2, it is clear that Russia already and China increasingly will become vulnerable to sanctions and pressures from outside world. Studies over the effects of Kosovo over the Russians and the Chinese tend to point to the importance of moving these states towards cooperation.23
Even given the nature of complex interdependence, there will be cases when one of the "big three" will adamantly oppose certain humanitarian intervention considered necessary by other countries. I think at the moment, the "international community's" ability to act must stop at that point. There may be some regional solutions to be sought. But UN Security Council is a kind of a concert system and it will remain so for a while to come. It must also be stated that although nobody has the ability to stop one of the "big three" against some kind of "humanitarian intervention" it deems necessary of which we for some reason do not approve, although in the longer run it is more likely to create resentment against the intervening state and make matters worse off.24
6. Conclusion
Any conclusion about global governance at the wake of twenty-first century will be inconsistent and unsatisfactory. That only reflects the nature of our global society at the moment. But still, I think we ought to aim for what Stanley Hoffman calls "defensible and purposeful inconsistency" or "case by case decisions" instead of "incoherent inconsistency."
"These will take into account cultural differences, local circumstances, differences in trends, differences in the potential of different countries, and the inevitable fact that human rights considerations will have to be balanced against or blended with other concerns. But the main idea would be that the balance or blend ought to be such as not to sacrifice the promotion of human rights altogether.
