The controversy surrounding this issue underlines both the necessity and the urgency of reforming the Security Council. Various proposals have been made ranging from expanding the number of permanent members to produce a more balanced geographical representation to creating a new category of membership called "tenured" or "standing" members that occupy seats for extended periods and which also represent a more diverse group of states.43 Other proposals focus on reforming the voting procedures and veto rights of Security Council members so as to allow for majority rather than consensus based decision-making. Given that such proposals entail either amending the Charter or seeking the approval of those country's most likely to have their power and prestige curtailed as a consequence, the prospects for fundamental reform cannot be considered good. This should not deter those from continuing their campaign for reform, however. Realistically though the implementation of more modest informal agreements among the Permanent Members that constrain use of their veto power in a way that lessens the likelihood of gridlock is probably about all that can be hoped for in the short term.44
The third source of contention, as discussed above, revolves around the apparently arbitrary nature in which the leading members of the "international community" observe the evolving norms and rules relating to humanitarian intervention. It would clearly be desirable if these rules and norms were enforced on a uniform and consistent basis not just for the benefit of those who may suffer if they are not but also to buttress the general legitimacy of the rules the international community wishes to see respected. That they are not is clearly a matter of concern but this is not a reason to question the value or even righteousness of the instances when they are and certainly not the overarching desirability of establishing rules in the interests of global order and human security. In short, "some degree of selectively is inevitable, and it is better to uphold basic principles selectively than not at all."45
This may be cold comfort to those in the world who feel ignored or discriminated. Yet this is almost certainly the way in which law and order was originally imposed or evolved within their own political community. For most states this process neither occurred rapidly nor in a uniform fashion. Most of the time it proceeded in an incremental and ragged fashion that served select interests rather than those of the entire community. This should not be interpreted as a justification for selectivity but rather to demonstrate that the effort to constrain force in the interests of global governance should not be held to a higher standard than most states practiced at one stage or another in their own development. Many national governing authorities, it should be added, still cannot claim that they either enjoy full sovereignty over their own territory or that they uphold their laws without prejudice to all of their citizens. As Lincoln Bloomfield has stated in this regard: "As with the rest of human life, consistency cannot be the major litmus test. It is not cynical but realistic to acknowledge that political triage is the likely prospect, and that the world is fortunate if the large matters… are tackled by the community even while some lesser issues remain unresolved."46 Some variance between the ideal and the practicable is to be expected, therefore. A better objective should be to strive to make the gap less egregious by actively endeavoring to narrow it even if it can only be done slowly and sometimes hesitantly.
In trying to address the fourth area of contention that revolves around the set of questions about how force should be applied in support of humanitarian intervention, many have referred to the principles contained in the classic doctrines of "just war" (jus ad bello) and "justice in war" (jus in bello).47
