Efforts to define a precise threshold of suffering to justify intervention is probably infeasible and arguably undesirable. If 100,000 deaths were set as the triggering criterion, would 90,000 deaths then somehow be considered acceptable And even if a precise figure were defined, could an accurate accounting be made in a time period that was operationally meaningful?38 As Olara Otunnu has argued： "This problem cannot be resolved through a juridical design. The appropriate threshold is more likely to emerge slowly over a period of time, through judgment on a case by case basis."39 Arguably a more productive approach to seeking international legitimacy for intervention is to focus on developing a consensus on where the authority resides to issue the equivalent of an international "warrant" for such actions (see below).
Let us now turn to the second source of contention, namely the question of where the legitimate locus of authority should reside not only to adjudicate which rights or rules of global governance take precedence in particular situations but also to issue the necessary international "warrant" for collective action in the event they need to be enforced. At the domestic level only those legally invested with such authority can claim to perform these functions. That this authority is unambiguous to everyone concerned in the sense that it is neither contested nor subject to overlapping claims is generally considered desirable. That it also be considered impartial when exercising this authority is likewise seen to be important.
The UN Security Council is currently the only international body that comes remotely close to meeting these criteria. While NATO chose not to seek a priori UN mandate and in the eyes of many set a dangerous precedent, it is by no means clear that the Security Council's role as the preeminent authority for sanctioning collective enforcement actions was fatally weakened. The palpable unease with which many NATO countries felt in proceeding without formal UN authorization that was manifested most clearly in the German government's declaration that "the decision of NATO must not become a precedent," is evidence for this view.40 The rapidity with which NATO sought the post-hoc blessing of the UN is another indicator. Certainly there appears to be little enthusiasm for investing regional security organizations with a formal mandate to authorize enforcement missions and even less to so called "coalitions of the willing" should wielding such authority.
Nevertheless, as is widely acknowledged, the UN Security Council has many deficiencies. The most important members of the Security Council can hardly be considered broadly representative of the international community, thereby undermining its general legitimacy. The ability, moreover, of any one of its five permanent members to veto the initiatives of others can also make the Security Council hostage to their narrow interests rather than the broader concerns of the international community they purportedly represent.41 This can produce stalemate and ultimately inaction. As Catherine Guicherd has argued in relation to humanitarian crises: "From the point of view of the victims, the situation is unacceptable: why should they be less entitled to protection when the permanent members are unable to agree?"42
