These factors make a persuasive case for maritime cooperation efforts as the ideal avenue for consideration of prospective security cooperation. Both Japan and Korea depend on the Sea for survival and prosperity, with the vast majority of their key sea lanes overlapping. Moreover, we must anticipate a domestic and international backlash to security cooperation that expands into the military realm; but such a reaction will be less severe in the case of maritime cooperation as compared to ground force cooperation. In terms of military cooperation, the nature of naval activity presents a lower political profile. Thus, in this context, maritime activity is the ideal front on which to initiate trilateral security cooperation.
Thus, for the new century, it is being proposed to organise a security scheme consisting of relatively invisible security cooperation triangle composed of the two bilateral security arrangements (the US-Japan and the US-ROK alliances) with the US as the apex. This triangle will be much easier to shape and less provocative because it is a scheme evolving from the existing security arrangements and does not have to constitute a formal trilateral alliance.
This scheme will also create new dimensions of Japan-ROK security relationships, currently the weakest leg of the triangle and will pave the way for a new framework of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. If this cooperative triangle is materialised, it will be the first maritime security scheme which has great potential for future enlargement in terms of the number of participants and in substantive areas of regional cooperation.
International Cooperative Scheme for SLOC Security
Almost all of the states in the Asia-Pacific region depend on the sea for survival and well-being, they also share their key sea lanes. Some territorial disputes within the region may develop into crisis for regional stability and freedom of navigation, so we should seek means for the affected states to cooperate on an effective response. In this context, maritime activity is the ideal front for which to initiate regional security cooperation.
It should be noted that the CSCAP has been and currently is successful in promoting multilateral security cooperation within the region in the areas including CBM, SAR, and safety of navigation. In addition, we should establish a scheme which can effectively respond to the aforementioned three destabilising factors hindering the free use of SLOCs:
1. unilateral declaration restricting specific waters;
2. disruptions due to regional conflict; and
3. intentional obstructions to deny use of sea lanes.
The assumption of responsibility for SLOC protection and direct contributions to SLOC maintenance can have long-term implications for regional stability, and thereby can contribute to the national interests of respective countries. The ideal formulation of a regional maritime security cooperation scheme can be established making use of the existing bilateral security arrangements with the US. In this regard, the naval cooperative aspects of US-Japan security arrangements could be a working model.
Strong US-Japan navy to navy ties exist in mutually complementary functions in roles and mission-sharing, and in interoperability. Thus, a scheme can be created which places the United States at the hub, and which allows bilateral systems with the regional states, much like a hub and spokes in structure.
In such a cooperative security structure, each nation would naturally protect its own interests. However, the US Navy, situated in the centre will also hold responsibility for coordinating closer contacts between regional navies and for acting as the sole key strategic player. The regional states should share geographic and operational responsibilities in accordance with their location and capabilities respectively. In order to choose the most appropriate burden sharing formula, the following roles are suggested in accordance with capabilities and geographic conditions:
1. for the US Navy: maintenance of sea control throughout the Pacific Ocean in addition to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf;
