But,atthe same time, these SLOCs remain very fragile and prone to external disruption.Dominant factors that may obstruct the free use of SLOCs may be divided into six general categories:
1. disruption due to maritime accidents or disasters at sea
2. damage due to piracy
3. disruption to the maritime system
4. unilateral declaration restricting specific waters
5. disruption due to regional conflict
6. intentional obstruction to deny usage of sea lanes.
VADM Yamamoto also pointed out that of the six SLOC obstructions listed above,the first three result from either natural disasters,accidents,or crimes which do not necessarily mandate a military response. However,the challenges posed by the last three obstacles remain difficult to resolve without the employment of a military response. Particularly,intentional obstruction represents the worst case. In such case, a nation or power may intentionally create obstructions to free access to a sea lane causing severe consequences.The power that exercises sea denial remains free to choose the means and course of its actions so as to maximise its own interests,carefully monitoring unfolding events.This places SLOCs in a considerable amount of danger. Psychological pressure will also intensify the crisis,especially if the act of sea denial employs the stealthy employment of submarines or the threat of mines. Sea denial committed near choke points and harbours can be lethal blows to a system unable to formulate effective countermeasures.1
The Current State of Regional Maritime Cooperation
As to security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, Particularly once the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into effect in November 1994, interest in pursuing maritime cooperation has heightened. Efforts to promote frameworks for cooperation have thus far centred on the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), particularly on the Maritime Cooperation Working Group, which has achieved significant fruit in materialising multilateral maritime cooperation such as Confidence Building Measures (CBM), environmental and navigational safety issues, and marine information exchange.2
However, it should be noted that consensual and procedural approaches along the lines of the ASEAN style simply cannot work if all the parties will not play. As a result, the scope of planned cooperation remains limited to nonmilitary aspects such as education and training, environmental protection, search and rescue (SAR), anti-piracy measures, safety of navigation, resource protection, and disaster relief measures, to date efforts have failed to touch on cooperation necessary for dealing with the types of crises categorised by VADM Yamamoto as items 4-6 above.
Frameworks for security cooperation − including military cooperation − in the region do exist. The US maintains alliance relationships with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines respectively, and the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) is still effective among the UK, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand.
Today the regular deployment of Australian naval and air resources, and regular joint exercising, provide a continuing commitment to common defence concerns. The current dominant activity under FPDA is integrated air defence system, which is the continuing basis for Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand to operate together for the air defence of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.3
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is another mechanism that has been instituted for regular dialogue among regional navies. The WPNS started in 1988 as a forum for a frank exchange of views on a wide range of issues, including the law of the sea and SLOC protection. It is a unique and significant forum that take steps forward for a better understanding between regional navies.4
However, in the Asia-Pacific region, military aspects such as standing Naval Forces Mediterranean, are unlikely to materialise in the foreseeable future, because insufficient assets, legal constraints, lack of interoperability, and particularly the absence of mutually held doctrine limit the formation of such regional maritime cooperation.
