(2) Examples of inappropriate control of IDs
The Japanese Maritime Safety Agency has responded to a number of cases which are apparently caused by the inappropriate control of IDs. The following are samples of such cases:
Case No.1:
On 2 April 1999, the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency received maritime distress information that a distress alert of 406 MHz was being transmitted 110 miles off Hokkaido, Japan, from the United States. Although the JMSA made ID reference to ITU, the ID was not registered in the ITU's record. In the meantime, JMSA dispatched its patrol vessels and aircraft to the scene in order to ascertain the accuracy and veracity of the information. However, no ships in distress were found at the scene despite JMSA's continuous search efforts. Afterwards, JMSA obtained relevant information from foreign RCC that the EPIRB in question was originally equipped in the foreign flag ship, that it had subsequently been resold and that it had become missing afterwards. Eventually, patrol vessels and aircraft of the JMSA discovered the EPIRB in question adrift, picked it up and stopped the alert by extracting the battery.
Case No.2:
In April 1999, the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency received a distress alert (DSC 2 MHz). As a result of ID reference by MCC, information regarding two different ships was received. While providing foreign RCC with the result of the ID reference, the JMSA sent a telex to both ships to ascertain which of the ships had transmitted the DSC distress alert. As a result of the inquiry it emerged that one of the ships transmitted the distress alert by mistake.
