This provision is controversial⁴⁹. The key phrase in this provision is "in accordance with international law." But international law in this area is still evolving. Perhaps the most potent provision in favor of such coastal State authority is Article 220 (3)-(6), which authorizes coastal States to obtain the identification of and to conduct a search of commercial cargo vessels in its EEZ that are suspected of violating the pollution regulations of the coastal State. Under Article 220 (3),(6), if there are "clear grounds" for believing that a vessel is violating international pollution standards, a coastal State may:

　

 This right of visit, inspection, and detention gives the coastal State a right to take action in some circumstances, but State practice appears to have expanded this right dramatically after the disastrous breakup of the oil tanker Prestige off the coast of Spain in November 2002. Spain refused to permit the crippled tanker to come into a Spanish port for "safe haven," and then when the vessel was towed out into the open ocean, it broke apart and the spillage of its cargo increased dramatically. After huge amounts of oil washed up along the beautiful and resource-rich coasts of Spain, Portugal, and France, France and Spain issued a decree that said:

　

 Shortly after the Spanish-French decree, Portugal announced that it would also take the same position on this issue⁵¹. And then Morocco announced that single hull oil tankers more than 15 years old carrying heavy fuel, tar, asphaltic bitumen or heavy crude oil would be subject to requirement that they provide prior notification and adhere to strict safety regulation⁵².

　

 On April 3, 2003, the French National Assembly unanimously adopted a new law asserting the right to intercept ships out to a distance 90 miles from its Mediterranean coast that release polluting ballast waters and also imposing stricter controls on transient oil tankers⁵³. Captains of vessels violating these new French rules can be sentenced to up to 4 years in prison and fined up to $600,000⁵⁴. About this same time, Spain, France, and Portugal were joined by Belgium and the United Kingdom in submitting a petition to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to declare virtually their entire EEZs to be "particularly sensitive sea areas" that would be completely off-limits for single-hulled oil tankers and other cargo vessels transporting dangerous cargoes⁵⁵. Although the IMO has not yet approved this initiative, this effort by five maritime countries to protect their own coastal resources provides strong support for their view that it is legitimate to restrict maritime freedom in order to protect the resources of the EEZ and to take interim action to do so pending IMO approval.

　

 Other examples of restrictions on navigational freedom in order to protect environmental resources include the US proposal, which was approved by the IMO in December 1998, to establish a mandatory ship reporting system off the northeast and southeast coasts of the United States in order to protect the northern right whale from being hit by ships⁵⁶. This whale species was hunted almost to extinction because of its oil, and is now thought to be the rarest whale species in the world⁵⁷. This new mandatory ship reporting area joins nine others that have been established by IMO to protect fragile environmental areas. In May 1996, the IMO approved a reporting regime for the Torres Strait region between Australia and Papua New Guinea and the inner route of Australia's Great Barrier Reef as well as the area adjacent to France's Ushant islet⁵⁸. Six months later, the IMO gave this status to Denmark's Great Belt Traffic Area, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the area off of Finisterre on the Spanish coast⁵⁹. On May 29, 1998, the IMO similarly required that notice be provided by ships passing through the Strait of Bonifacio between Corsica (France) and Sardinia (Italy) and also through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore⁶⁰. And on December 3, 1998, the IMO imposed this requirement on ships passing through the Strait of Dover/Pas de Calais as well as those sailing off the northeastern and southeastern coast of the United States to protect the remaining right whales⁶¹.

　

 The US Department of Defense vigorously opposed the designation of the eastern coastal areas of the United States as mandatory ship reporting areas, because it "was concerned that although public ships notably warships were exempt under the NOAA proposal, to require civilian vessels to report would make it possible to determine (by elimination) which ships were military" and thereby "would erode navigational freedoms globally and endanger American lives⁶²". The US Coast Guard, however, supported this initiative, because of its mandate to enforce US environmental law, even though it recognized that this move might require the United States to support similar initiatives by other countries and might lead to the perception that "international law increasingly recognizes environmental protection as a justifiable reason to curtail freedom of navigation⁶³."

　

 Regarding the transport of ultrahazardous nuclear materials⁶⁴, ratifying countries of the 1982 UNCLOS have lodged competing declarations to the Convention under Article 310 on the issue of ultrahazardous nuclear transports. One group of mainly nonnuclear States considers that Articles 22 and 23 of the Convention presume the existence of international conventions regulating such transport and that, until such treaties are developed, coastal States can require prior notification or even prior authorization for such shipments⁶⁵.

　

 Another group of mainly nuclear States emphasizes the right of free navigation and disputes the obligations of prior consent or even notification⁶⁶. Some of these declarations confuse the issues of prior notification and prior informed consent. A regime of "prior notification" requires the shipper to provide notification that it will be passing through the zone, but does not require approval of the passage. A regime of "prior informed consent" would require notification followed by formal approval by the coastal state of the passage. An argument can be made that a prior notification and consultation requirement would be justified in situations where the potential consequences of an accident to the coastal environment would be grave. A "consent" requirement would obviously be more burdensome on the shipper.

　

 Numerous States have declared that the shipments of ultrahazardouss nuclear cargoes should not transit through their EEZs. In 1992, for instance, South Africa and Portugal explicitly requested that Japan's shipment of nuclear spent fuel stay out of their EEZs⁶⁷, and in response to an inquiry from Australia, Japan stated that "in principle" the ship would stay outside the 200-nautical-mile zone of all nations⁶⁸. In 1995, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Nauru, and Kiribati all expressly banned the British nuclear cargo ship Pacific Pintail from their EEZs and Chile sent its ships and aircraft to force the ship out of its EEZ⁶⁹. In 1999, New Zealand issued a strong statement protesting these shipments and stating that they should not be permitted through New Zealand's EEZ because of the "precautionary principle" enshrined in the Rio Declaration⁷⁰.

　

 In October 2002, Chile modified its "Law for Nuclear Safety" to require prior authorization for any transport of "nuclear substances" and "radioactive materials" through Chile's EEZ⁷¹. Such authorization will be granted only if the transporter establishes that the shipment will "keep the environment free of contamination" and only after information has been provided regarding the date and route of the shipment, the "characteristics of the load," and the "safety and contingency measures" that are being⁷² utilized.

　

 In what may be seen as a defining moment in the tension between navigational freedom and the right of coastal States to restrict the movement of ships through their EEZs based on the nature of the ships and their cargoes, the United States announced on February 3, 2004 that it was abandoning its plan to ship a 770-ton decommissioned nuclear reactor from the San Onofre nuclear plant in Southern California around South America to South Carolina for burial⁷³. The plan, which had previously been approved by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) despite conflicting views within the US government⁷⁴, was to put the reactor on a barge for a 100-day journey around South America⁷⁵. This journey would have included the transiting of Drake's Passage at Cape Horn, the continent's southern tip, which is one of the world's most dangerous nautical passages, where gale force winds blow more than 200 days each year⁷⁶.

　

 Disposal of the San Onofre reactor faced opposition from myriad sources from the outset. Although logic would have seemingly favored burial in California, or Hanford, Washington, or even transporting the reactor across the United States by train, the DOT had rejected all these options because of US laws governing the disposal of nuclear wastes and because of liability concerns⁷⁷. The first international hurdle faced by the proposed shipment concerned Chile's "Law for Nuclear Safety."

　

 The US State Department had originally instructed Southern California Edison, which operated the San Onofre plant, that it "should not apply for Chilean authorization for the passage because it was concerned that doing so would set an unfavourable precedent for future shipments⁷⁸." Subsequently, however, the DOT indicated that it thought consultations with Chile would be logical because of the potential risks and the advantages of having emergency contingency plans in place⁷⁹. The DOT also urged Southern California Edison to develop more realistic plans for salvage in the case of a sinking, as the original plans provided for salvage only in 300 feet of water or less, while the actual journey would be "entirely over the open ocean⁸⁰."

　

 The DOT issued a permit for the shipment on December 2003, based in part on Southern California Edison's assurances that "the ocean journey will be made in international shipping lanes hundreds of miles off the coasts of Central and South America⁸¹." It was never clear if the vessel was going to try to bypass Chile's Nuclear Safety Law by avoiding passage through Chile's EEZ altogether by staying more than 200 nautical miles from the Chilean coast.

　

 A second hurdle to the South American transport plan was presented by a January 2004 court decision in Argentina, which prohibited the passage of the reactor through Argentina's EEZ⁸². This decision, issued by Argentine federal judge Jorge Pfleger, cited the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-Boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal⁸³ as authorizing coastal countries to block such shipments⁸⁴. After this decision, Argentine officials stated that if the shipment passed through Argentina's EEZ "the load will be intercepted by the military and escorted out of the nation's territorial waters⁸⁵." This important decision set the stage for a significant international incident if the shipment had taken place and had transited within 200 nautical miles of Argentina's coast. The decision to abandon the effort to ship the San Onofre reactor by sea, and thus to leave it in place in Southern California, avoided the potential for international confrontations, but also reinforced the view that countries can act to protect their coastal populations and coastal resources by preventing passage of particularly dangerous cargoes and unseaworthy ships through their coastal waters.