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9. "surveillance" means the observation by visual or any technical means of activities on, over or under the seas and oceans; and
This definition was developed de nouveau by the participants. From the discussion, it was apparent that it was meant to be comprehensive, i.e., to include all passive types of observations of persons, objects, and human or human-generated activities in the marine environment.
10. "threat of force" means a coercive attempt to compel another State to take or not to take certain specific action, or an action that is directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of that State, or against any of its assets or people, or taken in any other manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.
The 1982 UNCLOS Article 301 prohibits "threat of force" together with "use of force" that is inconsistent with the UN Charter44. UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibits "threat of force" together with "threat of force" together with "use of force". It is thus clear that any such "threat" must be closely tied to what the target State perceives as readiness of another State to use force against it. Such threat has a coercive intent to compel the target State to take or not to take certain specific action. Therefore only a threat directed towards a specific reaction on the part of a State is unlawful45. Another important point is that the threat of force prohibited by the Charter is not just any threat of force: it must be "threat [or use] of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law" embodied in the Charter.
Such threat therefore involves certain demands relating to the territory or affecting the political interests of the target State. A typical example is the concentration of naval forces in the EEZ of another State accompanied by certain political demands against that State. There may also be a situation where a coastal State considers foreign military maneuvers in its EEZ as threat of force, with tacit demands, if they are conducted in a situation of high political tension46. But would a massive jamming of a nation's military and/or civilian electronic systems by foreign vessels and aircraft in its EEZ qualify as a use or threat of force?
It has been pointed out that state practice reveals a relatively high degree of tolerance towards mere threats of force47. The reasons for this seem to be that some of the most obvious threats of force are legitimized by the right of self-defense under the Charter, and that there is difficulty in distinguishing clearly between offensive and defensive preparations48.
44. The following is an edited extract of Hayashi, supra n. 4, p. 126.
45. Simma, supra n. 42, p. 118.
46. Boczek, supra n. 30, p. 379 and supra n. 37, p. 456.
47. Simma, supra n. 42, p. 118.
48. Ibid.
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