As regards the serious prejudice, Article 6(3) of the ASCM, sets out a list of conditions under which it may arise. Amongst these, the first investigation showed that the one mentioned under point c) of this Article is the provision relevant in the present investigation, i.e. "the effect of the subsidy is a significant price under cutting by the subsidised product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market". This is confirmed by this updating investigation and, accordingly, the same factors were used for the purpose of the current report.

　

With regard to price undercutting and price depression an analysis has been carried out in the context of the injury assessment above. In view of the fact that the analysis above was made on the world shipbuilding market the assessment made is also valid in the context of serious prejudice.

The number of lost sales to Korean shipyards was less marked during the current investigation period . This is firstly to be related to the market development during that period. In view of the Koreans relatively full order book, they were not in a position to secure as many new orders as they did in the previous years. The Community shipyards were therefore in a position to secure a reasonable amount of new olders (also aided by the last available state aids in December 2000).

　

Secondly, it appears that, in certain cases, Community shipyards were not even contacted or invited to the bidding process. Therefore, in many instances no documentary proof of lost sales was provided.

　

Nevertheless, the investigation showed that, during the current investigation period, Community producers submitted offers to ship owners, but subsequently lost the contracts to Korean shipyards, due to significantly lower Korean price offers. As can be seen in the table below, this was the case for 6 containor ships (with a price difference ranging between 6 and 24%), 2 product tankers (ranging between 16% and 2l%), 1 LPG tanker (10%) and, finally, 5 orders for LNGs (ranging between 10 and 15%). It should be noted that in this latter sector orders usually concern a series of 2 to 4 ships to be delivered.

　

　

As already explained above, the market for LNG vessels suddenly expanded in the years 2000 and 2001, going from 4 ships ordered in 1998 to 18 vessels ordered in 2000 and 32 in 2001. In this tremendous market volume increase, the Community shipyards could only secure 3 orders in 2000 and 2 in 2001. These orders were secured by one single shipyard. Two other shipyards, both of which received orders for LNGs until 1993, were also interested in securing some orders in 2000 and 2001, in view of this increasing market segment, but were unable to do so. Market analysis suggests that Korean yards made inroads in this area due to very low offer prices. Their ability to supply a large number of vessels at an early delivery date may have been important also. The reason behind their attempt to access the LNG market is related to the downturn of the cruise ships market since 2000. The investigation also showed that some other shipyards have built such vessels in the past or are currently able to produce them, but are for the moment not actively attempting to (re)access this market.

　

Documentary evidence was provided by the two above mentioned companies detailing the offers they submitted and showing that the contracts were lost to Korean shipyards offering prices between 10 to 15% lower than the Community shipyards offering prices, which represent Community yard's break even costs. It appears that out of the five cases documented, three orders were lost to Daewoo, one of the main beneficiaries of the specific actionable subsidies (cfr. causality), one was lost to Hyundai, a Korean yard which did not receive restructuring subsidies and one to a Japanese yard.

　

It should further be noted that prior to the first investigation period the Community shipyards had a very strong presence on the LNG market. Moreover, the different technologies for LNGs existing at the morment world-wide, have been developed by Community enterprises which hold the relevant patents.

　

Consideration has also been given to the other specific criteria for determining the existence of serious prejudice as listed in Article 6.3 of the ASCM, i.e. the displacement or impediment of the imports of the like product into the market of the subsidising country or the displacement or impediment of the exports to a third country market.

　

As demonstrated above, there has been a change in the relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the overall Community shipyards. This was in particular the case, as shown in Table 4, for the product and chemical tankers and the containet ship sectors, where Korea sharply increased its market share during the period 1997 to 2001 to the disadvantage of the Community shipyards.

The situation of the Community industry slightly improved in the current investigation period compared to the previous year, but is still unfavourable. In addition, when considering the development during the period from 1997 to the current investigation period, it can be seen that the situation of the Community industry significantly deteriorated. Therefore the slight improvement experienced by the Community industry during the current investigation period is not such that it can alter the conclusions of the previous report. On this basis it is confirmed that the Community industry suffered adverse effects within the meaning of Article 5 of the ASCM and Article 2(3) and Article 2(4) of the TBR.

　

In the light of the above, the updating investigation