21 

In considering section 13 of Part A on training and drills, the MSWG decided to keep to the above concept of keeping the mandatory provisions as brief and general as possible, retained therefore only the chapeau of paragraphs 13.1 to .3 and paragraph 13.4 and transferred the necessary detail into Part B of the draft ISPS Code.

22 

The MSWG further agreed to retain the concept of the regularity of drills but again decided not to be too prescriptive as to the periodicity in paragraph 13.4.

23 

In considering the minimum standards for ship security, the MSWG recognized that the general authority and responsibility of the master had to remain untouched. Words to that effect had to be inserted, when the security implication in this respect became clearer in the further deliberations.

24 

The MSWG decided to follow initially the DE 45 approach in paragraph 9.3 namely to list a number of security measures in a recommendatory way and to leave it to the result of the security threat level assessment which ones should be implemented by the company or the ship. Further security considerations might impact on what would have to be actually implemented.

25 

The MSWG, having agreed on new paragraphs 9.1 to 9.7 of Part A of the draft ISPS Code on ship security requirements, subsequently agreed to develop the port facility security requirements in a corresponding manner for consistency purposes.

26 

As to the proposed old draft paragraphs 9.3 to 9.27, the MSWG agreed to keep them in abeyance for the time being.

27 

In considering section 7 of Part A on control of security requirements, the MSWG recognized that this was closely related draft regulation XI/13, both of which needed to be amalgamated, and decided to merge these provisions under Part A of the ISPS Code rather than under chapter Xl.

28 

As to paragraph 7.2, relating to the denial of entry for a ship coming from a port, not meeting the requirements of the ISPS Code, the MSWG agreed to consider the matter very carefully and return to this issue at a later stage (see also paragraphs 71 to 75).

29 

The MSWG agreed in principle to the inclusion of equivalents and bilateral/multilateral agreements in the draft ISPS Code, and redrafted the provision in accordance with similar provisions of other IMO instruments (i.e. SOLAS regulation I/5).

30 

The MSWG considered draft regulation XI/12 on communication of information and agreed that it should eventually become part of the Government obligation requirements. Noting that some information may be security sensitive and could not be disclosed, the MSWG also agreed that all exchange of information requirements should be amalgamated under one regulation. The drafting group was instructed accordingly.

31 

In considering draft regulation XI/16 on the Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), the MSWG discussed who had the final responsibility of keeping it updated at all times.

32 

The MSWG agreed that all information for inclusion in the CSR required by paragraph 16.4.1 to .9 would be held by the flag State administration in any case and it should therefore be that administration's responsibility to update and confirm the CSR. Only in those few cases where and when the information was temporary, within a reasonable period of time, not available to that administration (i.e. immediately after transfer of flag, class and/or ownership) the company or the master, as authorized by it, should update the CSR temporarily and refer that information to the flag State as soon as possible.

33 

The MSWG recognized the Port State Control implications of this requirement and agreed that the issue of carrying the CSR on board and the failure of keeping it updated as detention causes needed to be considered and agreed upon at some later stage.

34 

Recalling the issue of "ownership" and "control" of the ship, which had been referred to LEG 84, the outcome of which had been reported in document MSC 75/17/2/Add.3, annex, the MSWG agreed that the three information requirements:

35 

The MSWG agreed that this regulation should be transferred to Part A of chapter XI

36 

The ICFTU observer reiterated his statement made in plenary, that this information was not sufficient in the context of disclosing ownership of the ship for security purposes.

37 

The ICS observer stated that this issue had been considered by LEG 84, which had agreed that this information was sufficient for the security issue at hand.

38 

The MSWG agreed that a reasonable period of time, three months was mentioned, should be allowed for the flag State administration for updating the CSR information.

39 

In considering the draft amendment to regulation XI/3, the MSWG recalled the principle decision by the Committee on this issue of marking the ship (hull and beam or bulk head) with the IMO number (MSC 75/J/6, paragraph (9).2).

40 

A proposal by ICCL to limit this requirement to all cargo ships below 10,000 gross tonnage was not accepted by the MSWG.

41 

The MSWG, recalling resolution A.600(15) on IMO ship identification number scheme, agreed that the practical aspects of the exterior ship marking needed to be given further consideration, in particular, for passenger ships. It was recognized that the external location of the IMO identification number should allow the marking to be read from both the sea and the air.

42 

The MSWG modified the original draft text as appropriate.

43 

Recalling the Committee's instructions on this matter (MSC 75/J/6, last paragraph .4), the MSWG agreed to modify the draft regulation, keeping only the general concept in the provision, and to transfer the details into the performance standard, to be developed.

44 

In considering the draft text of regulation [XI/5], the MSWG agreed that on a number of issues further action needed to be taken:

45 

On the issue of shore based response to a security alarm, the MSWG recalled that COMSAR 6 already instructed the Joint IMO/ICAO Working Group to advise the Conference accordingly, which would have to consider the matter finally, once that advice was available.

46 

In view of the short period of time between adoption and entry into force of a ship security alarm requirement and the urgent need for a performance standard thereon, the MSWG tasked a small group to develop a draft performance standard for submission to COMSAR 7 for finalization together with some explanatory notes of the small group, as set out in annex 6. The Committee is invited to instruct COMSAR 7 accordingly. The Committee is further invited to instruct NAV 48 to start work on the means of raising alarm on ships under terrorist attack on a priority basis, taking into account the work done by COMSAR 6 and DE 45 (MSC 75/17/2 and Add.1) and the draft regulation [XI/5] developed by the MSWG (paragraph 46 and annex 1);

47 

The MSWG agreed on new texts for the definition of "ship/port interface" and "port facility" and decided not to regulate other ports, which would need to be considered through the port facility security assessment procedure. A Conference resolution was drafted encouraging prior liaison between ships and non-regulated ports. However, the MSWG retained paragraph 5 of draft regulation [XI/5] in square brackets to allow further discussion.

48 

The MSWG agreed on new text for draft regulation [XI/9] which addressed obligations of Governments relating to port facility security assessment (PFSA) and PFSP.

49 

Further consideration should be given to the fact that the relevant competent authority may virtually dictate the contents of the PFSP, in which case it could not be the responsibility of the PFSO to develop that plan.

50 

The use of terminology such as "territory" or "jurisdiction" throughout the draft text needed further consideration, having particular regard to law of the sea provisions.

51 

In considering port facility security requirements, the MSWG agreed to delete a specific requirement on the distribution of the report on the port facility security assessment and to leave it to the relevant Government administration to decide who should receive that report, to ensure maximum security.

52 

In considering section A/16 of the draft ISPS Code, the MSWG developed new text for the PFSA provisions. Again it was agreed to limit the mandatory requirements to the necessary and transfer the remainder to Part B of the draft ISPS Code for guidance. Some essential elements for the PFSA therefore remained in Part A of the Code.

53 

It was agreed that the periodicity intervals for updating and reviewing the PFSA and the PFSP should be similar to those given for the SSP.

54 

The MSWG, revising the requirements for the PFSO, agreed, in consistency with its previous decisions, to keep the essential responsibilities of the PFSO in Part A and transfer the remainder to Part B of the ISPS Code.

55 

In developing the requirements for the training and drills of the PFSO the MSWG followed the same concept, consistent with its previous decisions, keeping the essential provisions in Part A and transferring the remainder to Part B of the ISPS Code.

56 

In considering new draft SOLAS chapter XI regulations proposed by ICFTU on Government responsibilities and human, welfare and trade union rights of ships' crews, the MSWG agreed that these general principles, which were already part of other international treaties and instruments, were better placed in the preambular part of the draft ISPS Code, and prepared text to that effect.

57 

The MSWG, in considering the proposals by the United States relating to container sealing, responsibility for rejecting non-sealed containers, non-intrusive containers inspections and further work relating to the integrity of closed CTUs in multimodal transport to be done by WCO in co-operation with IMO (MSC 75/17/32 and 33), noted information provided by the WCO observer on the current work done by that Organization in this context (MSC 75/17/8). The WCO observer further informed the MSWG on the WCO conventions relevant to the maritime security issue, namely the Nairobi Convention (on exchange of information), which needed revision, and the recently revised Kyoto Convention (on control and customs procedures).

58 

Recalling the recommendation of the ISWG that the work on the integrity of closed CTUs in multimodal transport should be best left to the WCO, and that amendments to IMO instruments should only be made once WCO had completed their work, the MSWG considered how best to move forward on this issue and, in particular, how to ensure that the WCO work is being progressed as fast as possible and, failing that, how to ensure further expeditious action in IMO.

59 

The WCO observer advised the MSWG that the WCO Council would meet in June 2002 at which meeting its Director-General could initiate projects on the four elements proposed by the United States and could request accelerated action by the WCO Enforcement Committee, to meet in January 2003.

60 

The MSWG noted that work on security for closed CTUs in WCO is progressing since many years in relation to security threats other terrorism and that the incremental terrorism threat should only be considered as a further, very strong incentive to expedite that process.

61 

The MSWG agreed that a draft conference resolution on enhanced co-operation between Government and port authorities and port and shipping industries, encouraging the exchange of information/intelligence; promulgation of the development and conclusion of MoUs thereon between above parties, and activities like, e.g. the sea carrier initiative; and close co-operation between IMO and WCO on these matters should be prepared, which could be considered for adoption in light of the progress made in the work by WCO.

62 

The MSWG, noting that the industry could contribute a considerable amount to the integrity of closed CTUs in multimodal transport by reviewing and improving their operational procedures on a voluntary basis, agreed that the matter needed to be addressed as a matter of urgency by IMO, WCO and, as far as port workers were concerned, also by ILO; that letters to that effect needed to be sent by IMO and ILO to the Director-General of WCO, inviting WCO to undertake that work as a matter of urgency; Government representatives should advise their customs colleagues accordingly, to ensure their support in the WCO process; and the proposed draft conference resolution, indicating what particular elements needed to be progressed with priority, should be developed to ensure appropriate action by IMO upon completion of that process.

63 

A firm recommendation on the above should be put to the Committee for review and decision by MSC 77 upon completion of the Maritime Security Conference.

64 

The draft conference resolution and a draft letter to the Secretary-General of the WCO, as prepared by the MSWG given in annexes 5 and 7 respectively. The Committee is invited to request the Secretary-General to communicate along those lines with the Secretary-General of the WC0.