Professor KV. Kesavan

Visiting Professor, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan.

　

 Ocean security has assumed great importance in recent years in view of humankind's increasing dependence on the seas. The need for keeping the ocean secure is heightened manifold when security is seen in a comprehensive and multi-dimensional way. In the post-cold war period the concept of security has come to be increasingly redefined in a very comprehensive manner. Security is no longer perceived in simple military terms. Notwithstanding the importance of military strength, new issues like resource mobilization, technology, energy self-sufficiency, food security, environment , and so on, are seen as important adjuncts of comprehensive security. Similarly, until recently, the use of ocean was primarily linked to naval activities. Historically, countries sought to acquire power by controlling the seas. During the cold war years, the rivalry between the two power blocs was extended to the oceans where the US and the Soviet Union tried to establish their supremacy. The Super Power rivalry created an uneasy balance of power situation in the oceans. However, a certain degree of stability was seen in the maintenance of sea-lanes, navigation, etc. Security alliances, both bilateral and multilateral, forged in certain regions, acted as effective deterrence against any precipitate naval action. The collapse of the cold war structures removed the earlier uneasy balance ,but introduced a great deal of fluidity in the ocean situation. However, it should be recognized that the non-military aspects of maritime security came to be emphasized from then on.

 Two more developments followed which had a great bearing on the Indian Ocean situation in particular. A large number of Indian Ocean littoral countries having gained independence had been busy with the new tasks of economic reconstruction. Following the end of the cold war, one major shift was seen in their approaches to nation building. Almost all South Asian countries gave up their earlier inward-looking economic strategies and opted for market economy and economic liberalization. In particular, the shift in India's economic policies had a bearing on the whole of Indian Ocean region. Their growing economic needs made them think of a longer term energy strategy and the need for adopting a maritime security policy.

 The second development related to the extension of jurisdiction under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS, which came into force in 1994, introduced many controversial points into the whole arena of discussion on ocean resources, creation of economic zones, and so on. Nations, which had earlier pursued their maritime activities without any concern for their neighbours, now found the new situation quite restrictive. The UNCLOS has recognized the right of a country to claim: a) a 12 nautical mile territorial sea measured from baseline; 2) an additional 12 nautical mile contiguous zone in which countries can punish violation of their customs, immigration, etc, laws within their territory or territorial sea; 3) a continental shelf to a maximum of 350 miles and 4) an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from baseline and in which countries have rights over resources and all related activities as well as jurisdiction over artificial structures, marine scientific research and protection of the marine environment. (1) The UNCLOS has conferred new rights on the coastal states relating to ocean resources and activities. But many new responsibilities have also devolved upon them.

　

 It is in the light of the above-mentioned developments that one should approach the question of Indian Ocean security. But, additionally, one should also bear in mind certain peculiar features of the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean, the third biggest ocean in the world, provides the crucial routes to Middle East, Africa and East Asia. It has numerous littoral countries belonging to Asia and Africa. Almost all of them became independent only after the second world war. There is tremendous diversity in language, religion, and race among these countries. More than sixty per cent of the global trade in oil and petroleum products is carried through the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean to Europe, the US and Asia. In the Indian Ocean region, intra-regional trade is still small accounting for only twenty per cent. Japan depends on the West Asian oil to the extent of more than seventy five per cent of its total needs. The sea lanes have become so crucial that any disturbance in the flow of oil would severely hurt the economies of most countries in the world. The need to ensure the safety of these routes has become a subject of paramount importance. The Indian ocean is also endowed with numerous natural resources like hydrocarbons, oil and gas deposits, sands, fish stocks, etc.

 Despite the fact that the Indian Ocean region is known for prolonged political turbulence and economic backwardness, one should not overlook several efforts made in the past to ensure its security. The most prominent among them was the proposal made by Sri Lanka in 1971 to declare the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It was about the same time that Malaysia also put another proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. (ZOPFAN). The first proposal was supported by more than a hundred member countries of the UN which formed an ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean. The committee was supposed to prepare the ground for an Indian Ocean Conference that would negotiate the final agreement to execute the proposal. But the conference could not be held because of serious disagreements. One of the main aims of the proposal was to exclude the external powers particularly the two Super Powers from the Indian Ocean. This was not a realistic goal to achieve since the influence of the Super Powers at that time was too great. For another, many countries in the region welcomed the presence of the US in the Ocean as a stabilizing factor. Before any progress could be made in the realization of the proposal, the cold war itself was over. Though the proposal failed, its aim that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace continues to be relevant and important. But the question of keeping the external actors away from the zone is not realistic since the Ocean is a common heritage of mankind. Further, the Indian Ocean has become far more important now in terms of its strategic location.

 It is also necessary to note that some of the cold war alliances like the MEDO or CENTO have completely ceased in the region whereas in other parts of Asia, a series of bilateral security alliances between the US, and Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia still provides a security network in the region. Though the cold war has ended, they still provide a favourable climate for cooperation among these countries. Institution building is still new in the Indian Ocean region. In 1985, the UNESCO set up the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC), but it has had only mixed success.

 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) could have taken some initiatives to focus on the prospects of promoting economic linkages with the Indian Ocean countries. But the South Asian forum was far too preoccupied with its own internal contradictions to devote any time for other questions. After the end of the cold war when more and more regional blocs were emerging all over the world, South Africa\, Australia and India felt the need for taking initiatives to build some mechanism for the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) was formed in 1997 with the principal efforts of these three countries. The IOR-ARC holds its summit meetings once in two years. Simultaneously it holds two parallel second track meetings- the IOR Academic Group (IORAG) and IOR Business Forum (IORBF). The formation of the IORARC marked a significant development in that it gives an oceanic identity to its members in addition to opening opportunities for cooperation. The Association, whose present membership is eighteen, should be open for more littoral countries. In the second week of October, 2003, the Association held its latest meeting in Colombo and affirmed that " we have to make collective efforts to harness the wide resources of the Indian Ocean.". It also discussed the importance of strengthening relations with dialogue partners like Britain, Japan, China, France and Egypt. There is still a debate going on within the forum regarding its essential orientation. Some member countries strongly insist on the need for the Association to maintain its economic role while others want security to be added to its agenda. In a way this debate has somewhat slowed down the growth of the Association. Either way, it can play a very useful role as the only instrument available for the Indian Ocean rim countries. But this kind of debate is not something peculiar to this forum only. For a long time the ASEAN had the same dilemma. In more recent years, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was beset with a similar situation. But today it discusses a variety of political and security issues affecting the Asia-Pacific region. Since the IOR-ARC is a new body it will take time for it to broaden its parameters. From a long term perspective, it has to address several issues connected with maritime security like the safety of the sea-lanes, anti-piracy measures, and the like.

 Security proposals: the China factor: As the demands for energy from the Asia-Pacific region will grow in the coming years, the pressure on the Gulf countries will correspondingly increase. The present calculations are that the oil producing capacity of the Gulf countries would be sufficient to meet the demands of the Asian countries for a long time to come. Oil experts believe that it is too early to worry about the exhaustion of oil reserves. For one thing, new production techniques have considerably cut down the oil production costs. Second, they have also reduced the time required to develop new oil fields. (2) While the demands of all Asian countries for oil will increase in the coming years, the case of China is important as it will have a great bearing on the Indian Ocean security. If China maintains its present pace of economic growth, its energy needs will grow at more than 6 per cent per annum. It is even expected to surpass the energy needs of Japan by 2010. In the absence of any major alternative source, China will have to rely on the Gulf countries. Considering the growing energy needs of other countries like India, ASEAN, South Korea, etc, the pressure on the Gulf countries will be quite phenomenal. If China feels confident that the sea lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean including the Malacca Strait are safe, it will stick to the present policy of peacefully pursuing its economic goals. In other words, adequate measures should be taken to win the confidence of China that it can share the same sea lanes as used by others. Tension in the Indian Ocean would be greatly aggravated if any attempts were made to create an impression of denying China the use of the sea lanes. In this connection a proposal made by a Japanese expert to create an Asian body like the Asian Energy Agency makes sense. This body could safeguard the legitimate energy interests of the Asian countries. Within this body, a division on the maritime security could be created to ensure that there is no threat to the use of the sea lanes. (3) The same body could also undertake to encourage China, Japan, South Korea, etc, to go in for jointly exploiting the energy resources in Siberia. If successful, this could in the long run take the pressure off the Gulf countries.

 The UNCLOS III has given greater maritime responsibilities to countries and they have to enhance their maritime assets to discharge them. The National Institute of Defence Studies, Japan, has made an important proposal in this connection. Galling it Ocean Peace Keeping (OPK), the proposal is meant to safeguard necessarily the obligations of the states under UNCLOS III. OPK is different from the usual UN peace-keeping mission which comes into action only after an event has taken place. The OPK envisages joint monitoring activities to protect the environment of the ocean and to fight against illegal fishing, piracy and unauthorized immigrants. It would have other functions such as search and rescue, and constabulary responsibilities. The OPK personnel would be drawn from the navies of the participating countries though Japan itself would be very anxious to see that its personnel are drawn from the civilian controlled coastal guards rather than from the Maritime Self-Defence Forces. (4) The proposal has so far remained only at the discussion level and no serious attempts have been made to give any concrete shape to it.

 There are some other Japanese proposals that attach a great deal of importance to the United States as the focal point of ocean security. One writer points out that since the US alone has the capability ensure the security of the sea lanes, it should stay in Asia for a long time and that not only Japan, but other countries of Asia too should bear the cost of the US presence. It is suggested that there should be a 'host region ' framework for cooperation. (5) But such proposals may not get the support of several Asian countries as their perceptions of US policies may be different and critical.

 Indian Ocean security truly calls for systematic efforts at multilateral levels. But in view of the bewildering diversity and overlapping interests involved, it will take a long time to arrive at such multilateral mechanisms. Until then concerned countries should direct their efforts at bilateral levels to undertake such measures as would contribute to the ocean security. In this context, India and Japan, two major Asian countries, very much involved in the Indian Ocean security, should jointly address several issues confronting the question. Indo-Japanese cooperation could become a substantial component in the whole Indian Ocean security mechanism. While one should not expect quick results, the convergences and commonalties that exist between the two countries should be properly utilized.

 During the cold war period, India was seen as pursuing its maritime policy in line with the Soviet Union. Many even mistakenly considered that policy as mainly directed against Pakistan. Since the end of the cold war, it has become quite clear that India is pursuing a comprehensive maritime policy which takes into account several non-military factors like the development of ports and harbours, exploitation of marine resources, expansion of merchant shipping, etc. India's role in the UNCLOS deliberations was quite prominent. Later, it gave legal recognition to the changes that followed the UNCLOS. It also set up an Exclusive Economic Zone. It therefore went on to broaden the parameters of its maritime policy. This was followed by several measures that India took to strengthen its relations with the US including in the sphere of defence cooperation. That the US Secretary of State Colin Powell in one of his earliest Congressional testimonies called upon India to cooperate with the US in the Indian Ocean showed the importance of India's maritime policy. Soon, developments like joint patrolling of the Malacca Strait and joint naval exercises followed. Now a full fledged security dialogue encompassing all aspects of mutual cooperation is a major aspect of Indo-US relations.

 It is equally important to note that since 1992 India has pursued an effective 'look east' policy which strongly emphasizes the convergence of mutual interests between India and East and Southeast Asian countries. In 1994, India became a dialogue partner of the ASEAN countries. In 1996, it joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) the only security forum for the whole of the Asia Pacific. Now India is holding annual summit meetings with the ASEAN countries in ASEAN plus One. These interactions have placed India in the midst of important economic and maritime developments that are taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, one has to take cognizance of the significance both India and Japan have assigned to the need for setting up a structured security dialogue between the two. In 2000 following the visit of India's defence minister George Fernandes to Tokyo, a security dialogue was initiated. In return, his Japanese counterpart Ishiba Shigeru, also visited India in 2003. Such exchanges of visits at various levels are now taking place regularly. Needless to state that bilateral cooperation in the sphere of maritime security is one of the major subjects on their agenda. The joint communiqué issued by the Prime Ministers of Japan and India Koizumi Junichiro and A.B. Vajpayee in December 2001 strongly underlined the importance of cooperation in maintaining the safety and security of international maritime traffic. In particular they addressed the issue of ocean piracy and undertook to strive for a regional cooperation agreement against piracy.

 The security of the sea Lanes is far more crucial to Japan as seventy five per cent of its energy supplies depends on them. Following 9 September terrorist attacks, certain new trends have become prominent in Japan's maritime security policy. Japan took speedy legislative measures to send its maritime self-defence forces to the Indian Ocean to extend rearguard support to the American-led military operations in Afghanistan. The earlier International Peace-keeping Force Law could commit the Japanese contingents only after the termination of a conflict. But the Anti-terrorism Law authorized the Japanese forces to extend support to one of the parties in the conflict. Under this Law, supply ships and aegis equipped destroyers have been dispatched to the Indian Ocean and they have supplied fuel to the vessels of ten nations. Japan has been very carefully enlarging the frontiers of its maritime security interests. Like India, Japan too looks beyond its Southeast Asian vicinity to promote its maritime interests. But still it cannot project its naval power all of a sudden because of such reasons as Article 9 of its Constitution, domestic reaction and the strong resistance from the neighbouring countries.

 It is only against this background of expanding maritime outlook and interests, one has to examine the prospects of cooperation between India and Japan. Japan is quite pleased that India and the US have made considerable strides in strengthening their defence cooperation. Second, both Japan and India share many-perceptions on China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean and would like to discuss them under the rubric of security dialogue. But in order to push forward their bilateral cooperation, they have to initiate steps in non-controversial areas. In other words, they would do well to identify such areas in non-military spheres. Cooperation against piracy is one area where they have made some progress and would like to strengthen their efforts.

 Cooperation in anti-piracy measures: Piracy has been one of the most serious threats to the safety of the sea lanes in recent years. Joint action between India and Japan is not only essential, but they should include the ASEAN countries in the whole exercise. The International Maritime Bureau has been warning that the incidence of piracy may continue to escalate in the coming years unless prompt countermeasures are taken. The Malacca Strait, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea provide good sanctuaries for the pirates. In October 1999, the well-known case of Alondra Rainbow convinced both India and Japan of the urgency to take collective action to eradicate this menace. Subsequently, several developments followed. In November 1999, the Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo put forward a proposal whereby he wanted the Japanese Coast Guard to conduct joint patrol with the coast guards of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. Appreciating a favourable response to the proposal, Japan organized a preparatory conference in March 2000 on anti-piracy attended by fourteen countries including India. The meeting examined in detail the threats posed by piracy in each country and the measures to be adopted. In April 2000, an international conference on anti-piracy was convened in Tokyo.. The conference issued an appeal called the Tokyo Appeal, which reiterated the determination of the participating countries " to cooperate, devise, and implement all possible measures to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships". In pursuance of this, Japan has been sending its coast guard missions to various countries in South and Southeast Asian countries. In November 2000, an anti-piracy joint exercise was carried out off Chennai in India. The purpose of the exercise was to ensure the safety of sea lanes in the Bay of Bengal. Trawlers and ships of Bangladeshi, Burmese, and Thai origin regularly visited the Sundarbans and attacked the vessels of the Indian Coast Guard and also destroyed the marine resources. It was also reported that they were supplying arms to many groups of insurgents in Northeast Indian states.

 ARF and IOR-ARC : Many of the issues connected with maritime security and maritime cooperation could be discussed in an appropriate security forum. Unfortunately, the Indian Ocean region has not developed such a forum as yet. The ARF has a committee on maritime cooperation and it has promoted discussions on subjects like search and rescue cooperation and SAR training. Both India and Japan are members of the ARF and can cooperate on a number of issues of mutual interest. In January 2001, India hosted an ARF seminar in Bombay in which Japan and China also participated. The CSCAP, a Track II wing of the ARF, has been quite active in sponsoring discussions on maritime affairs. But the ARF itself has to evolve fully and right now it has no enforcement authority. Further. one should also note a certain degree of reluctance on the part of many countries to discuss naval cooperation, security, etc, in a multilateral forum.

 Japan and India: Scope for Cooperation: a. As noted earlier, the joint statement made by the Prime Ministers of India and Japan in December 2001 provides a very comprehensive framework for bilateral cooperation. As part of India's maritime policy, New Delhi wants to modernize its harbours and ports. It is also keen to modernize its fishing industry. Similarly, there is scope for Japan's assistance in strengthening India's shipbuilding industry. Now that the Indian economy has been greatly liberalized, it should be easier for the Japanese private business houses to participate in joint ventures. Similarly, India has an exclusive economic zone and it would need the support of countries like Japan to fully exploit resources of the EEZ.

b) Indo-Japanese security dialogue should have an institutionalized structure to continuously address the issues of maritime security. Both countries should also try to set up a body for search and rescue operations in the Indian Ocean. Since both countries are members of the ARF, they should endeavour to increasingly coordinate with that body. They should also try to organize regular seminars in India under the auspices of the ARF in order to transmit knowledge and information on maritime security.

c) The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is a major forum which brings together navies of the Western Pacific countries to discuss questions like the safety of the sea lanes, law of the sea and so on. India has been attending the WPNS meetings only as an observer. But full-fledged membership of the body would enhance India's role, and Japan could play a useful part in facilitating India's full membership.

　

Footnotes