2. Security environment of the integrated Indi-Asia & West-Pacific region in 21st Century
(1) Outline of increasingly varied factors of security instability
At the beginning of 21st Century, there are seven specific instability factors in the security of the integrated region. First factor is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from North East Asia to other regions. Second factor is the international terrorism, becoming apparent especially after the 9.11 terrorist attacks. It is gathering strengths through alliances in and out of the integrated region, and increasing the attacks of bombs and others to targets mainly in the countries with the governments of weaker governance functions. Third point is the rapid build-up of Chinese military power mainly in their naval and air power, which is proceeding in a way to possible tip the balance of regional military powers. Fourth point is what we may call the remnants of the Cold War, i.e. the confrontational structure still remaining in Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. These bring instability, uncertainty, and unclearness in regional situation. Fifth point is the historical issues of territorial, religious and ethnic disputes and confrontations. Especially, the disputes over the possession of islands are likely to affect the stability of whole integrated region in a significant way, while obstructing the "Maritime Freedom." Sixth point is the confrontational structures surrounding the oceanic interests, which are closely related to the disputes over island possession. Seventh point is the increase in internationalized and organized illegal activities, such as piracy, drug trafficking or slave trades, over the oceans of the integrated region.
Surveying these instability factors, we note a common key word, the ocean. In terms of the first point, many of proliferation paths of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles heavily rely on SLOC routes, and the threat of ballistic missiles in the integrated region is structurally and geographically extended through aerial routes over oceans (in the space) except in the case of threats between terrestrial neighbors. Similarly, the second point of expanding international terrorism threats heavily rely on SLOC for the proliferation of weapons and the transport of terrorists themselves. In addition, terrorist attacks over the oceans actually happened, as in the case of the suicide bomb attack against a French tanker off the coast of Yemen. About the third point of military build-up by China, it is clear that not only China but also many other regional countries are focusing on the build-up and modernization of their naval and air powers in their direction of military reorganization efforts. Therefore, the problem is how such efforts affect the regional security, including "the Freedom of Maritime Navigation" and "the Freedom of Maritime Activities" at SLOC. Similarly, for the fourth point of Korean Peninsula and Taiwan issues, it will become extremely important in view of regional geography to secure maritime military dominance in these areas through the securing of SLOC, maritime blockading or assault-landing, if an emergency situation arises. The fifth point of islandal territory disputes, the sixth point of ocean interests, and the seventh point of illegal Maritime Activities are the issues directly concerning the oceans themselves.
(2) Individual security issues in the integrated region
(i) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles
US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons in the integrated region. North Korea is right in the turmoil of nuclear program suspicion, and thought to possess several nuclear weapons, although their actual status is unclear in their unique brinkmanship diplomacy. Recently, the suspicions of close information exchanges on the development and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and of the actual transport of relevant materials were pointed out between North Korea and Pakistan.
Biological and chemical weapons are thought to be manufactured and possessed by some countries in the integrated region, such as US, Russia, North Korea and China. Incidents of saline attacks in Tokyo subways by Ohm cult in 1995, and the anthrax mailing in the US right after 9.11 terrorist attacks have impressed the international community with the easiness of making chemical and biological weapons and their applications not necessarily limited to state-to-state military confrontations.
Regarding ballistic missiles, Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud B missiles in mid-80's to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan, while China exported Dong Feng 3 (CSS-2)s, and North Korea exported Scud series missiles. Through these exports, the total number of nations possessing these missiles has risen to 46 in 2002. Furthermore, some countries are developing and manufacturing longer-range missiles. Even today, we find further proliferation of ballistic missiles to Pakistan, Middle East and East Africa by North Korea, and the continued efforts in China to modernize and strengthen ballistic missile arsenals.
In the 21st Century, there has not been found any effective regime or system that can put the brakes on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in the region. US and Japan only started to introduce ballistic missile defense systems, and to strengthen biological and chemical weapons measures. Moreover, since the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in the integrated region will mostly pass through SLOC, while the movement of relevant personnel will go via air, there has been the introduction of measures since September 2003, such as a joint maritime inspection drill between navies and coast guards, and an interception training between air forces, based on the Proliferation Security Initiative participated by 11 countries, including US, Japan, and Australia, as a part of the efforts to develop stronger inspection systems for international land, maritime and air routes.
(ii) Expansion of indiscriminate terrorism by international terrorist groups
Since the 9.11 terrorist attacks, various countries led by US formed an international coalition against terrorism, and have been fighting a long and difficult war against terrorism with the goal of destroying every international terrorist organization. Despite extensive efforts, however, the risks of terrorist attacks have not been diminished with the international terrorist organizations still expanding their networks throughout the world.
In the integrated region as well, similar risks have become apparent. The suicide bomb attacks happened in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2002 was determined as the work of Jemaah Islamiah, which is an Islamic radical group with a network covering entire South East Asia and said to have a relationship with Al Qaida.
Moreover, the international terrorist groups are active in the regions neighboring the integrated region, such as the one called "horn of Africa" and the Middle East. In the Arabian Sea, maritime blockade activities are ongoing by coalition forces including Japan, in the efforts to destroy international terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the storming and hostage-taking at a Moscow theater by Chechnya military group, and the discovery of biological weapons in the urban city of UK indicate that the risks of terrorist attacks by international terrorist organization extend to any country in the world.
These coordinated efforts to fight against terrorism are undertaken all over the world with US at the center. In the integrated region, as well, US and Philippines are to conduct the joint exercise named "Balikatan 03-1" as they did last year, in order to wipe out Abu Sayyaf, an international terrorist group in Philippines, and, as mentioned above, American and Indian naval forces are conducting joint patrols to protect US Navy ships passing through the Strait of Malacca from April till September 2002. In 2002, ASEAN and US signed the declaration against terrorism.
(iii) Military power build-up in China that may tip regional military balance
From the start of 1990's, the national defense budgets of countries in the integrated region, which expanded as their economies experienced unprecedented growth, started to shrink in many countries due to the fall of their currencies and the deterioration of fiscal situation caused by the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997, significantly affecting their ability to procure equipment and to conduct drills. From the start of 1999, these countries in the integrated region seemed to feel that the worst of crisis was almost over, but the direction of their national defense budget and military build-up then defer significantly, depending on how each was affected by the economic crisis.
In view of the integrated region as a whole, the gaps between the military powers of regional countries may expand further for the moment, as the differences in the effects of economic crisis have been added up to the original differences in their economic powers. Particularly outstanding in the region in terms of military build-ups will be some South-East Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, which are increasing and modernizing the military powers of naval and air force, and India, which is actively seeking the introduction of aircraft carriers from Russia. Their neighboring nations have not taken such moves as immediate threats, yet none can deny the possibility that the threat of rapid changes in regional military balance will develop into political problems in the future, as there seems to be growing political discord within the region, after the currency crisis.
More than any of the above, there is one country in the integrated region, which rapid military build-ups raise anxieties among neighboring countries, that is China. China considers its People's Liberation Army as a fundamental power for building socialism, and important security assurances for the development of economy and the longer term stability of a regime. Especially, China has clearly stated that they are to focus on the missions to defend their sovereign rights over their land, air and sea (space) territories, to secure their maritime interests, and to protect the unification and security of the nation, by advancing the efforts to improve the quality of military forces, and to strengthen combat forces, to be able to respond to the needs of modern warfare. For these missions, they are to focus on the reorganization and reform of military forces to build up combat forces, and on the modernization of equipment by scientific and technological advancement. For these purposes, China has been expanding their national defense budget with more than 10% increase per year since 1989, and has not slacken their increase rate of 9.6-17.6% per year (public figure) even in 2000's.
There are two distinct views on the prospects of future military build-ups in China including military modernization. One view finds that recent increases in their national defense budget, rapid modernization of military forces mainly in naval and air forces, transfer and proliferation of Chinese made weapons, purchases of most advanced weapons mainly from Russia, and aggressive advancement into neighboring waters such as the South China Sea will clearly impose threats to other countries of the integrated region, and such a trend will accelerate further in the future. Another view considers that their defense budget increase is modest compared with their inflation rate, and, in view of their backwardness in military equipment, it will be extremely difficult for China to achieve true modernization, so the current trend does not necessarily constitute a true build-ups of military power, and will not pose threats to neighboring countries for the moment. Yet, despite various excuses and justification efforts of China, most of regional countries recognize the trend as unquestionably the military force build-ups.
Nonetheless, the consensus of the Indi-Asia & West-Pacific integrated region is that, for today and immediate future, the military power of China does not present serious and significant threat to the region, except to Taiwan, but as China continues to advance economic development, actively invest in the modernization of military forces especially for naval and air forces, and improve capability to project powers over neighboring waters, China may become a serious threat to the region in near future. Moreover, regionally common concerns over the military forces of China include the obscurity in their intentions and in the future direction of their military forces.
The concerns of the integrated region countries over the potential military movements China may take in near future include military advances to Taiwan even with the risks of confronting US; direct military actions to solve disputes with neighboring countries other than Taiwan or neighboring regions; military actions taken to reduce instability emerged domestically or in neighboring regions; and intimidation backed by military power, which may pose significant threat potentials to regional countries. Many of these will directly link to the obstructing actions against "the Freedom of Maritime Navigation" and "the Freedom of Maritime Activities."
(iv) Confrontations continuing in Korean Peninsula and obscured future for Taiwan, as the remnants of the Cold War.
Regarding the Korean Peninsula issue, two leaders of South and North Korea signed South-North Joint Declaration as a result of South-North Summit in June 2000, in which South and North agreed to self-resolve unification issue in the direction of "federation (alliance regime)," to solve the issue of separated families, and to implement economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. The dialogue between the authorities of South and North for the implementation of this declaration was expected to further deepen their contacts, and to direct toward the détente of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, there were strong concerns over the obscurity of declaration, including how the progress in South-North dialogue would lead to mitigate military confrontation in the Korean Peninsula, and how it would link to the solving of issues such as nuclear development suspicion and ballistic missile development of North Korea.
In the end, North Korea not only maintained massive military power deployment along DMZ but also powered-up their training, and demonstrated unilateral brinkmanship diplomacy, by continuing the development, production, and export of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction further, while the dialogue between North and South authorities has not shown any progress after the Summit.
US has taken every opportunity to express their concern over the issues of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction of North Korea, yet when Deputy Secretary of State Kerry visited North Korea in October 2002, North Korea admitted of their plan to make enriched uranium of weapon-grade, as Kerry disclosed later. When US requested North Korea to abolish nuclear weapon program in a verifiable way, North Korea did not respond to the request and instead demanded US to enter non-aggression pact with North Korea, while re-declaring the withdrawal from NPT again. US, in turn, indicated that it had no intention to attack North Korea, while expressing unwillingness to offer any compensation through negotiation, and managed to hold a six-party meeting by drawing in China and Russia in addition to Japan, US, and South Korea, claiming that North Korean nuclear issue would not be a bilateral problem between US and North Korea but an international issue. However, the future of the six-party talks is still unclear at this point, with hardly any perspective for holding the second meeting. Relevant countries continue to hold their hard/soft postures toward North Korea, including their responses against the sudden and provocative actions of North Korea based on the brinkmanship diplomacy unique to North Korea. Depending on the course of future talks, there may be a possibility to implement the joint on-board inspection training like aforementioned, in the seas neighboring the Korean Peninsula, based on the concept of intervening the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in expectation of political meanings as well.
Concerning the Taiwan Strait issue, on the other hand, Chinese Government was strongly offended in July 1999 by the statement of Li Denghui, then the president of Taiwan, that "Taiwan and China are in a unique state-to-state relationship," and in their efforts to influence Taiwan's presidential election scheduled for March 2000, Chinese Government, in turn, published Taiwan White Paper titled "the principle of one China and Taiwan issue" immediately before the election in February 2000, indicating that it would exercise military power in the cases when: (i) Taiwan declared independence; (ii) a foreign power invaded or occupied Taiwan; and (iii) if Taiwan refused to negotiate unification infinitely. In this way China attempted to exert political pressure on Taiwan.
When President Li Denghui visited US in July 1995, and right after the direct election of Taiwan president in March 1996, China test-launched ballistic missiles to the water near Taiwan, and gravely affected the SLOC in the adjacent region. As enumerated here, China used every opportunity to exert military and political pressures to Taiwan, and despite the progress of China-Taiwan relationship in economic cooperation, the basic stance of China toward Taiwan in political and military aspects will not likely change for the future.
Against such Chinese stance, President Chen who was elected by February 2000 election stated repeatedly that Taiwan would not resort to one nation two systems regime, while trying to avoid irritating China as much as possible, but some people in Taiwan tend to show dissatisfaction in Chen's stance. On the other hand, Taiwan's domestic economy sector is pressuring President Chen, claiming that his careless statements and actions have adversely affected Taiwan-China trade relations. So the focus is whether President Chen will make any decisions, such as the revision of constitution or change of a country name, in the face of presidential election expected in March 2004.
US's Bush Administration has taken a clear stance to adhere to "Taiwan related legislation" and, based on the legislation, proposed the list of weapons sellable to Taiwan in 2001, which included modernized naval and air force equipment such as 4 Kydd-class destroyers, 8 diesel engine submarines, and 12 patrol planes (P-3C).
The military power of China and Taiwan should be assessed not only in the simple comparison of quantities, but also in various aspects including operation preparedness, skill of necessary personnel, and back-supporting systems. Their general characteristics can be considered as stated below. There is no doubt that in the future, the success or failure of naval and air force development will determine the superiority or inferiority of their overall military forces.
(1) In terms of ground military force, China has overwhelming power, but their capability to land and invade the main island of Taiwan is limited.
(2) In terms of naval and air forces, China has overwhelming power in quantity but Taiwan dominates in quality.
(3) Regarding ballistic missile forces, China possesses many short-range ballistic missiles to Taiwan in their range. Taiwan's offensive or defensive missile capability is extremely limited.
(v) Territorial, regional and ethnic conflicts with roots in the history
In the Indi-Asia & West-Pacific integrated region, there are potentially conflicting factors that are based on territorial, religious, and ethnic conflicts entangled in a complex way with deep roots in the history unique to this region. Actually, several issues become apparent after the end of the Cold War. Among them, the territorial disputes over islands are the one deeply related to the ocean interests, which will be discussed later, and present the problems that may lead to direct military confrontation between relevant countries for now and in the future. Therefore, I will like to address this issue of territorial disputes over islands, as they are likely to cause significant influences over the regional stability especially.
As well known, Japan itself has territorial disputes over Northern Islands (with Russia), Takeshima (with Korea), and Senkaku Islands (with China and Taiwan), but in terms of actual and repeated confrontations and the number of countries involved, the most noted territorial dispute over islands in this integrated region is the one over the territorial right of Spratley Islands. The origin of this issue backed to the time of San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, when Japan, which used to practically govern these islands, renounced its territorial right, but where these islands were to belong was not identified. As the islands offer rich fishery resource, China (Taiwan), Philippines, and Vietnam claimed their territorial rights at first. In 1980's, when their rich sea bottom mineral deposits became apparent, Malaysia and Brunei also claimed their territorial rights. At present, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are claiming the territorial rights over whole islands, while Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei claim for the territorial rights over some of these islands.
From late 1980's, China became active in their territorial claim, and had military confrontation with Vietnam in 1988. After the end of the Cold War, and in response to the diminishing presence of US and Soviet (later Russia), China has increased their attempts to expand their maritime activity range, and reinforced their activity bases mainly in Spratley and Paracel Islands where territorial rights were disputed with ASEAN countries.
In 1992, China proclaimed their Territorial Water Law, stating the territorial rights over Spratley and Paracel Islands, as well as Senkaku Islands, which is a rightful territory of Japan, and in 1995, the dangers of military confrontation were heightened over MischiefAtoll with Philippines.
Afterwards, the possibilities of military confrontation were appeased, but in 1997 China enacted the National Defense Law that clearly stated the protection of their ocean interests along with the defense of security in territorial land, sea, and airspace. In 1999, regional nations accelerated their moves to gain the practical control of disputed islands, and the possibilities of conflicts were resurrected. In the face of such situation, the issues were addressed in bilateral and multilateral talks between relevant countries, while taken up at ARF and others. Even during these talks, some countries proceeded with their efforts to establish the practical control of these islands. However, in November 2002, the "Declaration on the Actions of Interested Parties in the South China Sea" was signed between China and ASEAN, and the issue was appeased again for the moment. In the South China Sea, however, surrounding nations still have the conflicts of their interests including those over the Spratley Islands, so the works to establish "Regional Action Standard in South China Sea" between ASEAN and China, which started in 1999, are facing the hard going.
In the Andaman Sea, the naval fleets of Thailand and Myanmar fought in January 1999 after the similar incidents occurred in 1998, with both sides enduring casualty and injuries. This water with undefined sea borders continuously saw illegal cross-border fishing by the fishing boats of both countries, which frequently received gun-firing from the naval fleet of the other country in their patrol mission. Illegal fishery is increasing in the South China Sea and other waters, and one cannot deny the possibility that the confrontation surrounding fishing boat patrols in the water of undefined sovereign right range would develop into a real military confrontation some day.
In addition, India is strongly alerted by China's advance to Coco Island of Myanmar and Gwadar Port of Pakistan, and strengthened their naval and air power based in Nicobar Islands of the Andaman Sea.
(vi) Confrontational structure over ocean interests
To outline the restructuring of military powers conducted by the countries of integrated region after the Cold War, most characteristic is their focus on the modernization of naval and air powers, which seem to lag behind their ground forces. After the currency crisis, their effort to reorganize military power share a common factor of protecting ocean interests over the waters such as islandal waters, South China Sea, East China Sea, Andaman Sea, and Bay of Bengal, as well as to attempt the improvement in maritime operation capability, with a mind to secure SLOC, which passes through the region as the shared lifeline for their economic development. Especially, China is advancing their development and reinforcement of naval and air powers, and exerts every effort to develop troop strength and to improve operation capability in order to implement the securing of their ocean interests in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
Since the rapid economic growth in this Indi-Asia & West-Pacific integrated region will likely let their intentions realized in the future, the potentials for confrontation over ocean interests will grow further, and we should not overlook such possibilities. Particularly from the viewpoint of geo-political importance of oceans in this Indi-Asia & West-Pacific integrated region, any future instability factors over oceans will undoubtedly afflict decisive and serious effects over the survival and prosperity of not only countries involved but also the regional society as a whole. In other words, the confrontational structure over ocean interests developed after the end of the Cold War has become the largest instability factor for the security of the integrated region. It is a universally agreed view that indications are already apparent mainly in the South China Sea, Andaman Sea, and East China Sea.
However, an effective forum to discuss this matter does not practically exist in this region, and for now the addressing of the issue depends on bilateral or multilateral talks among the countries involved, which is the fact sending a dark cloud over regional security.
In the neighboring waters of Japan, also, China is conducting ocean-survey-like activities using their ocean survey ships in recent years mainly over the exclusive economic zone of Japan. For this matter, both Japan and China established "the Framework for Mutual Advanced Notification of Ocean Survey Activities," in February 2001, for the scientific survey activities of oceans near the water of the counter-part in the East China Sea (except territorial waters of each). Still there were some activities China conducted by their ocean survey ships, in violation of the obligation for mutual advance notification under the Framework.
Moreover, Chinese naval fleet has been active in the waters near Japan, and Japan noted the activities of Chinese ships by 27 ships in 1999, 15 ships in 2000, and 8 ships in 2001. Japan also observed the activities of Chinese naval fleet, which were thought to be conducting intelligence collecting and ocean survey activities, and in May 2000 their "Hai Bing 723," the intelligence collecting ship with icebreaking capability of Chinese Navy circumnavigated Japan, and it was observed that the ship repeatedly and reciprocatingly navigated through Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits. Furthermore, their naval ships conducted activities over a broad range water East of Japanese South-West Islands, which included the repeated navigation and stopping along longitudinal and latitudinal lines at several different longitudes and latitudes, as well as the repeats of dropping in and pulling up of equipment thought to be measurement gauges in the water, for the duration of about 20 days each. The Naval fleet involved was "Dong Diao 232," which is the missile observation support and intelligence collecting ship, in July 2000, and "Hai Bing 723," in July and November 2001 again. These ships are likely conducting survey and intelligence collecting activities in order to collect basic data required for future naval activities in that water. China continues to practice such activities sporadically, and despite Japan side's protest and request to halt such activities through diplomatic route, China side has not shown any sincere response to this issue.
(vii) Globalized and organized piracy
According to the statistics of International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce, the cases of piracy have increased drastically worldwide from the later 1990's, and regionally, the waters of South-East Asia has the largest number of piracy claims with almost half of global piracy occur in Malacca-Singapore Strait, waters around Malaysia, those of Indonesian islands, and those surrounding Philippines. The characteristics of piracy in these waters are that they are internationalized and organized with sufficient equipment and criminal skill.
Increase in maritime traffic volume and widening gaps between haves and have-nots due to regional economic development are major factors of the recent rise in Asian piracy. The poor started piracy with ties to organized crimes, and escalated their activities by taking advantage of undermanned maritime guard because of economic crisis and deterioration in domestic security. In recent years, even those belonging to naval force or coast guard are said to exert to piracy, while local authorities even tolerating such activities. On the other hand, some piracies are the works of anti-government organizations, and Tamil-tigers, for example, is said to raise funds by piracy.
Both Malacca-Singapore Strait and Indonesian Islandal waters are the strategically important locations in maritime transport; yet the presences of coast guards and defensive forces are relatively weaker in these areas, facilitating the piracy.
As the countermeasure for piracy in these waters, three countries of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia started to reinforce the patrols of straits in their own territories in 1990's, while setting information exchange hot-line between Indonesia and Singapore, and organizing a team for designing maritime operation plan in order to conduct the joint patrol of the Malaccan Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia.
As a result, piracy incidents in Malacca-Singapore Strait tend to decrease, but the numbers in Indonesian Islandal waters have multiplied instead. These organized pirates will simply move to wherever the patrol is weaker, so we cannot expect the effective patrolling of these waters, if done by the military forces of these three countries only. At present, the regional Anti-Piracy Center of IMB in Malaysia is recommending the multilateral cooperative operation by regional countries, but the prospect of its implementation is bleak due to the sovereign right disputes over territorial waters.
Moreover, these pirates are said to be active in other illegal activities such as drug trafficking and slave trades of organized crimes, as well as piracy. So like the piracy issue, the patrolling for such activities has become the common issue of this region.
Since it held the "International Conference on Piracy Measures" in Tokyo in April 2001 under the proposal by Late Prime Minister Obuchi, Japan has taken initiatives in the international efforts to solve this problem throughout the years of former Mori Administration and current Koizumi Administration. It held international conference for several times and implemented the dispatch of patrol ships.
|