2-1 One of the most important highly accessed sea areas (HASA) is the South China Sea, which plays a huge strategic role in today's geopolitics. Last year, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a code of conduct in the South China Sea and agreed on confidence-building measures. This breakthrough holds out the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the problems in the South China Sea. It would be useful to know more about trends within these countries today, one year after the code of conduct was adopted.

　

2-2 The code of conduct in the South China Sea serves the role of a confidence-building system. Since the adoption of the code of conduct, the danger of a naval confrontation between China and the Philippines, caused by a dispute over territorial seas, has disappeared. Proposals for joint development are being tabled with Indonesia. If the extent of resources in the South China Sea were accurately known, joint development could begin.

　

2-3 In China, moves on maritime policy have quickened, with rapid progress on conventions with ASEAN. Regretfully, however, the topic has provoked no widespread discussion or any flurry of publication of research papers, because China's foreign ministry and academic community communicate little with each other.
 The code of conduct is a positive development for the South China Sea. We can expect international affairs to stabilize on this front, in both bilateral and multilateral terms.

2-4 In Indonesia, maritime policy is covered by 17 government agencies, among which the exercise of jurisdiction is vertically distributed. In South Korea, to avoid the deadlock this vertical division of power can create, a Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries was established, but even this body does not hold total authority over maritime policy. The degree of authority wielded by such agencies varies from one aspect of maritime policy to the next. This is why it is important to determine directions on ocean policy at the national level.

　

2-5 Indonesia recognizes the need to set common targets in regional maritime policy, but great differences in culture exist in Asia. For example, Indonesia and Australia are poles apart. Indonesia does learn from training programs with other countries, but the difference in level between Indonesia and other countries are stark, due to the wide variance in efforts between nations.

2-6 Indonesia now enforces an international regime in its archipelagic waters, with support from the IMO. The case of the Philippines, however, remains difficult. We hope that some coordination between these two countries is possible.

　

2-7 The Philippines has so far failed to take specific steps in accordance with UNCLOS. This is a particularly difficult case. Firstly, no baseline has yet been established. Drawing the country's maritime borders is problematic, as the border with Malaysia's Sabah region has not yet been delineated. To enforce UNCLOS, the Philippines will have to revise its domestic laws, but it is still a matter of debate whether the Philippines' ratification of UNCLOS was conditional or not.

　

2-8 In the Philippines' domestic law, archipelagic waters are designated as internal waters. However, will the proposed archipelagic passages be conferred the right of innocent passage, or designated as archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP). How about the status of US Navy battleships, which is also unclear?

　

2-9 The US Navy has signed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, recognizing its right of passage through the Philippines' internal waters. No progress has been made on a project concerning an ASLP. Because the ASLP cuts through internal waters, Philippine politicians find this proposal hard to accept.

　

2-10 What is happening regarding Indonesia's archipelagic waters and East Timor?

　

2-11 Various government ministries and departments are undertaking all manner of research projects. Indonesia's baseline runs lies on the south side of the islands, with archipelagic waters facing the land. Some observers wonder whether negotiations between Indonesia and East Timor are possible based on East Timor's territorial waters and Indonesia's archipelagic waters, rather than on East Timor's and Indonesia's territorial waters. Research and survey work is focusing sharply on security in Indonesia's sea lanes passage.

2-12 I have heard that Indonesia has a coordinating agency named "BAKORKAMLA" which is short for "BADAN KOORDINASI KEAMANAN LAUT", meaning Coordinating Agency for the Security of the Sea. I am unsure where this agency fits in the debate on new concepts in security. Also, I have heard that Indonesia is in the process of establishing a coast guard. Will this coast guard be Indonesia's means for enforcing new security concepts?
 At the beginning of his address, Chair Kuribayashi asked whether it was better to pursue new concepts in security within a regional framework or through an overarching body such as the IMO. In session 1, wide-ranging discussions were held on regional cooperation. Personally, I believe that promoting specific dialogue on regional cooperation is a realistic approach. In the case of terrorism and piracy, for example, the regions involved can be quite large, as necessary. Therefore, even as we encourage ASEAN to join the SUA convention, the region affected by these issues is much larger than ASEAN and therefore difficult for ASEAN to deal with on its own. On the issue of ASLP, as with the problem of territorial baselines, the region in which collaboration is pursued may be large or small according to the objective.

　

2-13 In 2002 Indonesia introduced new legislation to separate the defense and police forces. Although it is not yet clear which ministry will manage this process, the navy is making efforts to establish a body similar to the BAKORKAMLA. The Coast Guard is essentially conceived as an organization involved in maritime traffic, and so far there has been little progress. At the same time, moves are afoot to find a replacement for the BAKORKAMLA, but this is a traditional approach to security and does not correspond to any new concepts in security.

　

2-14 Regional cooperation is needed on emergency measures against the deterioration of the environment. If this issue is bundled together with national security, environmental concerns are likely to be neglected. If these new concepts are introduced as part of a global approach, ways must be found to prevent security issues from alienating environmental matters.

　

2-15 Participating in the workshop on the South China Sea underscored for me how difficult it will be to spur collaboration in this troubled sea area. Conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands and sea boundaries are the principal stumbling-blocks. Moreover, many of the countries involve harbor extremely retrogressive attitudes on the conclusion of treaties and cooperation pacts. It is worth asking whether the Chinese government has shifted its stance over the past five years, and whether it remains skeptical of the other parties to the dispute. To bring forward new concepts in ocean security, committees must be established to facilitate cooperation between the government bodies of each nation. More progress is likely to be made by cooperating in specific fields than through an ambitious scheme of all-encompassing collaboration.

　

2-16 Personally, I believe the Chinese government's posture is changing. Several years ago, China was extremely skeptical about piracy, dismissing out of hand every proposal for dealing with the problem. Today China seems to have lost that earlier skittishness and is much more open to dialogue. Some of the countries in this region have no wish to participate in a binding treaty. Codes of conduct have been adopted, but these are not binding legal documents, as each of the countries involved is extremely sensitive where sovereignty is concerned. Fortunately, this apprehension does not extend to environmental issues, and even China is taking part in a strategic action program. Perhaps their resistance is breaking down, or at least a window of opportunity is opening. If the countries engaged in the South China Sea disputes become engaged in the way we have discussed at this conference, a legal framework and environmental agreements may come to fruition. An environmental convention has been concluded in the Persian Gulf, and documents and conventions have been drawn up for the Mediterranean Sea. I think there is a real possibility of pursuing talks on track 2, raising them to track 1, and finally reaching an official accord between the states.