Terrorism, which has profoundly bedeviled the global village following the September 11 bombing, has taken roots in Southeast Asia through Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah cells in Indonesia and southern Philippines. Operations of Islamic extremists have been reported in Malaysia and Singapore and have spread to southern Thailand and Cambodia.³⁹ In its growing cells of Islamic extremism the region stands the prospect of generating risks and threats in the South China sea as a potential war zone of international terrorism.

　

 Two events in October 2002 may signal the vulnerability of the South China Sea as a vital segment of the oil routes from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific through the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait. Every day about 10.3 million of oil pass through the Malacca Strait. On October 6, Limburg, a French 299,000-ton supertanker carrying 397,000 barrels of Saudi crude oil for Malaysia's state-owned oil company Petronas, came under attack in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Yemen by bombers in a speed-boat. The explosion hit the side of the tanker and set it on fire.⁴⁰ Limburg is the first casualty attributed to terrorism in the oil route from the Persian Gulf to Asia. It has sounded the alarm for vulnerability of the world's lifeline for Gulf oil.

　

 On October 12 last year, the bombing in Bali was a demonstration of Jemaah Islamiah terrorism that convulsed the international community. To security experts, however, its significance acquired specificity in its proximity to Lombok Strait, one of the chokepoints in a detour route for supertankers. A month before the Limburg attack, the US Navy issued a warning to shipping in the Gulf about possible Al-Qaeda attacks. Through its Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, it informed shipmasters "to take extreme caution when transiting strategic chokepoints, ・・・ or sailing in traditional high-threat areas."⁴¹

　

 The difficult process of instituting effective counter measures against terrorism in the oceans is a way of dealing with a nightmare of a potential catastrophe to international shipping in the South China Sea.

　

 1. On 27 September 2003, the Philippine Ports Authority raised the alert level in all ports of Mindanao on account of intelligence report on an alleged Abu Sayaf plot to bomb Manila-bound ships.⁴² General alert is maintained all over the country, in the face of possible attacks by Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network.⁴³ Together with other Southeast Asian countries and Australia, the Philippines is included in JI's vision of a Pan-Islamic state.⁴⁴ It forms part of the region's "second front" in the international war on terrorism.⁴⁵

　

 In the face of terrorist threats spreading into shipping routes, the problem is compounded by the lack of facilities to counter activities of Islamic extremism. The country's capability depends to a large extent on foreign assistance, in particular in terms of military training under the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. Resources are spread too thinly owing to the wide expanse of waters of the Philippine archipelago.

　

 2. Piracy incidents are concentrated in southern Philippines, (i.e., about 85 percent) along Moro Gulf, Davao Gulf, Sarangani Bay, Sulu Sea, Basilan Strait, and the waters of Tawi-tawi. In Luzon, piracy occurs mostly in Manila Bay and the waters of Cavite, Bataan, Quezon, and of the Bicol region.⁴⁶ Short-term seizure of vessels is the most prevalent mode of piracy, consisting of small-craft attacks lasting for less than an hour. Incidents in Manila Bay and in the Manila Container Port are mostly harbor boarding for robbery.⁴⁷

　

 Piracy has established a long record in Philippine waters. In the 1980s, the country figured in hijacking of ships, beginning with the disappearance of M. V Comicon on 15 February 1980, together with 25 crew members. In 1986 alone, three ships vanished: M. V Cresat and M. V Mayon while in Manila Bay, and M. V Irene in Cavite coast. On 26 May 1988, Negotiator, a bulk carrier, was hijacked while in Subic Bay. On 26 September 1988, M. V Silver Med disappeared in Manila Bay, and on 25 June 1989, M. V Isla Luzon was hijacked in the coast of Iligan with her steel cargo.⁴⁸

　

 Overlapping sovereignty claims in Philippine-China relations are concretized into intermittent confrontations. With respect to dispute over Scarborough Shoal, Chinese incursions have come in waves. In the first quarter of 2002 alone, incursions by about 68 Chinese military and fishing vessels in 14 incidents were recorded by the Philippine Navy.⁴⁹ Cases of illegal fishing, collection of corals, and harvest of clams have elicited repeated diplomatic protests from Philippine authorities. The most serious incident in the Scarborough Shoal occurred on 31 January 2001 when Philippine Navy ships and aircraft engaged a group of Chinese fishing vessels in a standoff. The Chinese refused to move away despite Philippine military presence.

　

 The sharpest edge of the dispute so far is the Chinese installation of permanent structures in Mischief Reef (or Panganiban Reef), which the Philippines finally confirmed in 1998. Located about 150 miles from the western coast of Palawan island, Chinese presence evolved from temporary shelters in 1995 to permanent multi-story structures equipped with communication and air transport facilities in 1998.

　

 Disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam over Spratly are moderated by their membership with the Philippines in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The code of conduct declaration with China over disputes in the South China Sea has eased the tension among the claimants. Confidence-building measures among the ASEAN claimants find consolidation in Philippine bilateral agreements with Malaysia and Vietnam on defense cooperation and in a network of arrangements promoting ASEAN community interests.

　

 The implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea would give rise to radical shifts in the Philippine situation, creating new vulnerabilities to its maritime security.

　

 Contrary to the mandate of its own constitution, which provides that "[t]he waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines",⁵⁰ under the UNCLOS these waters are characterized as archipelagic waters and are subject to the right of innocent passage on the part of ships of all States,⁵¹ including warships, submarines, oil tankers, nuclear-powered ships, and those carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances. ⁵² Consequently, the regime of internal waters under the Philippine Constitution suffers a drastic reduction to waters in lakes, bays, gulfs, mouth of rivers, and in permanent harbor works.⁵³

　

 Note that if the Philippines is to be governed by the UNCLOS as an archipelagic state the right of innocent passage in its internal waters as transformed into archipelagic waters are in addition to the right of innocent passage in its territorial sea. (See Figure 13)

　

 The UNCLOS has initiated a new maritime regime as a component of the archipelagic state, namely, the archipelagic sea-lanes. It provides that "[a]ll ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lane passage in such sea-lanes and air route", which archipelagic states are under duty to designate.⁵⁴ Vulnerability of the country's national security is aggravated by the designation of more than one archipelagic sea-lanes. UNCLOS requires that the sea-lanes and air routes "shall include all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or over flight through or over archipelagic waters."⁵⁵ The sea-lanes are to be at least 50 miles wide, with an air route of corresponding breadth.⁵⁶ (See Figure 14.)

　

 In the exercise of right of innocent passage by submarines through the territorial sea, it is required that they navigate on the surface and show their flag.⁵⁷ But in the archipelagic sea-lanes they are allowed to pass through "in their normal mode", i.e., in submerged state. Shigeru Oda, former judge of the International Criminal Court of Justice, has commented that the concept of the archipelagic sea-lanes passage was introduced as a condition to the concept of the archipelagic state, thus: "the undetected and uninterrupted passage of submarines would be guaranteed throughout the archipelagic waters."⁵⁸ Prof. D. L. Larson has even a more revealing interpretation, involving as it does greater security threat to "Southwest Pacific archipelagos of the Philippines and Indonesia for east-west transit and from the Indian Ocean". He affirms that the "essential features of archipelagic sea-lanes passage is that the United States, ・・・ Britain, France, and possibly others may send SSBNs [nuclear ballistic missile submarines] or attack submarines through archipelagic waters in their normal mode of operation."⁵⁹

　

 The complementation of the right of navigation and the right of overflight in the archipelagic sea-lane passage becomes a perfect facility for the passage of aircraft carriers through archipelagos, thus adding to their security burden.

　

 From the viewpoint of environmental security, innocent passage in the country's "waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago" and archipelagic sea lane passage would expose the Philippines to inestimatable risks and threats to oil pollution. The advent of oil supertankers of more than 200,000 dwt and their passage from the Persian Gulf through Lombok and Makassar Straits then through Basilan Strait and the Sulu Sea would in itself be a potential disaster in oil spill or worse.

　

 In the face of the deep predicaments generated by a host security problem, the underdeveloped infrastructures and facilities of the Philippines would bring the country into crisis situation, and to a formidable challenge.

　

 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) may provide an approach to a possible inter-government framework on a more organized and sustained basis. This approach is to be built on a system of cooperation of littoral countries in the South China Sea as a semi-enclosed sea.

　

Article 123 of the UNCLOS enunciates as follows:

　

 States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization:

　

　

 The cooperative essence of this approach is not be seen merely in the traditional concept of good faith and mutuality. More than that, it should now define an imperative born out of necessity in the function of the South China Sea on which the survival of the global economy is at stake.

　

 The approach outlined in this provision lends itself to concrete organizational and operational programs, including those on piracy and terrorism, that can be worked out in urgency of purpose, with the blessing of more benign power relations among the stakeholders.

　

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