Senior Scientist, Science Applications International Corporation

　

　

 Events in recent years have heightened international concern over maritime terrorism. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen in October 2000, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the October 2002 terrorist attack on the oil tanker Limberg were key events. The general heightened terrorist alert status since the 11 September attacks has resulted in increased recognition of the broad possibilities of maritime terrorism-threatening commercial shipping as well as naval vessels, in ports as well as at sea. This new appreciation of the potential possibilities of maritime terrorism is leading to organizational, operational, and technological and policy initiatives by the international maritime community to address the problem, and also leading the United States and other nations to enhance international cooperation against maritime terrorism. Key elements of this response include Navy-Coast Guard cooperation and increased regional maritime operational cooperation.

 The major problems in sea lane security-terrorism, piracy, maritime drugs/smuggling, and illegal migration-all have a strong "law enforcement" as well as naval aspect. The nature and relationship between the military (Navy) and civilian law enforcement agencies vary from country to country throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This complicates cooperation, requiring not simply Navy-to-Navy coordination, but also understanding and interagency coordination between the Navy and civilian maritime law enforcement agencies-within each country and between countries. The experience of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard in cooperation in maritime law enforcement offers some potential ideas regarding the need and modalities for broader Asia-Pacific interagency cooperation in safeguarding the security environment of the sea lanes.

 Although a considerable part of the threat of maritime terrorism and piracy must be addressed at the national level, in ports and territorial waters-and thus the importance of national Navy-Coast Guard cooperation--other aspects of the maritime terrorist threat must be addressed at the global level by the current work of the IMO, regional shipping organizations, and even the recent APEC shipping security initiative, to establish global standards for anti-terrorism security for ports, containers, and ships. However, there still remains the real need for regional cooperation to operate against the terrorist threat against ships underway at sea, particularly in the sea lanes and choke points of the Asia Pacific region.

 Now is the time to consolidate the gains achieved in maritime confidence-building and transparency over the past decade and move to "Securing the Oceans" through Asia Pacific Maritime Operational Cooperation against the new maritime terrorist and other threats to critical Asia Pacific sea lanes and choke points.

　

　

 Events in recent years have heightened international concern over maritime terrorism. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen in October 2000, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the October 2002 terrorist attack on the oil tanker Limberg were key events. The general heightened terrorist alert status since the 11 September attacks has resulted in increased recognition of the broad possibilities of maritime terrorism-threatening commercial shipping as well as naval vessels, in ports as well as at sea. This new appreciation of the potential possibilities of maritime terrorism is leading to organizational, operational, and technological and policy initiatives by the international maritime community to address the problem, and also leading the United States and other nations to enhance international cooperation against maritime terrorism. Key elements of this response include Navy-Coast Guard cooperation and increased regional maritime operational cooperation.

　

 Terrorist events of the past two years have provided the United States and the international maritime community a sobering wake-up call on the possibilities of maritime terrorism. An appreciation of the breadth of this threat is essential to understanding the nature of organizational, operational, and technological and policy initiatives needed to counter the threat-as well as the essentiality of enhanced Navy-Coast Guard and regional maritime operational cooperation.¹

 The potential for maritime terrorism is not a peripheral problem that can be ignored or wished away, but a central threat that must be addressed. The great majority of world trade is transported by ships, and the volume of seaborne trade is expected to double in the next fifteen years. In an increasingly globalized world, this means that maritime terrorism can cripple a central component of the global economy that is the basis for global prosperity and economic development.

 The maritime terrorism problem may be analyzed in two major areas of threat-threats to naval vessels and naval bases, and threats to commercial shipping, both underway and in ports. To date, the most publicized threats to naval vessels have been suicide small boat attacks-such as that on the USS Cole in 2000, and the recently revealed plots by Al Qaeda members based in Morocco to attack US and UK ships in the Straits of Gibraltar.² But there are other maritime terrorist threats to naval vessels, at sea or in port, such as underwater swimmers with explosives, aircraft (manned or unmanned), or even a terrorist mini-sub. Maritime terrorist threats to commercial shipping include threats inport (in the U.S. or overseas) and underway (particularly in straits/restricted waters, but also on the high seas). Commercial shipping includes not only merchant ships-including oil and chemical carrying tankers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, and ships transporting nuclear materials for reprocessing-but also passenger ships such as large cruise liners and passenger ferries.

 There are numerous "high profile" options for maritime terrorism to attack commercial shipping, in addition to potential maritime terrorist acts by suicide small boats, aircraft, or swimmers (similar to those possible for naval vessels). Suicide small boat attacks, like that on the USS Cole, could also be directed at commercial shipping. Indeed, the October 6, 2002 explosion and fire aboard the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen was just such an attack. Beyond the immediate ship targeted by such an attack, the potential damage to the marine environment and costs (direct and indirect) to the global oil and shipping markets are most serious. Another possibility is that, like the commercial aircraft used in the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, terrorists could seize a merchant ship and use the ship itself as a weapon, driving it into other ships, into port or commercial facilities (including refineries), or into oil/gas platforms at sea. Similarly, a cruise ship or passenger ferry could be hijacked, with up to thousands of passengers onboard.³ Oil/gas platforms at sea could be attacked or seized by maritime terrorists, with the loss of hundreds of lives and-as with commercial ships such as oil/chemical tankers, LNG carriers, and nuclear material transport ships-the creation of an environmental disaster far worse than that of the Exxon Valdez. Maritime terrorists can also use commercial shipping and containers to transport weapons and even personnel. (The Al Qaeda terrorist network has been reported to own 23 ships, and a major multinational "Leadership Interdiction Operation" (LIO) in the Arabian Sea/Horn of Africa area has been underway since the fall of 2001 to prevent Al Qaeda personnel from escaping by sea.)

 Indeed, perhaps the most serious impact of maritime terrorism would result from the use of commercial shipping and containers as a delivery platform for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As will be further discussed below, maritime terrorists could use commercial shipping/containers to import a nuclear weapon, "dirty" bomb with radiological material, or chemical and biological weapons.

　

 Since the October 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole, the U.S. response in countering the maritime terrorism threat to naval vessels has been intensive. Many of these responses are also relevant to many aspects of defense of commercial shipping against maritime terrorism. Since the Cole attack, the U.S. Navy changes to anti-terrorist force protection (AT/FP) policies have focused on several critical areas. Intelligence, doctrine, and alerting procedures (tactics, techniques and procedures) have been improved, as has training.⁴ Action is ongoing to improve ship sensors and armament to deal with the detection and response to close-in terrorist threats to ships. Perhaps most important-and of most relevance to also countering maritime terrorist threats to commercial shipping-is enhanced port security, from the gate to the waterfront. This includes increased standoff zones seaward of the piers (for example, the Los Angeles Times reports a 500 yard security zone and a 100 yard no-go zone being established.)⁵ Pierside, there are increased security patrols and barriers. At the entry to the naval base/port, enhanced entry security and barriers provide a first line of defense landward. For naval vessels underway at sea, recent enhanced defenses against the maritime terrorist threat includes the stopping and searching of suspicious vessels in the Arabian Sea/Horn of Africa area-with the explicit official Notice to Mariners warning that "any perceived hostility to U.S. or official coalition naval units will result in the destruction of the commercial vessel." Since September 2001, the U.S. has also frequently maintained a ship on patrol in the critical Strait of Malacca to counter terrorists or piracy (the threat of pirates approaching or boarding ships in such critical restricted waters being virtually indistinguishable in action from a maritime terrorist act.)⁶ Indeed, in mid-April 2002, the U.S. ship then in the Strait of Malacca was joined by a warship of the Indian Navy in a joint patrol.⁷ These anti-terrorism/piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca have not resulted in any terrorist or pirate seizures, but the deterrent effect is suggested by a simultaneous decline in piracy attacks in this area.

　

 Port security (particularly in commercial ports, with their traditionally more open access and high traffic volumes) is clearly the greatest challenge to respond to the threat of maritime terrorism. The fact that the maritime terrorist threat with the most serious consequences is the import in commercial ships/containers of Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological) makes port security an even greater priority. However, in the United States alone, there are 361 ports (50 of them major ports), through which pass each year $750 billion in cargo (equal to 20 percent of the U.S. economy). Globally, there are nearly 4,000 ports and 46,000 vessels in the world maritime transportation system. U.S. ports receive six million cargo containers-only two percent of which have in the past been physically inspected by Customs, and all of which could carry terrorist personnel, explosives, guns, or WMD.⁸ The problem is clear-how to ensure that commercial ships/containers are not used as a terrorist tool. This problem is also real, not just hypothetical-the Al Qaeda explosives used to blow up U.S. Embassies in two East African countries in August 1998 arrived by ship in Kenya.⁹ In late September 2001, Italian authorities discovered an Arab man in a container onboard a ship about to sail for Halifax, Canada, equipped with satellite and mobile telephones, a computer, an aircraft mechanic's certificate, and plans and security passes for airports in Canada. In May 2001, U.S. Senator Bob Graham (Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee) revealed that 25 "extremists" had recently entered the U.S. hiding in cargo containers. ¹⁰

 Changes in organization, operations, and technology and policy are being implemented by the United States to enhance port security against maritime terrorism. Organizationally, the U.S. created in early 2003 a new cabinet Department of Homeland Security, which would include several of the agencies most critical to port security, such as the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, and Immigration and Naturalization Services. The first element of enhanced port security is improved intelligence sharing between the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies such as the Defense Department, FBI, CIA, and Drug Enforcement Agency. Operational measures have also been taken to tighten port security, including establishing port security zones landward and seaward (including 24 hour patrols and even random underwater sweeps), and increased law enforcement personnel and responders. The U.S. Coast Guard has required (since September 2001) 96 hours advance notice of entry to U.S. ports for certain vessels of concern. Measures have been taken to restrict free access to piers and to screen personnel working in ports, although these measures have proven difficult to implement in heavy trafficked (and unionized) busy commercial ports. A new program of Sea Marshals has now been established, to board and inspect selected ships at sea and escort them to and from ports. The U.S. Congress has recently passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, requiring the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct vulnerability assessments on U.S. and foreign ports (with entry to U.S. ports potentially denied to ships coming from foreign ports lacking antiterrorism measures.) That bill also requires that a cargo identification and screening system be developed and maintained for all containers shipped to or from the United States.¹¹

 Since September 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard has assumed a leading role in U.S. and international initiatives to enhance port security. The Coast Guard has traditionally played key roles in port organization through its missions as Port Captains, Marine Inspection, and Marine Pollution Control. However, port security previously was less than two percent of daily Coast Guard operations. Since September 2001, port security has grown to between 50 and 60 percent of daily Coast Guard operations.¹² The Coast Guard has extended the security zone to seaward through such measures as the 96 hour advanced notification requirements for port entry, and has received authority to stop ships 12 miles (instead of 3 miles) from port. In November 2001, Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy presented the 162 nations of the UN's International Maritime Organization in London with several key proposals to improve maritime security against the terrorist threat.¹³ In December 2002, the IMO adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, to take effect in July 2004. This ISPS Code requires security plans for ships, port facilities and offshore terminals, and requires assessment of vulnerabilities of ports to terrorist attacks. Also, automatic identification systems (transponders) must be fitted on all larger ships. Additionally, the International Labor Organization annual conference in June 2003 required the more than one million seafarers to be fingerprinted for new identity cards.

 The Coast Guard and the new Customs and Border Patrol agency in the Department of Homeland Security have also been acting to address the potential threat from the six million containers now entering U.S. ports each year largely uninspected. The key to this is the concept of "point of origin" inspection and certification of containers destined for U.S. ports. As described by the U.S. Customs Commissioner, the goal of the "Container Security Initiative" is to reach agreements with the governments of the 20 major world ports (19 had agreed as of early October 2003) that account for 68 percent of all container traffic to the U.S., to provide U.S. Customs personnel to assist national port personnel in inspecting and certifying "high-risk" containers before they are shipped to the U.S. (eventually, containers would also use container identification tags with anti-tampering devices and GPS technology tracking ability.)¹⁴ In March 2002, the U.S. sent Customs inspectors to the three largest Canadian ports (and Canada sent its inspectors to two U.S. ports). In September 2002, the U.S. signed similar agreements for "point of origin" customs inspections with Singapore, Malaysia (for the ports of Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas in Johor), Hong Kong, and Japan (for the ports of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya). Similar agreements have been reached for major ports in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany. Indeed, only the port of Kaohsiung remains to be agreed out of the top 20 ports. Although some nations initially resented this U.S. push for a more intrusive customs inspection presence in foreign port security, not to mention the associated costs of technology improvements, the fact remains that only "point of origin" inspections offer the prospect to reduce the remaining cargo arriving in U.S. ports to an amount low enough to be practically inspectable. Clearly, it is likely that the international shipping community and other nations have now concluded that (as with the U.S. national requirements for double-hulled tankers), they must adapt to new U.S. requirements, since they cannot afford to have their shipments to the world's largest economy delayed or even blocked from entering.

 Other vulnerabilities to maritime terrorism, noted in previous writings, still require addressal. First there is a need for improved technologies for port security-in command and control and communications, surveillance sensors (radar and sonar), perimeter detection sensors, unmanned surface vessels (such as SAIC's Unmanned Harbor Security Vehicle),¹⁵ and even unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance of port areas, as well as affordable inspection technologies for container screening (such as SAIC's Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems [VACIS]). The traditional shipping industry practice of openly providing sensitive information on hazardous cargo must be curbed. The IMO still must come to grips with the widespread problem of fraudulent certificates for ships.¹⁷ Future port development worldwide must eventually address the great problem today of the proximity to ports of dangerous industrial areas-refineries, petroleum tanks, and chemical and hazardous waste facilities.¹⁷' The international legal regime to detain and prosecute terrorists must also be enhanced, particularly through the adherence of all nations to the 1988 UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome Convention).

　

 The major problems in sea lane security-terrorism, piracy, maritime drugs/smuggling, and illegal migration-all have a strong "law enforcement" as well as naval aspect. The nature and relationship between the military (Navy) and civilian law enforcement agencies vary from country to country throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This complicates cooperation, requiring not s imply Navy-to-Navy coordination, but also understanding and interagency coordination between the Navy and civilian maritime law enforcement agencies-within each country and between countries. The following discussion briefly examines the experience of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard in cooperation in maritime law enforcement, both as a factual datapoint and as for the potential lessons it might hold regarding the need and modalities for broader Asia-Pacific interagency cooperation in safeguarding the security environment of the sea lanes.

　

 The United States has a particular system of maritime law enforcement, based on a unique and close relationship throughout over two hundred years of US history between the US Navy and the fifth Armed Service, the US Coast Guard. Due to the Posse Comitatus Act, passed by Congress in the period after the US Civil War to prohibit the other federal Armed Services from being used as civilian law enforcement officers, the US Coast Guard is the only US Armed Service with law enforcement authority.¹⁸ Notwithstanding these formal restrictions, there is a close history of cooperation in maritime law enforcement, and in other missions, between the US Navy and the US Coast Guard. In peacetime, the US Coast Guard is an independent agency in the new civilian Department of Homeland Security, but the Coast Guard and its historic predecessors, starting with the 1790 Revenue Marine (which served with the US Navy during the Quasi-War with France after 1797), have actively participated in every major US war, and in the two World Wars the Coast Guard was in fact transferred to the Department of the Navy.¹⁹ In more recent major conflicts, US Coast Guard units served in coastal interdiction and maritime operations in Korea and Vietnam, and in port security and maritime interdiction operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and off former Yugoslavia, and during the Iraq war. The U.S. Navy's support for the US Coast Guard lead role in maritime law enforcement has grown in recent years, at the same time as there has been greater US Coast Guard support for traditional naval international missions. The recent commitment of these two US maritime services to a "National Fleet" reflects, and will further advance, increasing mutual support of both services.