As seen in its classification alongside the US, China, and Russia as one of the four major countries in East Asia, Japan is frequently accorded the status of "major power." However, Japan's diplomatic efforts are only seen through the lens of "major power diplomacy" by the other countries of Asia when the potential of these efforts is viewed with concern. When Japanese themselves speak of "major power diplomacy," they often do so as a critique of current circumstances or as an expression of determination, and post-war Japanese foreign policy cannot rightly be termed "major power diplomacy."

A foreign policy suited to Japan's stature would in no way resemble the strategic game played by such major powers as the US and China but would instead be an approach in which Japan would put its shoulder to the wheel to build a "middle power network" with the countries of Asia. Such a foreign policy would enhance relations with the countries of Asia as equals, especially in civil society.

The major premise for such a foreign policy would not be rejecting the strategic game between major powers but rather pursuing major power relations through the Japan-US security relationship. The strategic weight of US-China relations has a considerable impact on Asia's political system, and Japan and the other countries of East Asia do not have the capability to develop independent strategies in this regard. Though situated between the US and China, Japan should resist the temptation to view Japan-US-China relations from an equidistant stance. Japan and the rest of East Asia should adopt a similar perspective in addressing the US-China strategic relationship, establishing multilateral cooperation as a basic principle. Upon this will rest the basis on which the countries of Asia will welcome Japan-US security relations as an element of stability.

Creating a self-image for Japan is a major precondition for formulating a basic stance on Japan-US relations, but even more important is that this will provide a basis for Japan to engage in "dialogues among equals" with its East Asian neighbors.

The first and most important partner for such dialogue is Japan's next-door neighbor, South Korea. It has become almost second nature for the vast majority of South Koreans to view Japan through the "major power" lens. It is highly probable that the Korean peninsula will see an acceleration of changes in the circumstances surrounding North Korea. Should that occur, it is also likely that Japan's response will not be taken for what it actually is by South Koreans looking at it through the lens of "major power diplomacy." Cooperation with South Korea is the very foundation on which Japan constructs its policy towards the Korean peninsula, and the South Korean people must be convinced through dialogue and exchange via all possible channels that Japan's actions are not simply diplomatic tactics but substantial responses arising out of Japan's self-image.

The conventional stereotypes of Japan in the area of political security have for the most part disappeared in Southeast Asia. Japan is exceedingly indifferent, however, to the tendency of Southeast Asian countries to regard Japan as basically an "extra-regional major power." If close attention is paid to this inclination, the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia has great potential as a means of implementing multilateral approaches in Asia. In that sense, Japan's conduct in principally Southeast Asian forums such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN + 3 is very important. Similarly, one can expect future implementation of the proposals in Prime Minister Koizumi's policy speech (January 2002, Singapore), which emphasized building momentum towards the creation of an "East Asia Community" with Japan-ASEAN relations at the core.

　

The 21 ^st century was once optimistically termed the Asian Century and in particular the Chinese Century, but a more cautious view has become prevalent of late. Even so, later historians most likely will acknowledge the rise of China from the late 20 ^th century to the early 21 ^st century as an important event in world history. China is undoubtedly a key element to be examined when considering Japan as an integral part of Asia.

China already boasts the sixth-largest economy in the world. The inflow of foreign capital and systemic reform that the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will promote are expected to further invigorate China's economy. China perceives itself as a regional power in the process of developing into a global one and, as certainly the only regional candidate for superpower status, its presence in the region and around the world appears to be growing day by day.

Nevertheless, Chinese society is facing many serious problems. Public funds have had to be used to cover an accumulation of bad debts, leading to an increasing dependence on the issue of government bonds that, together with the difficulty of structural adjustments and the aging of the society, will likely pose increasingly serious challenges as we move deeper into the century, as will environmental problems stemming from economic growth and widening income disparities between regions and social strata. Rising pluralism and a diversification of views in Chinese society are also putting pressure on the authorities to carry out political reforms. The authorities have made a point of utilizing nationalism as a centripetal force for national unity, but skillfully controlling such a force without error is by no means an easy matter.

The reality of China is complex and many-sided, and its presence has a double meaning for East Asia. As economic competitors, the countries of ASEAN see the emergence of China as the "sole winner" as a threat, though at the same time they also have high expectations of attracting Chinese capital and of exporting some of their goods to China. There are some in Japan, too, who perceive China as an economic threat, but Japanese companies have expanded their business as China has grown. All of the countries of East Asia can benefit by utilizing the rise of China, and the worst-case scenario would in fact be a disruption in the Chinese economy leading to political instability. Unproductively warning China's imminent collapse or portraying China as a clear and present danger should be avoided; instead the realities of China need to be grasped.

Despite its efforts to ensure a peaceful international environment for the sake of economic development and to maintain and develop cooperative relations with other countries, China faces the dilemma that achieving growth to the degree that it appears to be the "sole winner" will provoke concern among its neighbors of "a Chinese threat."

To allow everyone to benefit from the "asset" of Chinese growth, therefore, China has sought to avoid isolation by forming multilateral frameworks that will bring about a "win-win" situation. Some Chinese also place a practical emphasis on frameworks of regional cooperation inclusive of the US in light of the close interdependence between the countries of East Asia (including China) and the US. It is important that we endeavor to offer indirect support to those on the side of greater cooperation with the international community in policy disputes within China. A key element in pursuing both global international cooperation and harmony within Asia at the same time will be the incorporation of China as a trustworthy member into the East Asian community.

　

The process of regional formation in East Asia has been one of "regionalization." What forces are at work in this regionalization process?

Both the security and trade foundations of the East Asian regional system were built by the US. Hence American guarantees of security in East Asia and access to US markets have become preconditions for the continuation of the East Asia regional system. Americanization projects have been carried out on that basis, with their principal aim being to groom people sharing the same language and thinking about matters in the same way as Americans to manage systems (states) that are fundamentally the same as the American system.

Japanization, on the other hand, was premised on the success of Japan's "politics of productivity," its economic growth and its advanced industrialization. Japanization attempted to bring to East Asia economic growth, greater industrial sophistication, and political stability by way of extension through foreign policy approaches such as direct investment and comprehensive economic cooperation, and it entailed the expansion and further development of informal production and distribution networks by companies receiving policy-based assistance to expand into East Asia. "Sinofication," grounded on the presence of communities of Chinese descendants throughout Southeast Asia, involved companies run by these "locals of Chinese ancestry", who had gradually become a powerful force in East Asia's economic development from the 1970s, transcending national boundaries to become "transnational" companies and expanding and deepening informal networks of personal trust based on shared territorial bonds and blood relations.

Even today these forces still play a significant part in the formation of a regional order in East Asia. With the onset of the Asian economic crisis, Japan put forward the idea of an Asian Currency Fund and carried out the Miyazawa Initiative, and in 1999 it even began negotiations with Singapore on economic cooperation. Prime Minister Koizumi further proposed Japan-ASEAN economic cooperation during his 2002 visit to Southeast Asia. Why? Economic recovery in the ASEAN countries would be a big plus for Japan, and assisting these countries in overcoming the crisis and enabling them to return to the path of sustained growth was extremely important for Japanese companies expanding into Southeast Asia.

The same can be said with regard to China and "Sinofication." Unlike Japanization, however, Sinofication does not imply an extension of the Chinese model and Chinese economic power beyond the country's borders. "Sinofication" refers to the process whereby people who had long been settled in Southeast Asia and transformed from "overseas Chinese" to "locals of Chinese ancestry" expanded their economic activities across national boundaries from the 1970s, at the same time extending their informal networks among other "locals of Chinese ancestry" internationally. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone being proposed by China can be seen as a means of allowing "locals of Chinese ancestry" linked by these networks to engage freely in trans-national trade without being hindered by formal systems.

From this perspective, it appears that, despite a number of recent regionalistic initiatives, regionalization will continue to be the basic approach to regional formation.