by the Study Group on "Japan in Asia: What Should We Do?"

Leader: SHIRAISHI Takashi, Professor, Central for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

Members: SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University

TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, Rikkyo University

HAYASHIDA Hiroaki, Deputy Editor, International News Department, Yomiuri Shimbun

　

East Asia and Europe differ greatly in their approaches to regional formation, which can be described as "regionalization" and "regionalism" respectively.

After World War II, regional formation in both East Asia and Western Europe took place under American hegemony. In the early days of the Cold War, from the 1940s to the 1950s, the US was faced with two major strategic questions in both East Asia and in Western Europe. In East Asia, the first question was how to deal with the threat of international communism and how to contain China and, of course, the Soviet Union, and the other was what should be done to restore Japan economically and make it a US ally while at the same time ensuring that Japan never again posed a threat to the US. America's answers to these two questions were bilateral security treaties (with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, etc.), the construction of a regional security system comprising a series of base agreements, and, in the economic realm, the creation of a triangular trade system among Japan, the US, and Southeast Asia (as well as South Korea and Taiwan).

The two questions facing the US in Western Europe were how to deal with the threat of international communism in Western Europe and how to contain the Soviet Union, and what should be done to restore Germany (West Germany) economically and make it a US ally while at the same time ensuring that Germany never again posed a threat to the US. The US responded to these questions differently in Western Europe than it did in East Asia. To promote security, the US formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a collective security system, and to promote economic development, it supported European unification based on a French-German partnership.

The US thus made dissimilar strategic decisions on forming regional systems in East Asia and Western Europe. In combination with the two regions' historical experiences in the 20^th century, this resulted in decisive differences in the structure of their respective regional systems and in their approaches to regional formation. The greatest difficulty in Western Europe was achieving lasting reconciliation and peace between France and Germany, enemies in the two largest wars of the century. European integration was advanced ideologically on the basis of a Europeanism that conceived a community built on the self-identity of the region's peoples as Europeans, and set in motion politically by expanding the authority of, and systemizing, regional organizations on the basis of French-German collaboration. By contrast, nowhere in East Asia was there the political will to form such a community, and the ideology of Asianism, in which the various peoples of the region would commonly view themselves as Asians, has been almost entirely absent from regional formation in East Asia until very recently. Instead, the regional security and trade system constructed under US hegemony, together with the political successes of economic growth in Japan and "developmentalism" in the countries of East Asia, produced an echelon pattern of regional economic development with Japan in front, and the expansion and development of informal production and logistics networks through market mechanisms culminated in the latter half of the 1980s with East Asia becoming in effect a single economic zone. This is regionalization.

　

What forces are at work in this regionalization process in East Asia? Let us consider this question invoking the concepts of Americanization, Sinofication, and Japanization.

As was mentioned above, both the security and trade foundations of the East Asian regional system were built by the US. Hence American guarantees of security in East Asia and access to US markets have become preconditions for the continuation of the East Asia regional system. The project of Americanization has been carried out on that basis, with its principal aim being to groom people sharing the same language and thinking about things in the same way as Americans to manage systems (states) that are fundamentally the same as the American system. Japanization, on the other hand, was premised on the success of Japan's "politics of productivity," its economic growth and its advanced industrialization. Through foreign policy approaches such as direct investment and comprehensive economic cooperation, Japanization attempted to bring to East Asia economic growth, greater industrial sophistication, and political stability by way of extension, and it entailed the expansion and further development of informal production and distribution networks by companies receiving policy-based assistance to expand into East Asia. "Sinofication," grounded on the presence of communities of Chinese descendants throughout Southeast Asia, involved companies run by these "locals of Chinese ancestry", who had gradually become a powerful force in East Asia's economic development from the 1970s, transcending national boundaries to become "transnational" companies and expanding and deepening informal networks of personal trust based on shared territorial bonds and blood relations. The "echelon pattern" of economic development that has become the engine for East Asia regionalization has only been achieved through a conglomeration of Americanization, Sinofication, and Japanization. This can be seen in the decisive importance of economic management by technocrats under a system of "developmentalism", direct investment and assistance from Japan, and the economic activities of overseas Chinese in East Asia's economic development; in more concrete terms, East Asian regionalization is the product of the expansion and development of the keiretsu networks of Japanese companies and networks established by "locals of Chinese ancestry".

　

Even today these forces still play a significant part in the formation of a regional order in East Asia. For example, Japan made a major change in its foreign economic policy in the period 1997-1999. Theretofore globalism had been Japan's guiding principle, with regionalism given little regard. Even though East Asia's regionalization had been driven by direct investment from Japan after the Plaza Accord, Japan's advocacy of globalism meant that it rarely if ever tried regionalistic approaches to such areas as currency and trade policy. With the onset of the Asian economic crisis, however, Japan put forward the idea of an Asian Currency Fund and carried out the Miyazawa Initiative, and in 1999 it even began negotiations with Singapore on economic cooperation. Prime Minister Koizumi further proposed Japan-ASEAN economic cooperation during his 2002 visit to Southeast Asia. Why the change? Economic recovery in the ASEAN countries would be a big plus for Japan, and assisting these countries in overcoming the crisis and enabling them to return to the path of sustained growth was extremely important for Japanese companies, which had already begun expanding into Southeast Asia during the 1980s. To put it another way, Japan's regionalistic initiatives, typified by Japan-ASEAN economic cooperation, are premised on the keiretsu networks of Japanese companies already in place throughout East Asia and are aimed at expanding and developing these networks (i,e., integrating local companies into these keiretsu networks).

The same thing could be said with regard to China and "Sinofication." Since the Asian economic crisis, it has become almost self-evident that China, with its remarkable economic development, will come to play a larger role in forming the regional order in East Asia. This seems a perfectly reasonable assumption given the strategic significance of the scale of China's markets and its economic development for the balance of power in East Asia over the long term, and is one reason for the level of attention being focused on the establishment of a China-ASEAN free trade zone. Unlike Japanization, however, Sinofication does not imply an extension of the Chinese model and Chinese economic power beyond the country's borders. It also differs from the "Sinofication = civilization" formula that characterized the tributary trade system under the Ming and Qing dynasties. "Sinofication" in essence refers to the process whereby people who had long been settled in Southeast Asia and transformed from "overseas Chinese" to "locals of Chinese ancestry" expanded their economic activities across national boundaries from the 1970s, at the same time extending their informal networks among other "locals of Chinese ancestry" internationally. These networks among "locals of Chinese ancestry" differ in character from the keiretsu networks of Japanese companies. Underlying these networks of "locals of Chinese ancestry" are ties of personal trust founded on shared territorial bonds and blood relations and, while the keiretsu networks are noted for their verticality, "overseas Chinese" networks feature horizontal structures. Over the past 20 years these networks have linked Shanghai, Xiamen, Canton, and other Chinese coastal areas with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and various parts of Southeast Asia, and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone being proposed by China can be seen as a means of allowing "locals of Chinese ancestry" linked by these networks to engage freely in trans-national trade without being hindered by formal systems.

From this perspective, it appears that, despite a number of recent regionalistic initiatives, regionalization will continue to be the basic approach to regional formation. With this in mind, what should be Japan's place within East Asia and what role should it play in future?

　

The position Japan should occupy and the role it should play in Asia's political system, above all in the area of political security, are issues for which neither Japan nor its Asian neighbors has an easy answer. While there are a number of reasons for this, the most important is that Japanese themselves have yet to establish a self-image for Japan.

Alongside the US, China, and Russia, Japan is often counted as one of the "four powers" in East Asia, and as such has frequently been accorded the status of "major power." Japan, however, has completely renounced the unilateralism characteristic of major power diplomacy, and has stayed away from the power politics among the major powers. Such approach might better be termed "middle power diplomacy." To put it another way, when Asian neighbors view Japan's diplomatic efforts in the area of security through the lens of "major power diplomacy," they are in effect directing groundless suspicion against Japan's motives, or viewing its efforts with concern for their potential as "major power diplomacy." When Japanese themselves speak of "major power diplomacy," they often do so as a critique of current state of Japanese diplomacy or as an expression of aspiration.

The fact is, however, that a Japanese foreign policy, reflecting the actual circumstances inside and outside Japan and suited to its life-size stature, would in no way resemble the strategic game played by the US and China. Its efforts and attention would instead be focused on the creation of "middle power networks" with the countries of Asia. The aim of such a foreign policy is to enhance relations with the countries of Asia, based in civil societies and as equals.

　

The strategic weight of US-China relations has a considerable impact on the regional system in East Asia. Japan must free itself of the bad habit of swinging back and forth as circumstances change in the rivalry and cooperation between the US and China. The US and China see each other as "strategic competitors" in the long term, and Japan and the other countries of East Asia do not have the capability to develop independent strategies in this regard. Consequently, Japan and the rest of East Asia must adopt a similar perspective in addressing the US-China strategic relationship, establishing multilateral cooperation as a basic principle.

A full-blown dispute between the US and China would greatly destabilize the regional system in East Asia. Cooperative relations between the US and China - in essence, the strategic co-existence of "strategic competitors" - are therefore desirable for the stability of East Asia. Japan is not capable of developing an independent strategy in the same dimension as US-China relations, though, and no attempt to do so would be constructive from the standpoint of stability in East Asia. Regardless of the level of stability in the US-China strategic relationship, Japan's strategic reference point is the US. Though situated between the US and China, Japan should resist the temptation to view Japan-US-China relations from an equidistant stance.

　

Creating a self-image for Japan is a major precondition for formulating a basic stance on Japan-US relations, and will provide a basis for Japan to engage in "dialogues among equals" with its East Asian neighbors. The most important partner for such dialogue is South Korea. A certain South Korean researcher has termed Japan "a superpower without action," and it has become almost second nature for South Koreans to view Japan through this type of "major power" lens. As a result, many South Koreans, including foreign affairs experts, believe without hesitation that the reunification of the Korean peninsula will rekindle the rivalry between Japan and China over the Korean peninsula. From this concern stems the logic behind asking the US military to maintain a presence there after reunification.

From Japan's viewpoint as well, ensuring a certain US military presence in Japan after the reunification of the Korean peninsula will likely continue to be an important issue. The logic in this case, though, is concern with the overall peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and not some competition between Japan and China over the Korean peninsula. This divergence in logic between Japan and South Korea over this issue, if left unaddressed, could disrupt the political system in East Asia after reunification.

It is necessary to bear in mind, too, the differing stances of Japan and South Korea towards China. With the exception of a few experts in international politics, South Koreans do not seem to exhibit any concern whatsoever about future Chinese moves in East Asia. On the contrary, they tend to pay great heed to Chinese sensitivities, determining on that basis the position South Korea should take on various issues in East Asia. In Japan, on the other hand, alarm over Chinese intentions has reached levels higher than justified by actual circumstances. Japan-South Korea dialogue must be enhanced for the purpose of developing a flexible view towards China.

It is highly probable that the Korean peninsula will see an acceleration of changes in the circumstances surrounding North Korea. Should that occur, it is also likely that Japan's response will not be taken for what it actually is by South Koreans, who are likely to look at it through the lens of "major power diplomacy." Cooperation with the US and South Korea is the very foundation on which Japan constructs its policy towards the Korean peninsula, and the South Korean people must be convinced through dialogue and exchange via all possible channels that Japan's actions are not simply diplomatic tactics but a substantial response arising out of Japan's de facto "middle power diplomacy."

　

Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia ranks alongside its relationship with South Korea in terms of importance. The conventional and stereotypical views of Japan in the area of political security have for the most part disappeared in Southeast Asia. Japanese contributions to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region through the Japan-US security alliance are basically welcomed, and the expansion of Japan's security role through the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and through the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act has been received positively in Southeast Asia. This relaxed atmosphere, however, has often made Japan indifferen to the tendency of Southeast Asian countries to regard Japan as an "extra-regional major power." Even if Japan were to adopt a diplomatic initiative from the same viewpoint and with the same aims as the countries of Southeast Asia, these countries would remain on their guard against the machinations of an "extra-regional major power," as evidenced by the reaction to Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama's proposal of a "political dialogue" in the early 1990s.

If close attention is paid to this inclination, the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia has great potential as a means of implementing multilateral approaches in Asia. In that sense, Japan's conduct in principally Southeast Asian forums such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN + 3 is very important, as is greater progress in Japan-ASEAN economic partnerships.