|
3. Biographies of the Mediators and Panelists
SHIRAISHI Takashi / Professor, The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University
B.A. (1972) and M.A. (1974) from University of Tokyo. Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1986. Served as Assistant Professor at University of Tokyo in 1979 and Professor at Cornell University during 1996-98. Current position since 1996. Concurrently, Faculty Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
SOEYA Yoshihide / professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University
B.A. (1979) and M.A. (1981) from Sophia University. Ph.D. from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in 1987. Served as Assistant Professor at Keio University in 1988 and Associate Professor at Keio University. Current position since 1995. Concurrently, Faculty Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
KIM Woosang / professor, Yonsei University (Korea)
B.A. from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in 1982, and M.A. from Syracuse University in 1984. Ph.D. from University of Rochester in 1988. Served as a Member of the Policy Advisory Committee, the National Security Council, the Republic of Korea, Associate Director of Institute of East & West Studies at Yonsei University. Concurrently, Chairman of Department of Political Science at Yonsei University and Research Director of CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific)-Korea.
Panitan WATTANAYAGORN / Professor, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand)
Ph.D. from Northern Illinois University in 1993. Served as Head of a Special Working Group on Security and Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister/ Minister of Defense Chuan Leekpai, and a Committee Member of the Subcommittee on Defense Capability within the Military Affairs Committee at the House of Representatives in the Parliament, and Director of the Defense Studies Program at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) in Bangkok. Concurrently, Advisor to the Strategic Institute of the National Security Council at the Government House, and Advisor on Security for the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center at the National Science and Technology Development Agency in Thailand.
ZHANG Yunling / Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China)
Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University during 1985-86. Served as Distinguished Visiting Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1997, Guest Professor at Chuo University in 1999, President at Chinese Association of Asia-Pacific Studies, Member of the China Standing Committee for PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) and CSCAP (the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific). Concurrently, Professor of International Economics and Director of Research Center of Regional Cooperation at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
TAKAHARA Akio / professor, Rikkyo University
B.A. from University of Tokyo in 1981, and Ph.D. from Sussex University in 1988. Served as Research Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Professor at Obirin University, and Assistant Professor at Rikkyo University. Current position since 2000.
ITO Kenichi / President & CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University, and entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at Harvard University from 1961-63. Served in the Japanese Foreign Service until 1977. Since 1982 Executive Director of the Global Forum of Japan. Since 1984 Professor of International Politics at Aoyama Gakuin University, since 1990 President of JFIR and since 1999 President of the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention.
(In order of appearance in the program)
4. Outline of Discussions Session I: "Self-Portrait of Japan"
1. The Gist of Professor Soeya's Keynote Presentation (the full text is attached)
（1）In East Asia, Japan has been accorded the status of "major power" alongside the United States, China and Russia. Despite this, the independent actions taken by and the power politics expected between "major powers" have rarely been a part of Japanese diplomacy. A network of "middle powers" should be constructed within the Asia-Pacific region and should play a pioneering and leading role.
（2）The China-U.S. relations have a tremendous impact on the stability of East Asia. Japan is not capable of directly involving herself in this regard. Japan and the other countries of East Asia should address the China-U.S. relations from a common standpoint, pursuing multilateral discussions as a general rule.
（3）To engage in the dialogues with the countries of East Asia, it is highly imperative that Japan establish her own self-portrait. It has become almost second nature in certain countries, particularly the Republic of Korea, to regard Japan as a "major power diplomacy."
（4）In view of the fact that the countries of Southeast Asia tend to regard Japan as a major power outside the region, the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia have considerable potential as a forum that weaves multilateral diplomatic efforts in Asia into networks for implementing multinational approaches.
2. Salient Points of Comments of the Three Lead Discussants
（1）Comments by Professor Kim
（1）Two important points that Japan must consider in developing this "middle power diplomacy" are （1） how Japanese themselves see Japan's behaviors, and （2） what Japan should do if neighbors do not regard Japan as a "middle power." In both cases, "persuasion" is the key. A public consensus must be built in Japan, and Japan's intentions must be thoroughly explained overseas.
（2）It is reported that people in the Republic of Korea believe that Japan's shift to a "normal country" will result in her becoming a strong military power. Therefore, it is understood what is considered to be essential is what the average think.
（2）Comments by Professor Wattanayagorn
（1）It is to be concluded that Japan will ultimately have to make decisions for herself, even if this does take time.
（2）There are still elements of instability in Asia, as seen in the problems on the Korean Peninsula, the India-Pakistan issues, and the Indonesian affairs. It would be acceptable for Japan to become a "middle power," but Japan must also play an active role globally in contributing to international security at the same time.
（3）"Middle power diplomacy" will be suitable, yet Japan seems to have already surpassed "middle power" status. Japan has played an adequate role as evidenced by her participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and the others.
（4）Further blustering Japan's role would be beneficial for Asia as a whole. Together with a clear definition of Japan and the United States relations and their alliance relation, it is to be expected that China will be more involved in maintaining stability in Asia and play more active role in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
（3）Comments by Professor Zhang
（1）China regards Japan as a major power in light of her technological capabilities, her giant corporations and her economic strength. Even though Japan is considered to be in the midst of an economic slowdown, Japan is still a major political and military power.
（2）Japan is in a unique position: she maintains a close relationship with the United States, the world's only superpower, even as she seeks for integration with East Asia. Japan's security and future will not be determined by the Japan-U.S. alliance alone.
（3）Rather than Japan and the United States serving as the mainstay of the region, more balanced Pacific relations should be established.
3. Free Discussions
（1）The behind-the-scene diplomatic intentions of Japan on becoming a "middle power" should be made a bit more lucid, in light of geopolitical and strategic approaches.
（2）Japan in the 21st century should seek to make those contributions that only Japan can make, not as a "middle power" but rather as a "unique power"; at the very least, the Japanese public should be encouraged to take a more outward-looking perspective.
（3）It should also be understood that Japan's Self-Defense Forces have no aspiration of becoming a major military force.
（4）Should all of the countries of Southeast Asia fail to come together in a single economic group, security problems will likely arise between them at some point. A single East Asia community should be formed not in response to pressures from the United States but rather through the power of the market.
（5）Requiring of Japan's present situation and potential strength with, there is a considerable gap between Japan's perception on one hand, and the perceptions of the Republic of Korea and China on the other, possibly due to dissimilar levels of development and freedom of the press.
（6）It is considered to be highly imperative to note that the sentiments of the Republic of Korea towards China contrast greatly with the ones of Japanese toward China. Careful thought must be given to determining why fewer people in the Republic of Korea are concerned about China as a threat and the hollowing-out of industry than in Japan.
4. Panelists' Responses to the Comments and Questions
（1）Responses by Professor Soeya
（1）While there is consensus in Japan on greater integration with Asia not just politically and economically but also culturally and socially, realizing such integration may require a paradigm change.
（2）Whenever Japan takes the initiative on the diplomatic front, the countries of Asia become apprehensive. Reflexively, their anxiety prompts them to begin seeking Japan's true intent.
（2）Responses by Professor Kim
（1）The Republic of Korea supports the maintenance by Japan of her alliance relationship with the United States, even after the reunification of the Korean peninsula.
（2）Japan's becoming a "middle power" will make herself be a normal country. Any revision of Article 9 of her constitution might result as a natural part of this process.
（3）The Republic of Korea would support Japan's attempts for a large role, not only in power politics but in human security, economic security, and environmental security as well.
（4）It is expected to observe Japan endeavor to get her message out, and to make all efforts necessary to encourage both the Republic of Korea and China to adopt a Japan-friendly stance.
（3）Responses by Professor Wattanayagorn
（1）Japan's persistence to historical and traditional approaches and her practices are considered to become a matter of concern for Asian countries, when she plays a larger role in the region. It is to be expected that Japan should transform herself as a regional country and, at the same time, a global state.
（2）It is expected that Japan expand her economic role as soon as possible to the social, political and cultural arenas as well.
（4）Responses by Professor Zhang
（1）Japan should note that closer and more direct relationships are emerging in the Asian region.
（2）Japan should not use the idea of "middle power diplomacy" to join together with other "middle powers" in creating a regional framework confronting with China. Japan and China need to collaborate in shouldering major roles in the region. Accordingly, Japan should not regard China as a distant acquaintance.
|
