The atrocious events of 11 September 2001 also introduced in IMO a new and very important series of responsibilities. The Organization started work in earnest and, two months later, the twenty-second Assembly adopted resolution A.924(22) entitled "Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships", requesting the Maritime Safety Committee, the Legal Committee and the Facilitation Committee, under the direction of the Council, to undertake, on a high priority basis, a review to ascertain whether there is a need to update any of the IMO instruments under their scope and/or to adopt other security measures, as necessary. In doing so, the Committees were also requested to take account of the work of other international organizations competent in the development of standards for transport-related safety and security by land, air and sea, such as the ILO and the WCO, as well as industry organizations, such as the ISO.

　

Since then, considerable progress has been made in the preparation of a meaningful regulatory regime that would provide the protection that passengers and crews and all those involved in port operations need and deserve. Additionally, the IMO has been channelling assistance to developing countries in an effort to contribute to the global initiative aimed at protecting shipping and port installations from terrorist attacks. Regional seminars and workshops already held in Mombassa, Singapore and Sydney will be followed by other training activities under the Organization's Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme.

　

IMO work on maritime security has been carried out so far by an Intersessional MSC Working Group on Maritime Security (11 to 15 February 2002); the Legal Committee (22 to 26 April 2002); the Maritime Safety Committee though four of its technical Sub-Committees and an adhoc Working Group (15 to 24 May 2002); the Council (10 to 14 June 2002); and, more recently, a second meeting of the aforementioned Intersessional MSC Working Group (9 to 13 September 2002). These actions, which demonstrate clearly the effort being put into achieving IMO's common objective of safe, secure and efficient shipping, have resulted in draft amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and a related draft Code for the security of ships and port facilities, as we will see in more detail later on, which will be considered for adoption by a Diplomatic Conference to be held from 9 to 13 December of this year.

　

　

The proposed amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention affect mainly chapter XI, currently entitled "Special measures to enhance maritime safety". The objective is to renumber this as chapter XI-1 and add a new chapter XI-2 entitled "Special measures to enhance maritime security".

　

On the maritime safety side, chapter XI-1 is to require that the IMO identification number be marked permanently and clearly visible on the ship. Under new regulation 5, the flag Administration will issue a Continuous Synopsis Record, which is intended to provide an on-board log with the history of the ship, including all registration details; name and address of the owner, bareboat charterer and shipping Company; all classification societies with which the ship is classed; details regarding ISM Code certification; and the date when the ship ceased to be registered with the State in question, if appropriate. These measures will encourage all the parties involved in the operation of the ship to give more importance to the need for transparency and accountability.

　

Maritime security as such is addressed in the proposed new SOLAS chapter XI-2. The new provisions add a new dimension to the Convention, in as much as they will apply, not only to the ship itself, but to port facilities serving ships and high-speed craft engaged on international voyages. Also very important, the proposed chapter XI-2 introduces the new International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities, or ISPS Code, consisting of Part A, which is mandatory, and Part B, which should be treated as recommendatory, as we will see later on.

　

Draft chapter XI-2 sets out the statutory requirements for ships and shipping Companies and lays down the degree of discretion that the master may exercise in ship security matters. On the equipment side, the new chapter will require ships to be provided with a ship security alert system which, if activated, will enable an Administration receiving notification of such alert to communicate immediately with the State in whose waters the ship is operating at the time.

　

The new chapter is also expected to contain port State control provisions, initially to verify that there is on board a valid International Ship Security Certificate, as required in new regulation 3, unless there are clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance with the requirements of the chapter or of part A of the ISPS Code in which case the officers duly authorized by the Contracting Government may take measures proportionate to the circumstances, such as delaying or detaining the ship, restricting its movements within the port or expelling it altogether.

　

Furthermore, a Contracting Government may require that ships intending to enter its ports provide specific information to authorized officers to ensure compliance with the new chapter prior to entering the port. so that the need to impose the proportionate measures just mentioned is removed.

　

　

As we have seen before, the proposed new International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities, the ISPS Code, comprises two parts. Part A contains mandatory requirements regarding the provisions of chapter XI-2, which we have just reviewed briefly, while part B has been drafted as guidance material and is recommendatory in nature.

　

The overall objectives of the Code are to establish an international framework involving cooperation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats, and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade. It will establish their respective roles and responsibilities and ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security-related information, providing at the same time a methodology for security assessments and ensuring confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures are in place.

　

The Code seeks to establish the guiding philosophy that will underpin the whole approach to maritime security. The essence of this philosophy is that, because each ship and each port facility present different risks, the Contracting Government should determine and set the appropriate security level. Security levels 1, 2 and 3 will correspond to normal, medium and high threat situations, respectively, and have the following meaning:

　

　

The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility. The Code will provide a methodology for security assessments to be made so that plans and procedures to react to changing security levels can be established.

　

As an example, at security level 1 the activities to be carried out onboard, taking also into account the guidance given in part B of the Code, would include:

　

　

Onshore, this level of security would require a number of actions within the port facility similar to those taken onboard but reflecting the physical and other differences between ship and shore.

　

Naturally, security levels 2 and 3, both for the ship and the port facility, incorporate additional protective measures specified respectively in a ship security plan and a port facility security plan, commensurate with the gravity of the situation. The ship security plan, developed on the basis of a ship security assessment and approved by the Administration, will have to be carried on board, as well as the Continuous Synopsis Record we mentioned when reviewing new SOLAS chapter XL-1. Similarly, the port facility security plan shall be developed and maintained on the basis of a port facility security assessment, and approved by the Contracting Government with jurisdiction over the port facility.

　

On the human element side, the Code will require shipping companies to appoint a Company security officer and a Ship security officer, both with specific functions and responsibilities. Conversely, a Port facility security officer shall be designated for each, or more than one, port facilities, also with defined duties and obligations. All the security officers will be required to undergo training as well as regular drills and exercises to ensure the effective implementation of the ship and port facility security plans.

　

Finally, each ship to which the new Code will apply shall be subject to initial, renewal and intermediate verifications to ensure that the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship complies with the applicable requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code and that it is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service for which the ship is intended.

　

　

I have mentioned before that the IMO benefits from the advice given by 61 non-governmental international organizations in consultative status. In fact, of these, ISO was the second to apply for observer status soon after the first IMO Assembly in 1959 and consultative status was eventually granted in 1961. The intervening 41 years since then have marked a long and fruitful period of collaboration between the two organizations, especially during the past eight years, where ISO/TC 8, under the able chairmanship of Captain Piersall, has been at its most active and productive as regards the work of IMO. Proof of this is the valuable contribution by ISO to the cause of maritime security concerning, among other initiatives, the international pilot effort in containerised cargo identification and tracking using electronic seals, details of which we have heard from Captain Piersall himself.

　

　

Throughout its work on maritime security, IMO has endeavoured to balance the need for a continued, seamless flow of international seaborne trade with the requirements inherent in any enhanced security measures. The Secretary-General has also called for balance in the matter of inspection and control of ships, and urged those Governments wishing to take preventative action and to put in place anti-terrorist defences as soon as possible that it would be prudent to wait until, after the Diplomatic Conference in December, IMO had adopted a meaningful set of international standards which would have been produced in the shortest possible time.

　

The importance of the forthcoming December Conference has been highlighted by the G8 Leaders who, at their summit at Kananaskis in Canada last June, focused on the issue of

terrorism and the need to protect shipping against terrorist attacks. The G8 Leaders clearly indicated that they expected IMO to take a leadership role in the promotion of the globally perceived need to protect shipping from becoming a target of international terrorism. By recognizing IMO's role in this world effort, they had indicated satisfaction with, and confidence in, IMO's swift, firm and decisive reaction to last year's tragic events and that they had great expectations of the results of the December Conference.

　

This is proof enough of the need to approach all maritime safety and security regulations from a truly international and uniform perspective.

　

　

The author wishes to thank the IMG Public Information Services for providing valuable background material in the preparation of this paper.