As mentioned above, for the purpose of the injury analysis, sales are based on sales contracts⁶⁰. The sales volume of each vessel is therefore attributed to the period in which the contact date falls.

　

　

Between 1997 and 1999, overall cgt volumes contracted show a clearly declining trend. This was also the case in a sector al perspective, except for passenger and RoRo ferries and other non-cargo vessels. As mentioned before, contracting activity in 2000 may be affected by the expiring availability of operating subsidies.

　

　

While average sales prices remained rather stable during the IP, prices for container ships declined between 1997 and the period January to November 2000, by around 5%. The decrease in this segment was more marked between 1998 and the period.

　

January to November 2000, i.e. 12%. In addition the Community industry could not sell certain shiptypes at all in certain years, for instance bulk carriers, between 1998 and the period January to November 2000, and oil tankers and product and chemical carriers, in 1999. As a consequence, for these sectors no data were available to establish the relevant price trend Prices for passenger and RoRo ferries slightly increased and the ones for other non-cargo vessels fell sharply in 1998, but then increased again.

　

Two scenarios were considered for the calculation of profitability: firstly, profitability was compiled taking into account the income (sales values) excluding operating subsidies. Secondly, operating subsidies have been added to the income. As the sales, these profitability figures relate to the contracts concluded in the respective periods. Therefore, for vessels still in the order book and not yet delivered, the latest estimation of the profitability was included. Profitability has been expressed as profit/loss in percentage of the sales value (excluding or including operating subsidies). For confidentiality reasons, only the trend of overall profitability is shown here.

　

　

On this basis, the overall profitability (excluding subsidies) remained negative throughout the IP. It fell between 1997 and 1998, then recovered between 1998 and 1999, but remained below the 1997 level. Between 1997 and 1999 the profitability situation clearly worsened for container ships. For certain other ship types this was the case in 1998 (oil tankers, product and chemical tankers and passenger and RoRo ferries). In 1999, profitability worsened in the sector of other non-cargo vessels.

　

　

The development of profitability by sector is not decisively affected by the inclusion of operating subsidies in the income.

　

　

Direct employment⁶¹ in the Community industry decreased by around 7% between 1997 and 2000.

　

Investments related to commercial vessels decreased by 24% between 1997 and 2000. These investments were not related to an increase in capacity but rather to the modernisation of technical equipment such as steel cutting and steel welding machines, investments due to new environmental regulations (painting halls) as well as maintenance.

　

During the IP, the product mix of Korean shipyards has shown a shift from less sophisticated products, such as cargo ships, towards more specialised products, such as passenger ships. However, no Korean shipyards produced cruise ships during the IP. This is indeed a segment in which Community shipyards have a historically strong position. Given the logistic situation (the majority of supplier and subcontractor companies is located in Europe) it is unlikely that in the future Korean shipyards will actually produce cruise ships at a large scale and at depressed prices. It is therefore concluded that there is no threat of injury for this market segment. As a consequence data relating to this type of vessel have been excluded from the injury analysis.

　

Korean shipyards, despite the fact that most of them co-operated in the investigation, did not provide to the Commission services data on their sales prices during the IP. As a consequence, the examination of whether the subsidised Korean shipyards undercut the prices of the Community industry had to be based on the best facts available, i.e. mainly information on Korean pices previously gathered by the Commission in the context of the Commission's reports to the Council on the situation in world shipbuilding. ⁶². These prices were then compared to prices provided by Community industry.

　

In order to ensure a fair price comparison, the latter was carried out for similar ship types. However a very limited number of types was found for which price data were available. On the basis of a comparison of sales prices for two RoPax ferries, twelve container ships and three LNG carriers sold by the subsidised Korean shipyards in question, with sales prices for vessels comparable in type and size sold by the Community industry, both expressed in , an undercutting ranging between 10 to 31% was established.

　

Considering the actual amounts involved and the financial burden imposed on shipowners (each vessel costs several $ US millions) such price undercutting is significant within the meaning of Article 6.3(c); indeed all factors remaining equal an undercutting range of merely 5% - 10% would suffice to guarantee an order. Therefore, undercutting reaching one third of the price of the vessel, as that established above, is very significant and injurious.

　

Several shipbrokers have submitted that one major reason for the Korean pricing policy during the IP was the depreciation of the Korean Won (KRW) in 1997. The following graph shows the development of the KRW versus the /Ecu and versus the USD during the IP.

　

The KRW has indeed depreciated against the USD and the /Ecu, particularly between October 1997 and January 1998. Given that a significant part of the costs of new vessels are denominated in KRW, this gave indeed an advantage to Korean shipyards in terms of USD prices. However, as has been shown above, during 1998, the year immediately following the currency depreciation, the Korean shipyards could not benefit from this situation, and their market share declined, as they were confronted with the non-availability of ship financing from domestic financial institutions . The KRW subsequently recovered from its lows and in November 2000, at the end of the investigation period, the depreciation versus the USD amounted to 36% since January 1997. However, the /Ecu also depreciated against the USD during the IP and therefore the depreciation of the KRW against the amounted to only 4% between January 1997 and November 2000.

　

Compared to European shipyards the short term advantage of Korean yards in 1998 therefore decreased considerably during the rest of the IP and was almost not existent at the end of the IP. In addition, account has to be taken of the medium term inflationary effects of the sharp depreciation, which increased wage and material costs to be paid in KRW.

　

It is therefore concluded that the currency developments may have given a short term advantage to Korean shipyards, but they are not the cause of the aggressive Korean pricing policy and subsequent injury suffered by Community shipyards during the IP.

　

　

Several shipbrokers suggested that Korean shipyards could offer low prices due to lower labour and material costs and due to economies of scale. In this respect, even if production costs were lower, this does not explain prices at a level where considerable losses are made⁶³, as happened during the IP, a behaviour that in the long term is only possible in the presence of subsidies. As to the economies of scale, they were obtained due to capacity expansions and investments that also could not have been carried out in the absence of subsidies.

　

Shipbrokers also put forward that Korean shipyards also obtained contracts due to non-price criteria such as reliability, after sales service, punctual delivery, flexibility etc. This does, however, not explain the aggressive pricing policy pursued by Korean shipyards. On the contrary, such non-price advantages would have justified prices above the ones of Community shipyards. The investigation has shown that the price of a ship is by far the most important criterion for shipowners to decide where to place orders.