The most important component of the new framework for protection of the marine environment introduced through UNCLOS is the system for enforcement by coastal states. As discussed earlier, UNCLOS recognizes the jurisdiction of coastal states to protect the marine environment in their own EEZs. However, this right is different from the coastal states' "sovereign right" explore and development living resources in their EEZs (Article 56, Section 1 (a)) and their "exclusive right" to construct artificial islands and other structures there (Article 60). Formerly, the EEZs were high seas, where responsibility for pollution of the oceans rested exclusively with flag states. In those earlier times coastal states made great efforts to gather evidence of pollution, taking photographs and testing water quality. They then related this information to the flag states, entrusting them with the task of applying the appropriate measures under the flag states. domestic laws. Within this legal framework, countries were required to accumulate oil registers, which were checked whenever ships called at port. Thanks to unification of standards for land-based waste-oil processing facilities and ship facilities, the creation of an international cooperative framework for enforcing regulations on the waste generated in the course of normal shipping is under consideration. Also tabled for discussion is port state control, in which port states examine the seaworthiness of ships calling at their ports. These efforts are all directed toward reducing the volume of pollution caused by ships at sea. However, in the actual event of a disposal violation, even within coastal states' territorial waters, coastal states can only force vessels to dock at port to obtain proof of violation unless the violation qualifies as "harmful passage." Even this limited action loses effectiveness in the process of reporting to flag states. To eliminate improper intervention in shipping by coastal states and protect the interests of international shipping, responsibility for enforcement rests with the flag state. Regardless of the impropriety of acts of pollution at sea, UNCLOS supports the responsibility of flag states to prevent and restrain the pollution of the marine environment by their own ships (Article 211 , Section 2, and Article 217). The freedom of passage recognized for ships in high seas is also upheld for EEZs (Article 58) and great discretion is called for regarding the intervention of coastal states in the passage of foreign ships to prevent or restrain marine pollution in the coastal states' EEZs. However, pollution by foreign vessels in territorial waters and EEZs has an impact on the general marine environment, and the effect of this pollution on the coastal order and on the living resources of the EEZs. For this reason, UNCLOS provided new recognition of the extension of the legislative jurisdiction of coastal states to EEZs in order to protect the marine environment. At the same time, in certain cases the coastal states' enforcement measures based on these laws are recognized. These provisions constitute the enforcement system of coastal states.

　

The enforcement mechanisms of coastal states consist of numerous restrictive and protective measures stipulated to protect shipping from improper intervention by these states (Chapter 12, Article 7).First, domestic law applying to EEZs must be harmonized with international standards; enforcement based on violations of coastal states' laws alone is not recognized Coastal states cannot simply apply their own independent sets of strict standards (Article 211, Section 5). Their legal jurisdiction over violations in territorial waters is broader; only their authority to enact laws with respect to the right of innocent passage is restricted (Article 21 , Section (f), Section 2). Second, in punishing legal violations, corporate punishment is prohibited; only the imposition of fines is recognized (Article 230). In practice, efforts are made to avoid actions that may render vessels unable to travel. The third point, closely related to the second, is that a system is in place to ensure prompt release upon deposit of collateral (Article 20, Section 7).The purpose of this provision is to minimize coastal states' ability to intervene indefinitely in shipping to enforce their laws. Fourth, except in the case of violations in territorial waters, procedures by flag states take precedence (Article 28, Section 1). The primary responsibility for control of acts of pollution in EEZs falls on the flag states. Exceptions can be made, for example, when acts of pollution by foreign vessels in EEZs causes especially grievous harm to coastal states, or when such ships repeatedly violate their responsibilities. Within the limits of this framework, then, coastal states can exercise their right to enforce the application of their own laws with respect to foreign ships.

　

UNCLOS provides detailed, phased stipulations on coastal states' rights of enforcement that are separate from these protective measures. If a violation occurs in a coastal state's territorial waters or EEZ, and the infringing ship is then freely docked at a port of its choosing, the coastal state can initiate punitive measures for the violation. In such cases the coastal state's actions do not constitute intervention in shipping, and the regulations are relatively simple because the measures to protect the interests of shipping as described above are fully upheld. If the infringing ship is asked to return to its original port, however, the process becomes a coercive one, and the "freely docked" condition is thought to be annulled. A different scenario unfolds if a foreign ship commits a violation while passing through the territorial waters of the coastal state. In this event, if clear and sufficient reason exists to believe that an infringement has occurred, even ships on innocent passage can be stopped for a physical inspection of the ship's documents and the like. Unless such a search turns up irregularities with documents, such as false statements, incomplete documents or missing documents, the coastal state is not entitled to any further physical search of the vessel. If the results of the physical search reveal evidence that the intervention was warranted, only then is the coastal state able to begin punitive procedures, including detention.

　

In the next scenario of interest, a foreign ship that has committed a violation in a coastal state's EEZ is presently passing through its own country's territorial waters or EEZ. In this case, a physical search cannot be carried out immediately; the coastal state can only request the ship's classification and ask at which ports the ship called immediately before and after calling at the coastal state's ports. This state of affairs maintains the balance that allows foreign ships to travel through EEZs with the same freedom as in high seas. Even if the ship refuses to divulge the requested information, or the information it gives is clearly false, the coastal state cannot proceed to a physical search unless it is clear that major pollution of the marine environment has occurred or actual emissions have occurred that render such pollution imminent. In other words, violation of the laws of the coastal state is not sufficient grounds to mount a physical search. Indeed, even if major pollution of the marine environment has occurred or actual emissions have occurred that render such pollution imminent, and a physical search confirms that a violation has occurred, the coastal state cannot immediately initiate punitive measures such as ship seizure. To initiate such procedures, not only must the violation have resulted in major pollution of the marine environment, but major damage must have occurred to the state's coast, related interests or the resources of its EEZ; or actual emissions must have occurred that render such pollution imminent. In other words, the coastal state's ability to take action is limited to cases where major damage to the resources of its EEZ have occurred or are about to occur because of a major emission violation that has already happened. The actions available to the coastal state depend on whether the event was an actual emission that caused significant pollution of the marine environment or an actual emission that caused significant damage to the individual interests of the coastal state beyond such pollution. Only in the latter case is the coastal state's right to apply and enforce its own laws recognized while the precedence of the flag state's procedures is not. To state this in the opposite way, the right of the coastal state to conduct a physical search in the event of significant pollution of the marine environment of its EEZ exists for the purpose of giving force to the flag state's exercise of authority under strict adherence to international standards. This is because enforcement by the coastal state in its own EEZ does not represent punitive measures in place of the flag state in accord with international standards.

　

The laws coastal states may enact regarding EEZs are limited to those that accord with and are used to implement international standards. However, UNCLOS provides no specific indication of what these international standards mean, effectively making UNCLOS little more than an umbrella. For the moment this umbrella covers standards set under treaties adopted by the IMO. Sometimes, however, the flag state or coastal state is not a signatory to those treaties. In such cases the question arises: How can the laws of coastal states that conform to these standards be applied against countries that are not signatory to the treaties on which they are based?

　

One key omission in UNCLOS pointed out long ago is the lack of any regulations to deal with vessels that commit a violation in a coastal state's territorial waters and then proceeds into the coastal state's EEZ. Opinions on the measures available to coastal states in such cases are divided. Some observers interpret Article 228 Section 2 to focus on the location of the violation, whereas others interpret Article 220 Section 3 to focus on the present position of the vessel. From the point of view of coastal states, protective measures and standardization of domestic laws already exist to avoid improper intervention of coastal states in shipping, so the location where the violation occurred is decisive. This is consistent with the fact that the precedence of flag states' procedures does not extend to violations in other countries' territorial waters. From the point of view of the ship, however, if no proof exists to show that a suspect vessel is the same vessel that committed a violation in territorial waters and is now passing through the EEZ, the recognition of enforcement by the coastal state raises the prospect of inviting improper intervention in shipping, and therefore enforcement should not be recognized beyond the exercise of a general right to pursuit. This reasoning is the same as when a foreign vessel has committed a violation in territorial waters and is presently passing through international waters. As stated earlier, UNCLOS provides a series of phased measures to follow if a foreign vessel has committed a violation in the EEZ and is presently passing through the FEZ, and Article 220 Section 2 clearly applies when the coast is strongly threatened with environmental damage. Although UNCLOS applies numerous restrictions, in this case alone the treaty compromises the interests of shipping, by recognizing the exercise of coastal states' authority. In the case of particularly egregious pollution of the marine environment, if the violating ship and a suspect ship are established to be one and the same, it is possible that measures by coastal states focusing on the location of the violation may be recognized. Even if the vessel is passing through the EEZ, if the violation is on a sufficient scale to cause significant damage to coastal interests and marine resources as stated in Article 220, Section 5, it should normally be easy to establish the identity of the ship as the culprit by following its wake, In practical terms, requiring a ship passing through the EEZ to call at the nearest port represents coercion. Also, it would be pointless to interpret such clearly coercive action as if the violating ship were freely docking at a port of its own choosing in the coastal state, thus enabling the application and enforcement of the coastal state's domestic laws (Article 220, Section 1).

　

In any case most of the regulations on enforcement by coastal states extend such rights to the coastal states but do not obligate coastal states to enforce their laws. Also, even if a coastal state does not enforce its laws, this does not absolve the flag state of its duty to enforce regulations for the protection of the marine environment in its own ships. To promote the protection of the marine environment, coastal states' jurisdiction clearly has to be strengthened; as discussed earlier, a broader interpretation of the system of mandatory ship routing and enforcement by coastal states in EEZs has been shown to be effective. At the same time, to ensure the economic benefit of port states when ships call at their ports, focus is placed on international standards to restrain improper intervention in the passage of ships. In this sense UNCLOS is "vessel-friendly," and moves are afoot to recognize the jurisdiction of coastal states, whose current position is that of a victim who receives only disadvantages from the status quo. If they wish to arrest this movement toward a broader interpretation of the enforcement rights of coastal states and support the interests of international shipping, flag states will need to fulfill their obligations correctly. Particularly in the case of the flag-of-convenience system, if the shipping activities of the flag states involved were in the control of their peoples, the people would have a personal connection to their ships. The flag states would then be obliged to establish measures under international cooperation to intensify the exercise of their jurisdiction to prohibit and restrain pollution caused by ships.

　

When Japan ratified UNCLOS in 1996, the Diet passed the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf ("the EEZ Law") and revised the Law on Prohibition of Marine Pollution and Disasters at Sea ("the Marine Pollution Prevention Law"). In Article 1, Section 1 of the EEZ Law, the EEZ is established as an area of sea where the "sovereign and other rights" described in Chapter 5 of UNCLOS are exercised. In Article 3, Section 1, laws for the "protection and preservation of the marine environment" are listed as those applicable to the EEZ. It is on this basis that the Marine Pollution Prevention Law is applied, but this can only be applied within a range that accords with international standards. Article 3, Section 3 states, "the areas of sea to which this Law applies are those outside the nation's territorial waters, in a range recognized to be necessary in consideration of the special conditions of the areas of sea in question. The arrangements and adjustments necessary in relation to the application of this Law shall be determined by cabinet order." Article 4 states, "Where particularly stipulated in

treaties governing the items stipulated in this Law, the stipulations of said treaties shall apply." This means that the context of application of the law can be adjusted by cabinet order and is upheld within the framework recognized for the nation's exercise of jurisdiction as a coastal state. This suggests that the development of the law of the sea will be handled more flexibly in the future. To put it another way, by spelling out the detailed stipulations in the EEZ Law, Japan fails to clarify its stance on the interpretation of UNCLOS with respect to the protection of the marine environment. For example, if Japan enforces its laws on a passing ship as a coastal state, the nation's ability to initiate proceedings against passing ships, including seizure, depend on whether the result of the violation is damage to the marine environment or significant damage to the interests of the nation's coast or its living resources. This ambiguity raises numerous questions of which standards to use to judge the matter and whether the flag state's jurisdiction takes precedence over the coastal state's junsdiction when the two conflict, as well as questions of procedural adjustment. In all of these cases, great differences in approach in the enactment of law will arise, depending on whether the law is enforced with emphasis on supplementing the junsdiction of the flag state or on an interpretation from the standpoint of measures against damage to Japan's interests as a coastal state. Because the EEZ is a functionally special body of water that is neither territorial water nor international water, junsdiction in such waters could be interpreted as corresponding to either international or territorial waters; UNCLOS is unhelpful in deciding in favor of one or the other. In sum, much room for interpretation is left regarding enforcement by coastal states in EEZs. As a shipping state on the one hand and a coastal state on the other, Japan must take balanced national action through consistent implementation of national law, to point a way to the development of a proper interpretation of UNCLOS.