Admiral Zheng He's Seven Voyages to the "West Ocean" and China's Peace-loving Tradition
China is a peace-loving country. The year 2005 is the
600th anniversary of Admiral Zheng He's first voyage
to West Ocean" (refer to West Pacific and India Ocean). In the seven voyages the
Ming-Dynasty admiral led in the 15th century, the ships
he commanded were fives times longer than those of the celebrated Portuguese explorer
Vasco da Gama. And once he led a fleet with more than 300 oceangoing vessels and
a crew of nearly 30000 men, ten odd times bigger than any of the fleets Columbus
commanded nearly a century later. The vessels, described collectively as swimming
dragons", boasted as many as nine masts apiece, and the largest could hold 1000
people.11 They carried soldiers, doctors, cooks, interpreters,
astrologers, traders and holy men. The seven voyages extended for 28 years (1405-1433),
covered a total of nearly 300000 km, roughly equivalent to 7.5 circumnavigations
of the world, and landed about 40 countries. The farthest land they reached was
East Africa (now Somali and Tanzania). Recently Mr. Gavin Menzies, a retired British
naval officer even said that in the 6th voyages led
by Zheng He, one branch of his fleet had passed the Cape of Good Hope, ferried
across the Atlantic Ocean, and reached America, approximately 100 years before
Columbus's "discovery" of the New Continent. Some people said Zheng He's men had
reached Australia far before the Western people. Mr.Menzies's new idea, of course,
need more evidences and further studies. However, his approaches have drawn the
interests of the academic circle all over the world. And he just publishes a book
these days.
Admiral Zheng He's voyages indicate, at that time (the early period of 15th century) China was the "superpower" as well as the strongest sea power in the world. Yet his voyages were peaceful in nature. Under his leadership the Chinese sailors mainly exchanged goods with the natives, never conquered colonies, oppressed the natives or robbed the wealth of the people, in stead, they did bring China's advanced productive technology and culture to those areas.
Needless to deny, at that time, the Chinese emperor regarded China as "Middle Kingdom", the center of the world, and regarded himself as the son of the Heaven, and held that foreign countries should honor him as the emperor of the world and provide tribute to him. One mission of Zheng He's expeditions authorized by the emperor was to propagate the power, prestige and civilization of Ming China and to collect tributes from foreign states. But the emperor also adopted a "give more, take less" policy, ordered the admiral and his sailors brought a lot of Chinese products, including cloths, silk, tea, porcelains to exchange the "tributes". So actually the native countries got much more than they offered.
According to the history, the Chinese navy commanded by Admiral Zheng He only used forces in three cases. One was for cracking down the sea pirates, one was for self-defense, only one could be regarded as intervention of a foreign nation's internal affairs. Hence Zheng He was not only a great explorer and naval commander, but also a great diplomat, a peace agent, a pioneer of foreign trade. He was by no means a "conqueror", as some Westerners alleged. As a matter of fact, he hadn't conquered any foreign countries and put them under the rule of Ming China. That's why up-to-date the people of Southeast nations remember him, worship him as a god. In some places of those countries, you can still find the "San Bao Tai Jian"(the honorary title given to Zheng He by the emperor) temples.
The Chinese government decides to hold big ceremony to commemorate the 600th anniversary of Zheng He's voyages in 2005. Its purpose is to advance and enrich the "Zheng He spirit", which, according to the Chinese leadership, can be summed in three points: heartily loving the motherland, establishing harmonious and friendly relations with neighboring countries and exercising scientific navigations.
China's Sea Defense Policy
600 years have passed, but China's peace-loving tradition remains unchanged. As known to all, China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. Its main goal is to preserve world peace and to promote common development, and to provide a long-term peaceful, secure and favorable environment for China's modernization. China will never seek hegemony. At present, China is still a developing country with low GNP per capita (this year it may reach 1000 US$) Even China achieves its long-term goal and become a mid-developed country in 2050 (its GNP per capita might reach 5000 US$ at that time), it will not seek hegemony, either in the world or in the Asia-Pacific region. Hegemonism is opposite to China's peace-loving tradition, and is harmful to the interests of the people and the country.
According to the state goal, China's sea defense is defensive in nature. The Chinese navy now pursues an offshore defense policy. Its mission is to contain and resist foreign aggression from the sea, to defend territorial integrity, and to safeguard the unity of the motherland and its maritime rights and interests. As currently the Chinese navy is still very backward, it can't even match Japan and India, not to mention the United States, China, of course is planning to strengthen its naval forces. However, this is very limited and should not be exaggerated. So far Chinahas no plan to develop a "blue-sea" navy and has no plan to build aircraft carriers.
Regarding the maritime territorial and jurisdictional disputes, China insists to solve them with the countries concerned peacefully through negotiations. The solution of the territorial disputes over the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu) between China and Vietnam is a good example. In December 2000, the two countries signed a treaty on the demarcation of the Gulf. The Treaty has not been approved by the legislatures of the two countries yet, and therefore, has not been published. And it is informed that there are some difficulties in the implementation of the Treaty, including the adjustment of the fishery areas of the two sides. However, it is a significant success.
Since many disputes related to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights are very complicated, sensitive an impossible to solve at present, China suggests the relevant countries might shelve the disputes for some time to come and work jointly to explore and to exploit the maritime resources.
In terms of the Spratly Islands disputes, China insists its sovereignty according to international law and historical facts, meanwhile China insists to solve the disputes with the countries concerned peacefully. When the disputes between China and a certain country sharpened, China used to take a restrained altitude, as people see clearly in the Mischief case occurred in 1995 between China and the Philippines. In fact, in the past decade, while insisting its sovereignty, China had made important policy shift on the Spratly Islands issue, including openly recognizing the disputes are negotiable in 1990;12 announcing that China would like to settle the disputes with relevant countries according to the international law including the UNCLOS in 1995;13 changing its original position that China should discuss the Spratly disputes with the country concerned on a bilateral (one versus one) basis, and discussing the issue with ASEAN countries on the 10 + 1 summit in 1999;14 jointly working with ASEAN countries to draw up he "Code of Activities in the South China Sea".15 On November 4, 2002, China and the ASEAN countries jointly issued the "Declaration on the Code of Activities in the South China Sea". The Declaration stresses that the relevant countries should solve their disputes over the South China Sea peacefully through friendly consultations and negotiations, and should keep restrained before the disputes are solved. This is an important step forward to alleviate the tense situation in the disputed areas. It also signals China's conciliatory altitude on the Spratly issue.
China holds similar position on the Senkaku disputes. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping visited Japan, some people raised the Senkaku issue at a press conference, Deng answered, "We have disputes with Japan on this issue. The name of the Islands in the two countries is different. China calls the islands Diaoyu Dao, while Japan calls them Senkaku. This problem could turn on for a certain period. Maybe the next generation, who are much more clever than us, will find a way to solve it. " Later Deng said, "Just at that time I think probably we can shelve the sovereignty disputes and jointly exploit the resources."16 The Chinese government endorses Deng's idea, and hopes to reach an agreement with Japan for joint exploration and exploitation. China also holds that before an agreement is reached, the two sides should exercise restrain and cautious, avoid the intensification of the disputes.
China is a signatory country of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and will strictly abide all the laws and regulations set by the Convention. China respects the freedom of navigation, and is willing to cooperate with other countries to safeguard the free navigation. In May 1995, China's Foreign Ministry issued a statement, saying "While safeguarding its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and its maritime rights and interests, China will fulfill its duty of guaranteeing freedom of navigation for foreign ships and air routes through and over the international passage of the South China Sea according to international law."17 However, China holds that any ocean powers should respect the sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights in the economic exclusive zone (or contiguous zone) of the coastal countries, military actions or semi-military actions are not in conformity with the principle of innocent passage. China is willing to negotiate with the United States to solve the disputes. Before the disputes are solved, it is absolutely necessary that the relevant countries adopt some measures to prevent collisions of ships or aircrafts such as the EP3-E incident in 1998, China and the United States had established a Maritime Consultation Mechanism (MCMA), and the consultation has been resumed after the EP3-E incident. China hopes further confidence-building measures and crisis-preventive mechanism could be established between the two countries in this respect, so as to avoid new collisions.
The disputes between China and Japan over the activities of survey ships in East China Sea are not a problem related to the principle of free navigations but a problem related to the disputes over the demarcation of the continental shelf. The latest round of frictions followed a sharp rise in the number of Chinese survey vessels in the past several years, in the areas that Japan considers to be within its own EEZ. Japan wants notification before Chinese marine research ships enter its EEZ. China says that it does not recognize the EEZ announced unilaterally by Japan and that its activities are in accordance with international law. However, later the Chinese government adopts a conciliatory posture, reaching a consensus with Japan that both sides should notice the other side when its survey vessels enter in the disputed areas. In December 2001, some warships of the Japanese NSDF entered in the Chinese EEZ to purchase a suspicious ship and finally sank it with bombardment without prior notification to the Chinese Government. This is a violation of China's sovereign rights. Later the two countries reached an agreement through consultation. Japan recognized China's sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ, and China agreed Japan to get the sunk ship out of water after Japan went through necessary procedures. This is a good instance of solving disputes through negotiations.
Some Japanese people fear that if the two sides across the Taiwan Straits achieve reunification, China will border on the Pacific Ocean directly, thus constituting a threat to Japan's lifelines, the sea line of communication passing through the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, and the sea line passing through the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean and the Pacific coast of the United States and Canada. This is totally groundless. After reunification, there is absolutely no reason for China to change its independent foreign policy of peace as well as its agreement with Japan to establish a good neighborly, friendly and cooperative partnership for peace and development, also there is no reason for China to violate its commitment to respect the freedom of navigation. In addition, China pursues a "peaceful reunification and one country two systems" policy, and tries its best to solve the Taiwan issue peacefully. According to the "one country two systems" policy, after the peaceful reunification, Taiwan will keep its troops, and the central government will not dispatch troops to stay in Taiwan. That means the PLA will not set military bases on the island (in the case of peaceful solution). So, where are the direct threats over Japanese lifelines from?
Approaches to Build a Peaceful and Secure International Sea Order in the Asia-Pacific Region
For maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and ensuring the security of the sea lines of communications in the region, it is important to build a peaceful and secure international order of seas. Following are some approaches:
(1) Under the auspices of the United Nations, launch a new round of dialogues among all countries concerned when conditions are mature, to discuss the differences exposed in the implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including principles about how to define the baseline of territorial waters, principles of delimitation of maritime boundaries in sea areas, principles about how to ensure freedom of navigation while safeguarding sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights of the coastal countries, etc, so as to make some revisions and supplements to the Convention. No doubt the participation of the United States is a necessary precondition for the new dialogues. Hopefully, it is informed that the United States will ratify the UNCLOS some time in next year. Before the beginning of the official dialogues, dialogues sponsored by the NGOs are also very important, and should be supported and encouraged, so as to form more and more consensus, paving way for the official dialogues.
(2) Review and sum up the experiences of solution of the maritime sovereign and jurisdictional rights disputes, and further promote negotiations between relevant countries to solve more disputes. So far there are two kind of approaches: one is solution of the disputes through bilateral negotiations, for instance, solution of the disputes of the Gulf of Tonkin, as mentioned above; some Southeast countries also have the experiences to solve their sovereign disputes through negotiations. Another one is, tries of settling the disputes through the decision of the International Court, which have happened between some Southeast nations.
(3) Promote joint exploration and exploitation in the disputed areas. Establish more joint development zones based on common interests of the relevant coastal countries. It is desirable that the developed countries and the big multinational petroleum corporations help to promote the joint exploration and exploitation, which surely will be to the great interests of the coastal countries and the multinationals as well as peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, any arrangement of joint development should get the agreement of all claimants.
(4) Before permanent or temporary settlement of the maritime sovereign and jurisdictional disputes, the relevant countries should establish more confidence-building measures, either bilateral or multilateral, through negotiations as soon as possible. The 1972 "Incidents at Sea" agreement (INCSEA) between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) has proven effective in regulating the interaction of their fleets on the high seas. This successful experience could be learned and followed. The "Declaration on the Code of Activities in the South China Sea" is a good example of multilateral CBMs. Probably the relevant countries could establish similar CBMs in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
11 |
Time magazine (Chinese version), October 2001, No.70, p. 101. |
12 |
Before 1990, China held the Spratly issue was related to Chinas sovereignty and could not be negotiated. |
13 |
Vice Premier Qian Qichens statement on ARF, June 1995. See Survey of International Affairs, 1996, p. 242. |
14 |
Premier Zhu Rongji attended the 10+1 meeting in November 1999. See Survey of International Affairs, 2000, p.168, 333. |
15 |
Before 1999, China held that any regulation on the South China Sea would impact Chinas sovereignty and stood against ASEAN countries initiatives to draw such a code. |
16 |
Deng Xiaoping Work, Volume3, The Peoples Publishing House, Beijing, 1993, p. 87. |
17 |
Beijing Review 8-14, 1995, p. 22. |
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